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Decentralisation is a tool that’s advocated for to govern health services by academic literature 
and development agencies. Its popularity stems from the notion that decentralisation 
increases local capacity by delivering efficient administrative and decision-making systems. 
Advocates of decentralisation further postulate that decentralisation allows for government 
to be closer to the people and is, therefore, a more responsive tool in improving delivery of 
social services and addressing poverty at local levels. Despite its popularity, critics of 
decentralisation often suggest that its success is dependent on the type of decentralisation 
that is implemented in specific contexts and how the implementation strategies relate to in-
country institutional arrangements and capacities. In spite of its critics, decentralisation has 
over the years continued to dominate the development agenda in both developing and 
developed countries, especially in the health sector. In Zambia, since 1992 governments have 
implemented health sector decentralisation with varying degrees of success.  
Therefore, this thesis seeks to examine why and how health sector decentralisation has been 
implemented in Zambia since 1992. Drawing on conceptual literature and historical 
understandings of decentralisation processes, the research uses the health policy triangle 
framework (HPTF) developed by Walt and Gilson (1994); to understand the content, context, 
processes and actors involved in Zambian national decentralisation processes between 1992 
and 2018. The thesis uses two specific examples of decentralisation processes – the health 
reforms of 1992 to 2006; and the devolution agenda that started in 2002 to date.  
Based on textual analysis of policy documents and on qualitative field research conducted in 
Zambia between February 2018 and August 2018 – forty-three (43) interviews conducted in 
total - the thesis makes contributions through a number of original insights and conclusions 
related to the practice of decentralisation for health service governance in Zambia. First, it 
shows how policy ideas come to the forefront of policy agenda and how and why these ideas 
come to be widely accepted in local policy practice in Zambia. Second, it locates the ensemble 
of actors and how they come to interpret policy ideas. Third, it demonstrates how actors’ 
interactions shape policy interpretation and implementation. Lastly, it shows how 
international policy agenda engulfs local policy practice in Zambia and how the conglomerate 
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Introduces the Research topic - Decentralisation and Health Service Governance  
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and health sectors in developing countries 
 
Explains the theoretical and practical benefits of the study – the importance of the 





Decentralisation is a concept that has come to be widely linked with democratisation and 
development in developing countries (Olowu, 2003; Smoke, 2003). Although ideas of 
decentralisation have a long history rooted in attempts to push back the dominance of central 
government in administrative, political and fiscal control (See Fesler, 1965, Treisman, 2006), 
in recent years it has been promoted as a public sector reform policy that can promote good 
governance, improve the delivery of public services, and enhance public management and 
accountability (See Mills, 1990; Conyers, 2003; Smoke 2003, Brinkerhoff, 2004). 
Decentralisation is believed to deliver a number of benefits - and thus its adoption by 
developing countries has been widely supported by bilateral and multilateral agencies (Crook 
2003, Ribot, 2003). Yet, in practice, decentralisation has often failed to yield the expected 
results (see Mills, 1990; Prud’homme, 1995). This has led to debates among academics and 
practitioners on the value of implementing decentralisation, and the recognition that, even 
though it may offer substantial benefits in theory, in practice the success of decentralisation 
can be challenged by domestic politics, structural constraints, and bureaucratic 








For most sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries, decentralisation has been pushed by reformers 
(politicians, academics, practitioners, multilateral and bilateral development agencies) with 
the belief that it has the potential to transform public institutions and build systems that are 
more responsive to people’s needs and foster public accountability, which is often seen as 
lacking - and which in turn is seen as an impediment to economic growth (cf. Brinkerhoff and 
Goldsmith, 2002). These beliefs were popularised as a result of the political-economic 
environment in the late 1980s, when most sub-Saharan African countries were deemed to 
have poor governance structures that were blamed for economic underperformance and 
poor service delivery (Van de Walle, 2001a). Admittedly, most sub-Saharan African countries 
were characterised by poor health indicators, low investments in the health sector, and 
generally weak institutional capacities to manage health services (see, Baylies and Szefel, 
1992; Kalumba, 1997; Van de Walle, 1999; Burnell, 2001). In addition, most of the developing 
countries in SSA in the late 1980’s were governed by authoritarian regimes that had tight 
control on resources with poor accountability and widespread corruption (see, Van de Walle, 
1999). Therefore, reforms in which decentralisation policies were embedded were employed 
as part of structural reforms in an attempt to create better organised regulatory frameworks, 
rules and procedures and strengthened institutional capacities (Van de Walle, 1999). The 
intention of the reforms was to reduce the role of the state (central governments) in 
economic and social activities (cf. Baylies and Szeftel, 1992).  
 
Nonetheless, the implementation of reforms did very little to achieve good governance, let 
alone improve service delivery. By 2000, policy discussions emerged focussing on attempting 
to understand the failure of decentralisation policies in SSA contexts (see Brinkerhoff and 
Goldsmith, 2002). Most stated that the failures of decentralisation policies in SSA were due 
to failures of implementation (Burnell, 2001; Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith, 2002) rather than 
any deficiency in the idea of decentralisation itself. In the health sector (the focus of this 
thesis), it was widely noted that the stated benefits of health sector decentralisation were not 
automatic and guaranteed, with most literature advocating for the generation of thorough 
theoretical and practical evidence that could improve the chances of health sector 
decentralisation achieving the desired outcomes (Conyers, 2007).  
 
Despite the doubts expressed in the literature with regards to whether decentralisation (in 
general, and in the health sector specifically) is beneficial in practice or not, decentralisation 
policies continue to be implemented across the world. Most African nations, and many 
international development partners, continue to see it as a key development policy tool (see, 
Hartmann and Crawford, 2008). Zambia – the focus of this thesis – is no exception. As this 
thesis goes on to explore, over recent decades, successive Zambian governments have 
promised to implement health sector decentralisation – and have done so with varying 
degrees of success. But in the case of Zambia – as in many other African countries who have 







have affected the success (or otherwise) of decentralisation efforts. Instead, the debates in 
the literature have often operated at a high level of generalisation, with the concept 
problematised and idealised in general without documenting what actually makes it work (or 
not) in practice.  
This thesis seeks to contribute towards filling this knowledge gap by delineating how, in the 
Zambian case, decentralisation policies have been pursued in practice over time. But rather 
than attempting to evaluate the effectiveness or otherwise of decentralisation policies (for 
example, by attempting to quantify their impact on health outcomes over time), this thesis 
concerns itself with the policymaking and policy implementation processes and how these 
have affected (and been affected by) health governance at different levels within Zambia.  
The thesis concerns itself with the ‘pluralistic’ nature of policymaking, and considers what 
health sector decentralisation policies in Zambia were claimed to deliver on one hand, and on 
the other hand what happened when they were implemented – both idealistic and realistic 
ideologies (see Walt, 1994, p.49)  
The substantive research question the thesis addresses is:  
Why has decentralisation persistently featured in policy discussions over health 
service delivery in Zambia, and how have decentralisation efforts affected, and been 
affected by, the governance of health service delivery in practice? 
In order to answer this overarching question, the thesis addresses the following sub-
questions: 
a.  What has driven the adoption of decentralisation policies in Zambia’s health 
sector? 
b.  What factors have enabled/inhibited Zambia’s health sector decentralisation 
processes? 
c.  How has political and bureaucratic action at different governance levels influenced 
health decentralisation policymaking? 
d.  How has political and bureaucratic action at different governance levels influenced 
health decentralisation policy implementation? 
e.  What implications do the answers to a, b, c and d have for arguments about 
decentralisation as a health sector reform tool (in Zambia, and elsewhere)?   
To address these research questions, a qualitative methods approach was used.  This 
included: i) a comprehensive review of international and national level secondary and raw 
data on decentralisation and health service delivery; ii) an analysis of policy documents on 
decentralisation in Zambia from government, donors, and non-governmental organisations 
which informed the research on factors that have helped to drive/inhibit decentralisation 
processes in Zambia; iii) semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders to capture their 







informal follow-up conversations were conducted with participants who had given interesting 
views during the interview processes on their roles as policy actors and how they interpreted 
the controversies surrounding government dominance and donor influence in the Zambian 
decentralisation agenda. This allowed for the capturing of views that some participants were 
only willing to share off record), also a key strength of the methods utilised. The participants 
for these discussions were drawn from the donor community, government Ministries and 
agencies. A total of forth-three (43) key informant interviews were conducted. In whole, 
participant's perspectives helped in understanding the power relations and negotiation 
processes involved in the decentralisation agenda.  
This combination of literature reviewing, documentary analysis and key informant interviews 
allowed for the research to; i) trace the history of Zambia’s attempts to decentralise its health 
system (sub-questions a, b); ii) understand how political and bureaucratic actions have 
affected policymaking and implementation (sub-questions c, d). In the conclusion, the 
research draws on this material to consider the implications of the findings for 
decentralisation more widely (sub-question e). 
What is decentralisation and how did it become linked to development? 
In the development literature, decentralisation is understood to mean the 
distribution/sharing of functions, resources and power by central government to lower levels 
of government (see Schneider, 2003; Rees and Hossain, 2010). Thus, for much of the 
literature, decentralisation is measured according to how far central governments go in giving 
autonomy to lower government levels for decision making; ceding tighter controls of fiscal 
operations; and how much political space is given to lower levels to enable participation 
(Schneider, 2003; Manor, 2006).  
Although decentralisation policies date back as far as the 1950s, it was not until the 1980s 
that development agencies popularised them as a way of addressing development problems 
in underdeveloped economies (Smith, 1985, p23). The poor economic performance in SSA 
was often blamed on autocratic government regimes that exercised tight controls over 
economic resources, and in which government spending on services did not benefit the 
populous but instead was seen to have bred corruption and political patronage (cf. Gilson and 
Mills, 1995). Decentralisation was thought to offer the opportunity to create pathways to 
initiating supportive contexts governed by legal frameworks and the creation of governance 
structures within local areas that would be responsible for decision making and accountability 
(see Gilson and Mills, 1995, Romeo, 2003).  
 
As a result of these ideas, in the 1980s, many developing countries began to implement some 
form of decentralisation policies (see Hartmann and Crawford, 2008). Scholars, for example 
Smith (1985, p41) and Conyers (1984a; 1984b), tried to understand why governments were 
adopting decentralisation policies, and to trace the influence of development agencies’ 








On the question of why development agencies were so keen to promote these policies, their 
answers rested on the desire to improve accountability and responsiveness, taking 
government closer to the people and empowering communities, in the process fostering 
citizen participation (Crook, 2003) and making public officials accountable to the populous. 
Other arguments that emerged about the positive effects of decentralisation included 
reducing abuse of power by central governments (because by transferring some functions to 
lower levels of government, central government’s powers are limited) and allowing for 
opposing groups and other minorities to have a degree of control of local jurisdictions (see 
Faguet, 2013). The belief was that decentralisation’s ability to foster local decision making on 
one hand gives central governments the opportunity to better understand local problems and 
develop appropriate responses, while on the other hand it fosters efficient development of 
local plans and appropriate mechanisms in the use of resources because of existing local 
accountability (Mawhood, 1983; Ribot, 2003). Overall, then, development agencies saw 
decentralisation as a means to address political instability, to drive democratisation, and most 
importantly to improve the delivery of social services (Conyers, 1986b; Mills, 1990).  
Internally, decentralisation policies were widely accepted by governments in SSA because 
they coincided with domestic political reforms pursued by new governments who were tied 
up with international demands and agenda around institutional reforms and debt 
restructuring (see, Gilson and Mills, 1995).  
However, the more decentralisation policies were implemented in developing countries, the 
more difficult it became to rely on evidence that decentralisation actually delivers what it 
purports to (see Olowu, 1989; Manor, 2006).  
Critics of decentralisation policies claimed not only that such policies do not deliver the 
purported benefits, but that they also create other problems such as increased corruption, 
marginalisation of smaller groups (for example ethnic minorities), bloated budgets, and 
disparities in regional development and functioning. Most of these arguments were 
substantiated by evidence from a plethora of African countries that had implemented 
decentralisation policies with limited results during the 1980s through to the 1990s - notably 
the works of Rondinelli et.al (1983), Conyers (1986a, 1986b), Smith (1985, p55), Olowu (1989), 
and Mills (1990). Moreover, within SSA some of the opposition to decentralisation related to 
the postcolonial power dynamics of the ways into which it was introduced by development 
agencies. 
Second, critics also contend that it is difficult to determine the extent to which 
decentralisation has happened in countries, as many governance systems exist in a ‘grey area’ 
(Fesler, 1965) where some power or discretion is transferred to lower levels, but at the same 
time central governments will always have the obligation of performing certain functions such 







Third, some localities tend to have better resources than others and therefore 
decentralisation becomes difficult to measure in such circumstances as it can be uneven 
across a country (Fesler, 1965, Conyers, 1986a), creating regional economic disparities in 
terms of wealth and benefits and distorting some aspects of policymaking processes (Hadiz, 
2004). 
For the purposes of this thesis, and as it will be discussed in Chapter Two, the focus is on how 
decentralisation affects service delivery - to be specific, health service delivery, as the health 
sector has been an area in which decentralisation has been commonly implemented as a 
policy designed to achieve health systems goals. The thesis does not take a principled position 
on whether decentralisation is or is not in theory a good policy approach. Rather, it regards 
decentralisation as a policy tool that can in principle contribute to the achievement of certain 
development goals (including health system goals), while taking into consideration that, like 
any other policy making and implementation process, decentralisation is affected by existing 
socio-economic conditions, political and bureaucratic factors. Thus, rather than debate 
whether or not Zambia has been right to pursue decentralisation of its health sector, the 
thesis attempts to provide a more contextually grounded discussion of why Zambian 
governments have chosen to do so, and what factors have (positively or negatively) affected 
the success of decentralisation. In the next section, the thesis briefly outlines the rise of health 
organisation reforms in Zambia, which are covered in more detail in Chapter Three.  
The rise of Organisational reforms in Zambia’s health system 
While decentralisation has been the main feature of the health sector reform process in 
Zambia over recent decades, the agenda has largely been implemented in isolation of the 
broader national decentralisation process.  For example, in 1995, the government of Zambia  
introduced legislation through Cabinet Circular No 1 of 1995 to strengthen the operations of 
provincial and district levels of government, including legislation that mandated local councils 
to operate a wide range of services (GRZ, 2002).  These actions were considered part of the 
national agenda to decentralise a broad range of services through empowering lower levels 
of government. However, at the same time, the government separately passed the National 
Health Service Act of 1995 to specifically implement health sector decentralisation (revised 
DIP, 2009 – 2013). Neither of these government actions delivered significant change with 
regards to empowering and strengthening local councils which to date remain underfunded 
(cf. GIZ, 2016). 
 
In 2004, when a new National Decentralisation Policy was launched, government set an 
ambition that health sector decentralisation was to operate under the umbrella of the 
National Decentralisation Plan. But again, this policy remained unimplemented and was 
retargeted for implementation in January 2016 (to date, the policy remains unimplemented). 
During this period, the health sector tried to implement various reforms which were not part 







Act was repealed, and the Health Management Boards, and the Central Board of Health, were 
abolished (MoH SDP, unpublished). Furthermore, between 2011 and 2014, there were other 
organisational reforms in the public health service which affected the delivery of health 
services. This included the creation of additional districts (from 72 in 2011 to 103 in 2014 and 
117 in 2018), and the realignment of the primary health care function at the Ministry of 
Health. In addition, HIV/AIDS services were decentralised through the creation of a separate 
set of structures and mechanisms. In addition, the management of the health sector has also 
involved some key events that have had an impact on health sector decentralisation as Table 
1 details.  
Table 1: Key Components of Zambia Health Sytems Reorganisation and Governance: 1992-2016 
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Boards at general 
and central level 
hospitals on basis of 
Medical Services Act 
of 1985 
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and Strategies  





































l Health Plans 
























First National Health 
Strategic Plan (NHSP) 
1995-1998 developed  
1995  Definition of 
Basic Health 
Care Package of 




 User Fees 
exemptions 
introduced 
 Revision of 
district RAF  





National Health Services 
Act legitimized, and 
establishes the legal basis 
for the creation of the 
Central Board of Health 
(CBoH), and District Health 
Boards 
1996  Creation of 
CBoH, which 
includes four 
regional offices  
 Medical Stores 
Limited (MSL) re-
organised1 
 MoH takes over 







1 When MSL was established in 1976, is was manufacturing, procuring, storing, and distributing essential drugs 
and medical supplies. In 1996, the process of restructuring MSL commenced. The key decision was to 
commercialise operations at MSL by contracting it out and restricting its functions to storage and distribution. 
Manufacturing of drugs and medical supplies was discontinued while the procurement function was transferred 












l Health Plans 




 Initiation of process to 
develop Comprehensive 
Health Financing Policy 
 NHSP 1998-2000 
developed 





out to GMR 









at district level 
 Cabinet approval of 
National Drug Policy 
Cabinet approval of 
National Laboratory Policy 
1999 Restructuring of 
CBoH and MoH  








   Cabinet approval of 
Reproductive Health 
Policy 
 Signing of SWAp MoU 
between MoH and CPs 













l Health Plans 


















Draft Code of Conduct 
(CoC) as an instrument for 
conflict resolution in the 
SWAp 
 
2004 MSL contracted-out 


























2005     Repeal of the National 
Health Services Act of 
1995 to pave way for 
the dissolution of the 
CBoH  
 Development of the 
NHSP 2006-2010 
 Signing of new SWAp 
MoU between MoH and 
CPs 
 
2 The medical levy was a 1% tax on interest earned on savings and deposit accounts, treasury bills, government 













l Health Plans 
2006  CBoH dissolved 
 Institutional and 
organisational 
restructuring of 
the health sector 
commences 
(MoH & Stautory 
Boards) 
  Some CPs 









 User Fees 
removed in all 
rural areas 
 
2007   User Fees 
removed in all 
peri-urban areas 
 
2009   Misapplication 
of funds leads to 
withdrawal of 
donor support, 
and casts doubts 




2010    Development of the NHSP 
2011-2016 
2011 Transfer of the 
primary health care 
(PHC) function to 
the Ministry of 
Community Devpt 
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in 11 districts 
countrywide 
Comprehensive National 
Health Policy developed  
2013   Medical Levy 
abolished  
Signing of new SWAp MoU 
between MoH and CPs 
2015 Re-merger of the 












organisation of the 
MoH 
   
Data sources with modification by author: Chansa 2009; Lake et al. 2000 
 
The ideals that lay behind decentralisation in Zambia reflect the general international 
consensus on the theoretical merits of decentralising health care: the proposed improvement 
in the quality and coverage of health care that would result. This was closely linked with the 
WHO’s 1978 Alma-Ata declaration3 which pledged to reduce health inequalities within 
 
3The Alma-Ata Declaration of 1978 emerged as a major milestone of the twentieth century in the field of public 
health, and it identified primary health care as the key to the attainment of the goal of Health for All. Among other 
things that were discussed and affirmed were the definition of health, the roles that governments, health workers 








countries, and between developed and underdeveloped countries, by the year 20004 (WHO, 
1986). The declaration emphasised community participation in planning and organisation of 
Primary Health Care, in the belief that community involvement yields better health outcomes 
leading to reduced health inequalities (WHO, Alma Ata declaration 1978). The Alma Ata ethos 
is constantly cited in almost all the Health Strategic Plans in Zambia and formed the core basis 
of the health reforms. Furthermore, these health sector decentralisation efforts in Zambia 
have received support from both bilateral and multilateral organisations, such as the World 
Bank, World Health Organisation (WHO) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) (cf. Kalumba, 
1994).  
 At the current time, Zambia’s health system remains relatively centralised in terms of 
operations, although with delegated responsibilities from the centre to the lower levels of the 
health care delivery system. This warrants in-depth investigation to interpret and understand 
what has happened to the implementation of decentralisation in practice. The Ministry of 
Health (MOH) plays a dual role of policy formulation and strategic planning and delivery of 
health services, with provincial and District Health Offices (DHOs) being upwardly accountable 
to the MOH headquarters (cf. World Bank, 2018). Provincial Health Offices (PHOs) oversee a 
number of Districts and are responsible for providing guidance in planning and budgeting, 
service delivery, financial management, procurement, and monitoring and evaluation. 
Delivery of primary health services is undertaken at district hospitals, health centres, and 
health posts, while DHOs are responsible for district-level planning and budgeting, fiduciary 
management, and monitoring and evaluation (World Bank, 2018). 
Zambia provides a useful case study in which to study health sector decentralisation because 
decentralisation has been the main feature of health sector reforms since 1992. This allows 
for investigation of why decentralisation was chosen as a policy option by several successive 
(sub-question a). The thesis examines the context and historical perspective of the health 
sector reforms between 1992 and 2018. To do so, a review of the policy objectives, and key 
political, managerial, technical and structural issues that have characterized the health sector 
reforms and decentralisation processes in Zambia was conducted, and they form the key 
aspect of the historical analysis as set out in Chapter Three. This provides some general 
understandings of the factors that have influenced decentralisation (sub-questions b, c and 
d), but such a historical review can only go so far. Therefore, the gaps were filled by 
conducting fieldwork focused on studying decentralisation in practice: its local rationales, 
drivers, and contextual factors that either aided or limited its ability to act as an effective or 
useful reform tool, allowing for a better determination of decentralisation embedded in the 
lived experiences of those who are affecting and effected the policy.  
 
4 In international policy theoretical explanations, the declaration implies how global set standards influence 
countries/states and the role of global organisations in exerting power to initiate new norms and models to change 









It is widely suggested that inefficient organisational arrangements lead to poor accountability 
and transparency and have a negative impact on health service delivery (not least in countries 
in SSA). Some of the frequently cited weaknesses include: (i) poor management of health 
services; (ii) health services not linked to the needs of the clients; (iii) clients having no say in 
the provision of health services; and (iv) no linkages between the communities and formal 
referral systems (See Andrews, 2011). It’s for these reasons that several developing countries 
have implemented health reforms with a view to better organise their health system for 
increased efficiency, improved accountability, and better health outcomes (Mills et.al. 2002). 
These reforms have taken many forms but can be grouped into four (4) categories: (a) 
organisational reforms; (b) financing reforms; (c) provider payment mechanisms and 
incentives; and (d) changes in the regulatory environment and legal framework (see Gilson 
and Mills, 1995; cf. Chitah et.al, 2018).  
 
Since 1992, the Zambian health sector has been reformed several times with a view to 
strengthening the health system and improving service delivery, generally with a focus on 
organisational and financing reforms (cf. Chitah et.al, 2018). Decentralisation (organisational 
and financial) has been the main feature of these reform process in Zambia and the ambition 
is to decentralise health service delivery based on the primary health care approach (MoH, 
1992). For example, the 1992 health reforms later led to the creation of community and 
district management structures, health management boards, the Central Board of Health, and 
the Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) - which in turn facilitated fiscal decentralisation (Chansa, 
2009, p18).   
 
As this PhD research project seeks to provide a wider evidence base on decentralisation as a 
health system reform tool as it has been practiced, it seeks to contribute to understanding 
Zambia’s historical successes and failures in implementing decentralisation policies to govern 
health services; the factors that have shaped decentralisation; local actions that have shaped 
and constrained decentralisation; and decentralisation’s effects on local political action, 
donor actions and policymaking.  In doing so, the thesis utilises the health policy triangle 
framework, which will be briefly introduced in the following section (with more details of how 
it is used to answer the research questions provided in Chapter Four).  
The Health Policy Triangle Framework 
The section begins introduces the health policy triangle framework. For the purposes of this 
thesis, the policy triangle provides a pathway to analyse policymaking and implementation in 
Zambia through: (i) how it emerges and develops (process and context) (ii) how it’s influenced 
and shaped by internal and external actors (e.g., by political actors, bureaucrats and donor 








The health policy triangle has been widely utilised to understand how health systems are 
managed in their entirety. The framework explores the roles, interactions and influence of 
‘actors’ on each other, and how their relationships and interactions ultimately affect health 
policy (Buse et. al, 2012). The framework also helps to create an understanding of how policy 
is formed, i.e. (i) what informs policy? (ii) how do health policies get on the national agenda 
and who tables them and why (Walt et.al, 2008) - hence the framework is used to understand 
policy processes in context. Furthermore, the health policy triangle exemplifies content, 
context, process and actors to represent the complex set of interrelationships to which health 
policies are subjected to (Buse et.al, 2012).  And in addition, the framework takes into account 
the fact that health policy is highly influenced by politics, from formulation to 
implementation.  
The health policy triangle was selected as the analytical framework to reflect the philosophical 
underpinnings of critical realism from which the research design has been approached. Based 
on critical realist approaches developed by Pawson and Tilly (1997), the research intends to 
interrogate the validity of assumptions and ideas about policy implementation, and to 
understand not only the outcomes that are produced from interventions, but also how and 
why they are produced - and the significance of the varying conditions in which interventions 
take place (Pawson and Tilly, 1997). In a nutshell, the research design aimed to interrogate 
policy programmes and how they are explained within social systems, with the assumption 
that “programs work (have successful outcomes) only in so far as they introduce the 
appropriate ideas and opportunities (mechanisms) to groups in the appropriate social and 
cultural conditions (contexts); therefore mechanism + context = outcomes” (Pawson and 
Tilley 1997; p56). Within critical realism, actors are regarded as being at the centre of 
interventions, because actors make (or don’t make) decisions in response to what 
programmes are supposed to be implemented. The reasoning behind this is that actors 
respond to resources and opportunities available to them, and their response produces the 
outcomes (Pawson and Tilly, 1997: p.85). Therefore, the policy triangle fits appropriately due 
to its normative orientation towards providing analyses on how contextual factors alter and 
moderate the predicted outcomes and presuppositions of decentralisation policy in achieving 
health system goals.  Furthermore it provides a framework to interrogate: 1) the roles played 
by various actors (the state, policymakers, providers, and citizens), based on 
decentralisation’s assumption that it creates effective interlinking mechanisms amongst 
actors (Bossert, 1998); 2) the context within which decentralisation policies are operating, 
that is the social, political and economic context in Zambia (which includes a historical 
perspective);and  3) the underlying assumptions that  decentralisation could lead to health 
system strengthening and improved delivery of primary health care services.  
In line with these commitments, the policy triangle framework positioned the researcher to 







policies have been introduced and why, how actors have engaged with the processes, and 
how the processes have produced the outcomes that they have in Zambia. In essence the 
interrogations were about what do we know about decentralisation in Zambia; and why has 
it yielded the results that it has. This enabled the researcher to understand decentralisation 
from experience and understanding the underlying institutions in the Zambian context which 
formed an important part of contributing to addressing the research question and generating 
the conclusions that are presented in Chapter Seven. Specifically, these conclusions are 
crucially important to the policy arena in Zambia because they make contributions to thinking 
about how the imminent devolution plan can contribute to better health outcomes.   
Ontological and epistemological commitments of the research framework 
The Zambian case study provides a unique context for studying health sector decentralisation 
because of the longstanding attempts at decentralisation that have been attempted over the 
past four decades. Given the ontological commitments of the research, the research had the 
task of unpacking how different actors’ roles tend to affect the way decentralisation operates 
in Zambia. This is in line with social constructionism which facilitates understanding the 
actions of social actors so as to place many different interpretations on the situations in which 
actors find themselves (Saunders et.al, 2009 p.111). In this regard, the interviews allowed for 
the analysis of how actors involved in decentralisation in Zambia perceive different situations 
in a variety of ways as a consequence of their interactions with the policymaking process 
(Saunders et.al, 2009). These different interpretations are likely to affect their actions and the 
nature of their interactions with others. In this sense, studying actors is not only about how 
they interact with their environment, but also how they make sense of it through their 
interpretation of events and the meanings that they draw from these events. In turn, their 
own actions may be seen by others as being meaningful in the context of these socially 
constructed interpretations and meanings (Saunders et.al, 2009 p111).  To state it in a more 
specific way as well as justifying the use of the health policy triangle framework; the 
framework allowed for understanding that the influence of politics on policy practice is a 
complex phenomenon, and that actors in policy process (at both the policymaking and 
implementation stages) exercise agency according to situations (Gilson et.al, 2018). 
Therefore, in the case of studying decentralisation in Zambia, the role of the researcher was 
to seek to understand the subjective reality of the actors in order to be able to make sense of 
and understand their motives, actions and intentions in a way that is meaningful.  
With regards to the epistemological commitments of the research, various methods were 
used to not only to understand the situational factors that have affected the implementation 
of decentralisation but also attach meanings and interpretations to actors’ behaviour and to 
understand why they make the decisions that they do in policy practice.  Specifically, the use 







where interviewees were required to explain, or build on, their responses with regards to 
their involvement and perceptions of decentralisation processes in Zambia. This formed an 
important aspect of the project’s interpretivist epistemology, helping the researcher to 
understanding the meanings that participants ascribe to various distinctive characteristics of 
policy processes in Zambia (cf. Saunders et.al, 2009 p.324). The value of in-depth interviews 
to the research was that interviewees identified unique characteristics that have driven 
decentralisation policies in Zambia, or rather how decentralisation agendas were brought to 
the fore on the national agenda. For example, two interviewees who were influential in 
driving the health reform agenda in the 1990s stated that they were able to command 
influence both at home and abroad regarding health sector reform because of their work 
experience and educational background (both had undertaken their studies in developed 
countries - one in the United States and the other in the United Kingdom), and in addition 
they both had political connections to the government through work relations. Such insights 
generated more meanings to add to the research: for example, in the stated case, it created 
an understanding that policy reformers are respected if they are regarded to have the 
necessary education and understanding of what policy reform is all about and that they need 
to be politically connected to initiate ideas (cf. Silverman, 2007).  And in fact, one of the 
interviewees put it clearly that this PhD study was highly relevant to policy development in 
Zambia especially for the health sector, but without any political connections the thesis would 
develop ideas that will be archived in the library, regardless of whether they were useful 
(Inter. 15 June 2018, former high-level manager MoH-pioneer of health reforms).  
 
A mapping process was undertaken to review three key decentralisation plans: the health 
reform process, the HIV/AIDS decentralisation process, and the national devolution plans. The 
mapping process enabled the research to identify the potential impact and risks of 
decentralisation plans to the overall policymaking process in Zambia. The backbone of 
mapping these processes was based on realistic evaluation where outcomes are explained by 
the action of particular mechanisms in particular contexts (Pawson & Tilley, 1997). Through 
the use of the policy triangle, further investigations were conducted on how Zambian 
governments make assumptions on the operations of decentralisation as a reform tool. That 
said, the value of the policy triangle to this research in this regard is that it positioned the 
researcher to interrogate the decentralisation policy documents, the environments in which 
decentralisation policies have been introduced and why, how actors have engaged with the 
processes, and how the processes have produced the outcomes that they have in Zambia. 
Similar to what has already been stated above; the interrogations were about; what should 
we know about decentralisation in Zambia, why is it popularised to govern health services; 
why does it yield the results that it does in the health sector and what does health sector 
decentralisation tell us about policymaking and socio-political processes in Zambia? This 







the underlying factors that called for decentralisation to be implemented. The understandings 
led to the conclusions as established in the last chapter. 
Importance of conducting the research 
The substantive research question arose as a result of my interest in health systems 
development in Zambia on a professional level – first, having worked for the Ministry of 
Health for a period of two years from 2008 – 2010 as a research officer on a national advisory 
committee that was mandated to set up a regulatory research body to strengthen Zambia’s 
health research agenda, so as to contribute to the strengthening of the national health 
research system and the health system itself (cf. CCGHR, 2010). Second, being a seasoned 
researcher in health promotion and having conducted studies that questioned the legitimacy 
of policymaking in developing economies, compelled further interests in studying why 
Zambia’s health system remains challenged in so many ways despite various efforts 
implemented by governments and donors to improve health policy and governance. At the 
time the idea for the thesis was conceived, between 2012 - 2015, Zambia was going through 
various political and administrative reorganisations (see, Chapters One and Three). Of 
particular importance politically, the Patriotic Front (PF) government had won the election in 
2011 having defeated the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) which had been in 
power for 20 years, from 1991 to 2011. The PF campaign had identified itself with unmet 
political and socio-economic demands for most Zambians, with health being one of the target 
sectors of their popularised campaign slogan “good health is an essential prerequisite for 
national development” - a slogan that probably won the sentiments of the electorate (see, 
Fraser and Larmer, 2007; PF Manifesto, 2011 -2016).  
The campaigns were widely premised on the promises of implementing decentralisation 
policies to take government closer to the people. And so, upon forming government in 2011, 
the PF embarked on acting on its promises, which did not necessarily fall within the existing 
national decentralisation plan policy that the previous government had (insufficiently) 
implemented. Among the key decisions was an executive order passed by the President, Mr 
Michael Sata, in 2012 to realign maternal and child health services from the Ministry of Health 
to the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services (MCDSS) (see, Chapter Three) 
while also having reaffirmed the commitment of his PF government towards implementing 
decentralisation to improve the delivery of health services through the National 
Decentralisation Plan policy (cf. revised DIP, 2009). Having been an ardent reformer of health 
services when he served as Minister of Health in the MMD government in 1995, at the peak 
of health reforms implementation, he was often praised for his good leadership in enhancing 
health service delivery (see, Chapter Five).  However, the demise of President Sata in 2014 
left the PF divided over succession; and in addition, when the party eventually won the by-
election in 2014 following the death of Sata, it was a new PF that rescinded the decision to 
align maternal and child health services to the MCDSS, and returned it back to the MoH 







that I started to question how decentralisation of health services should be implemented on 
the premise of delivering better health governance frameworks that can propel improved 
health services delivery in Zambia, considering that, previously, a number of decentralisation 
policies had been implemented with limited results (see Chapter Three). Crucially for the 
health sector, that is no existing legal operational framework: decentralisation, if 
implemented, was going to fill that gap (see, revised DIP, 2009). Zambia presents a unique 
case into which to study decentralisation because of three specific decentralisation processes 
with varied outcomes, the HIV/AIDS having been deemed as successful, the health reforms 
having been repealed and the stalled current devolution plan.   
Therefore, I considered that studying the case of Zambia would be a worthwhile intellectual 
journey that could provide useful insights for academics, development partners (multilateral 
and bilateral organisations) and policymakers in Zambia on approaches to decentralisation 
and health policy, explaining the contextualised interactions between institutions, interests 
and ideas in policy processes in Zambia (and, by extension, other low-and-middle income 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa (see, Walt et.al, 2008). Some may question why investigate 
Zambia and not another country with similar traits. Zambia was the focus of the study for the 
following reasons: 
 Failure to find effective means of managing health services. 
 Failure of decentralisation to attain health systems goals. 
 Despite the limitations, decentralisation continues to be pursued. 
 A large country with diverse cultures, economic pursuits etc. 
 Presents dynamism within context, for example rural areas versus urban areas.  
 Different donors involved in delivering health services – who bring along their own 
dynamics from their settings, including ideologies and political practises. 
 Health sector is underdeveloped with poor primary health care indicators. 
 Due to the nature of health services vis-à-vis institutional arrangements, 
decentralisation in Zambia is inevitable to deliver health services. 
 My own professional experience that could contribute to the research. 
 
Thesis contributions 
The thesis makes four key contributions, based on theoretical and empirical evidence. The 
first contribution relates to why Zambia has continued to attempt health sector 
decentralisation and why the attempts have yielded limited success due to the changing 
socio-political contexts.  The second contribution the thesis makes is about context and 
actors. The discussions relate to the power possessed by Zambian policy actors in driving 
policy agenda. Whereas there has been a push from international agencies with regards to 
legitimising the policy agenda through establishing legislative frameworks in developing 
countries like Zambia, where governance systems are relatively weak (see Reiss, 1985), the 
Zambian decentralisation cases demonstrate that local political practise continues to play a 







actors in policy practice (see Barnes, et, al, 2014. P.65), they are not silent but salient players 
regardless of policy agenda being funded by external resources. This is important in 
understanding the role of the Zambian state in relation to international donors. 
The third contribution is about the usefulness of the HPTF in locating how both local and 
international actors have emerged to shape policy agenda and how some actors have been 
left behind in policy processes but come to exert influence at the point they possess power 
to implement policy. The thesis shows that within the policy tier in the Zambian context, there 
is resistance to policy by bureaucrats throughout the health system as long as they feel that 
the policy does not serve their interests. The last contribution the thesis makes is on 
documenting the role of actors at all levels of the domestic health system, from the national 
down to the global, and the vital role that ‘non-political elites’ such as street-level bureaucrats 





This study is highly relevant to Zambia’s development ambitions because: i) it comes at a time 
when the National Decentralisation Policy plan, initiated in 2002 and launched in 2004, is 
about to be implemented; ii) it takes cognizance of several other organisational reforms in 
the public health service, such as the creation of additional districts (from 72 in 2011 to 105 
in 2014) and the realignment of the primary health care function at the Ministry of Health; iii) 
Zambia is currently transitioning from being a donor dependent to a self-sustaining country, 
and hence the need to strengthen governance systems.  
 
The study will therefore provide policy makers with: i) a historical perspective on how 
successive health sector decentralisation processed have impacted on health service delivery; 
ii) locate contextual factors which will; iii) inform current thinking on the planned 
decentralisation rollout, the three outlined areas are in line with Kuruvilla, et.al (2006) 
research impact framework which highlights that research should have impact on policy, 
service and society. Other impact to the research relates to the researcher’s positionality and 
dispositions to the research as will be discussed in the next section. 
 
Chapter Structure 
Having already provided an understanding of the overall focus and contribution of the thesis 
and the research question to be answered, it will be useful to map out the forthcoming 
chapters so as to demonstrate how the research questions are addressed by the thesis.  
The next chapter (Chapter Two) explores in more depth the nature of decentralisation as a 
concept and the rationales for the adoption of health sector decentralisation policies in 







this introductory chapter by characterising decentralisation; by discussing what 
decentralisation entails; by highlighting why it is favoured by some and not by others; and 
why some development advocates believe that decentralisation can trigger improved service 
delivery while others dismiss the idea. The Chapter also discusses the historical roots of 
decentralisation and its widespread implementation in African countries. The Chapter 
specifically asks why decentralisation has been promoted (not least by development 
agencies) to pursue health systems goals in African contexts, especially sub-Saharan African 
countries.  
Chapter Three provides a historical overview of decentralisation and health sector 
decentralisation processes in Zambia from 1990-2019. The chapter situates how and why 
decentralisation policies were adopted by successive Zambian governments. A number of 
critical points are raised here to highlight how decisions to manage health services at local 
levels were arrived at (i.e., sub-question a): What has driven the adoption of decentralisation 
policies in Zambia’s health sector?). The discussion also touches on how successive 
governments have utilised their political power to engage with decentralisation within and 
outside Zambia. The discussions in the Chapter also take note of the international pressure 
that Zambia is/was faced with in terms of implementing reforms, starting with the United 
National Independence Party that formed the government after independence from British 
Colonial rule in 1964 to the time that Zambia introduced political reforms that led to 
multiparty democracy.  
Chapter Four discusses the methodological and conceptual approach and the usefulness of 
the Zambian case to studying how decentralisation works in practice, considering the 
international normative consensus on decentralisation and how it applies to the Zambian 
context. Having already provided the historical contexts to the evolution of decentralisation 
processes in Zambia, this chapter incorporates the health policy triangle framework to 
provide explanations of why health decentralisation policies in Zambia are/were shaped and 
have produced the results that they have. In addition, the Chapter justifies the choice of a 
qualitative research strategy as appropriate for exploring health sector management using 
decentralisation policies because it reinforces the ontological and epistemological positioning 
of the research. To conclude, the chapter highlights the relevance of the study to health sector 
development and policymaking processes in Zambia.  
Chapter Five is the first of the two empirically grounded Chapters about the politics that have 
dominated the evolution of decentralisation processes in Zambia. Tracing the historical 
development of decentralisation through the health reform process, it considers how 
international influence shapes policy practise and the implications for policy outcomes and 
why the results did not match what was originally envisaged. The chapter argues that this is 
because the context into which these international ideas were introduced includes concealed 
power with the ability to shape the outcomes of the ideas introduced.  The usefulness of 







to explain why decentralisation policies were produced, promoted, and transferred, and the 
impact on policy relations and interactions within Zambia. Using the health reform process – 
which happened to be the first decentralisation policy idea that was transferred along with 
socio-economic reforms - the chapter discusses the roles of actors at international, national 
and local level in decentralisation – a key element of the health policy triangle framework. 
The Chapter focuses on understanding how the transferring of decentralisation policies 
shaped the understanding of actors with regards to the impact of the policy and how their 
roles shaped the evolution of policy practise with regards to decentralisation. In other words, 
the chapter examines how international ideas merged with local policy entrepreneurship. 
How do actors respond to decentralisation decisions, and how does their interaction with 
situational factors and with each other affect policy production? In doing so, the Chapter 
provides understandings of how actors exercise agency in policymaking and for the purposes 
of this study, it’s the agency exercised by actors that forms the focal point of how 
decentralisation policies affect the operation of health services delivery in Zambia (i.e., sub-
questions c) and d).   
Chapter Six is the second of the two empirically grounded Chapters. While Chapter Five 
focused on the health reforms, Chapter Six focuses on the devolution agenda in Zambia that 
began in 2002 but is yet to be fully implemented. The chapter has several overlapping ideas 
with Chapter Five but moves beyond that chapter to explain how and why the current 
decentralisation reform process has failed to be implemented. In particular this Chapter 
focuses on discussing how political actors in Zambia have repeatedly put this agenda at the 
fore of their campaign elections yet, when elected, have not followed through their campaign 
promises. Again, while the previously implemented decentralisation policies in Zambia (the 
health reform process and HIV/AIDS, as discussed in Chapter Three and Five) demonstrated 
how policy works in the Zambian context when produced and implemented through 
international/external influence and the impact on local practise and response, this Chapter 
is uniquely placed to explain the quest by sub-Saharan African Countries like Zambia to wean 
themselves off donor support. Thus, by using the devolution agenda, which is largely deemed 
to be domestically driven, this Chapter demonstrates how political practise has failed to 
sustain the reform amidst resource constraints, government transitions and suppressed actor 
participation. The chapter brings to the fore the complexities of implementing 
decentralisation embodied within the development lexicon and historical contexts explained 
by the academic literature (cf. Conyers, 1986a, Rondinelli, 1983, Brinkerhoff, 2004); that is 
the effects on decentralisation’s results when it is subjected to a variety of political decisions, 
specifically the impacts of the devolution agenda on health sector governance. In sum, while 
Chapter Five focuses on understanding the life of decentralisation processes rooted in 
international policies, this Chapter focuses on understanding why a decentralisation policy 
that has been anchored on principles of domestically driven policy agenda has faced 
implementation challenges, including creating a legal framework into which to embed its 







Chapter Seven forms the conclusion Chapter, which provides a robust discussion of the 
conclusions of the research and explicitly outlines the main contributions that the thesis 
makes to the existing literature on how decentralisation has been practised in Zambia.  The 
recognised limitations of the research are also discussed, along with the implications of the 
work for the future of decentralisation policies in the developing world (sub-question e). In a 
nutshell, this concluding chapter revisits the arguments that have been made in the thesis 
around decentralisation as a policy tool that can improve delivery of social services (more 
especially health in this case – the supposed claims for decentralisation to achieve health 
system goals) and more importantly achieve development goals in countries like Zambia. The 
chapter brings out a number of key learning points from the research to contribute to the 
gaps in the literature and identifies areas where improvements could be made when the 

































































Introduces the concept of decentralisation 
 
Explains the history of decentralisation 
 
Describes the rise of decentralisation in development policy 
 
States the reasons why decentralisation was popularised 
 
Examines the arguments in the literature 
 
Establishes the use of merits and critiques of decentralisation as a development tool 
 




Having introduced the research topic and the research questions in the previous chapter 
(One), the aim of this chapter is to examine existing debates and understandings related to 
the concept of decentralisation, as well as to investigate how decentralisation has been 
employed in public policy, within the development lexicon more broadly, and within the 
academic literature more specifically. As indicated in Chapter One, although decentralisation 
has been idealised by development agencies as a tool that can deliver development goals 
especially for the health sector, some literature suggests that there is little concrete evidence 
to track the specific impacts of decentralisation on health care systems, despite its 
widespread use (see Berman, 1995; Mohammed et.al, 2016). Others posit arguments on what 
really constitutes decentralisation (see, Smoke, 2003).  Moreover, there is a growing criticism 
suggesting that the decentralisation of health services requires proper planning for it to be 
implemented successfully, and in many settings, health reform systems are not clearly 
understood well, and the perceived benefits of decentralisation not well laid out (Berman, 
1995; Pollack, 2002). Bossert and Beauvais (2002) also note that understanding the effects of 
decentralisation requires new research efforts in order to better evaluate equity, efficiency 







decentralisation can effectively lead to the attainment of health systems goals without 
considering the environment in which it’s implemented, the capacity of the government to 
implement it, and the strength of lower levels of government where power and 
responsibilities intend to be shared (see Litvack, 1992).  
Given the existing debates and lack of existing literature on how the contextual factors that 
affect how decentralisation impacts upon health systems development, this chapter seeks to 
examine the debates and review the different understandings found in the literature of what 
decentralisation is, and how it shapes and is shaped by health policy practice. In doing so, the 
Chapter debates the fundamentals of decentralisation’s ethos and how they link to wider 
public policy making. The Chapter seeks to build on the discussion in Chapter One and further 
contribute to conceptual puzzles that emerge from the thesis’ substantive research question, 
which is:  
Why has decentralisation persistently featured in policy discussions over health 
service delivery in Zambia, and how have decentralisation efforts affected, and been 
affected by, the governance of health service delivery in practice?  
The Chapter explores, probes and problematises the concept of decentralisation in the 
development literature; explaining its emergence, what it is, what it purports to achieve, and 
why it came to be popularised as a development tool. As indicated in Chapter One, the thesis 
approaches decentralisation from a critical realist perspective, recognising that its ability to 
produce the desired outcomes is dependent on whether appropriate ideas and opportunities 
are introduced to a country/locality within appropriate socio-economic conditions. It’s within 
the socio-economic conditions (context) that the research framework – the health policy 
triangle - is embedded to offer a lens for the critical assessment of, first, why decentralisation 
ideas are introduced and, second, why they produce the results that they have in the Zambian 
health sector.  
The chapter begins by reviewing how decentralisation has been conceptualised in the existing 
literature. It then moves on to look at the history of decentralisation policies and the positive 
outcomes decentralisation has been claimed to produce (such as democratisation and 
accountability). Third, the chapter examines the critiques of decentralisation as a policy 
approach that are found in the literature. Finally, it examines why it has been particularly 
popularised as a reform tool in the health sector. In doing so, it lays the foundations for 
discussing the progression of decentralisation policies in sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries 
like Zambia (as outlined in Chapter Three) and demonstrates how a concept like 
decentralisation works in the health sector when subjected to four key elements – content, 









A review of the literature on decentralisation as a concept 
Decentralisation has been a prominent public policy concept since its original appearance as 
a policy management tool more than four decades ago (Smoke, 2010).  However, despite its 
widespread use, decentralisation as a concept remains ambiguous. This section starts with 
analysing decentralisation by defining the term, how it has been divided into a number of 
types and classifications, and how it came to occupy a prominent place on the development 
agenda. 
Defining decentralisation 
Decentralisation is a “concept that is used to denote the reallocation of power, authority, 
resources and responsibility from the centre to the periphery for political, economic, fiscal, and 
administrative systems” (Brinkerhoff & Leighton, 2002). Other general definitions of 
decentralisation suggest that it refers to “the transfer of responsibility for planning, 
management and resource raising and allocation from the central government and its 
agencies to: (a) field units of central government (b) subordinate units or levels of government 
(c) semi-autonomous public authorities or corporations (d) area-wide regional or functional 
authorities or non-governmental private voluntary organisations” (Rondinelli, 1981 p9; Mills 
1990). There is, then, general agreement in the literature that decentralisation refers to the 
moving of resources and power from the centre to lower structures, primarily in three main 
areas: fiscal, political and administrative (Schneider, 2003). 
Despite this apparent clarity, several conceptual debates have arisen in the literature. Within 
these debates, there are three main areas of contestation: the meaning of decentralisation 
(in that the term ‘decentralisation’ may imply different things within different contexts) 
(Conyers, 1986a); the difficulty of measuring decentralisation (how do we judge how far a 
country has decentralised? How do we know when decentralisation is complete?); and 
whether decentralisation is one thing, or whether different types exist.  
Despite this shared general understanding of decentralisation described above, the exact 
meaning of the concept has been a subject of widespread debate, particularly the application 
of the concept within public policy. These debates date as far back as the 1960s when the 
concept of ‘decentralisation’ was popularised in the policy development lexicon by the World 
Bank (see, Fesler, 1965). The lack of conceptual clarity could be explained by the fact that 
implementing agencies are more interested in the application of decentralisation and 
achieving its purported benefits, and less interested in debating its precise definitions. 
Academics, meanwhile, have insisted on establishing clearer definitions and more solid 
conceptual foundations for the term, with a view of coming up with a widely accepted 
implementation framework (cf. Smith, 1985, p.227; Schneider, 2003).  In practice, however, 
this has resulted in a variety of different academic approaches and debates over 
conceptualisation, and it is debatable whether these debates have added anything new to the 







This thesis seeks to avoid becoming entangled in these conceptual debates given that it is 
more interested in how decentralisation operates within a particular national context. Thus, 
it defines decentralisation simply as a process (suffix - isation), where the central government 
makes a decision to cede control of some of the functions and responsibilities it holds, and to 
transfer those functions (administrative, political, fiscal) from national public 
offices/ministries to a lower level of government, or to any legally established entity within 
the public offices/ministries operating at the subnational level (provincial or district level). 
This working definition recognises the fact that there is no state in the world that has all its 
powers entirely concentrated at the centre, and further acknowledges that almost all states 
have a political structure that distributes functions through multilevel governance. As Smith 
(1985, p 67) argued, the choice of how subnational levels are structured is always political 
because the choice reflects the interest of central government and the outcomes that they 
plan to achieve from a chosen form of governance. Thus, the working definition adopted here 
recognises the political nature of decentralisation, without assigning a positive or negative 
political or normative judgement on it. Finally, the working definition adopted here 
deliberately ignores privatisation as a form of decentralisation, because privatisation goes 
beyond the transfer of functions and responsibilities and is more profit oriented (as explained 
in the next section).   
Four types of Decentralisation 
While there are several approaches to try to understand variation in decentralisation, one of 
the frameworks that has been at the centre of forming and shaping discussions on 
decentralisation is the public administration typology of decentralisation, which outlines four 
distinct types: deconcentrating, devolution, delegation and privatisation (Rondinelli, 1981).  
Essentially, these four types of decentralisations describe the responsibilities that the central 
government assigns to other structures within and outside government (Collins, P; 1974).   
Deconcentration refers to the handing of some administrative power to the lower levels of 
central government structures. For example, within the structure of government ministries 
or agencies at provincial or district levels, depending on a country’s political organisation. 
Devolution refers to the creation or strengthening of subnational units of government, where 
the activities of these subnational units are supposed to be outside the direct control of 
central government. Delegation refers to the transfer of power and responsibilities to entities 
that are indirectly controlled by the central government, usually satellite companies or 
organisations that are set up and assigned responsibilities to perform particular tasks on 
behalf of central government, with clear oversight mechanisms. Privatisation normally 
denotes when a government allows responsibilities and functions to be performed by private 
entities or voluntary organisations with minimal oversight. Privatisation is often seen as 
emerging independently on its own through the private sector naturally taking over 
responsibilities that cannot otherwise be performed by the government. However, it can also 







(see Rondinelli,1983; Mills, 1990 and Mills et.al, 2002; Schneider; 2003). This framework also 
provides a way of understanding the distributions of power and resources ‘horizontally’ and 
‘vertically’: deconcentration and devolution are usually deemed to work more in a vertical 
manner, while delegation encompasses both and privatisation is more horizontal (cf. 
Hartmann and Crawford, 2008; Cameron, 2014). 
Here, two distinct issues arise pertaining to why different governments choose to pursue 
different forms of decentralisation The first is that decentralisation reflects the pre-existing 
powers and interests of government (for example, some central governments may structure 
decentralisation in a such a way that at lower levels power is held by unelected political party 
officials, which is very common in developing countries) (Smith, 1985, p61)). The second is 
that the process adopted will vary according to domestic decentralisation goals (Dale, 1987).  
In practice, approaches to decentralisation often include a mix of choices, with central 
governments sometimes choosing to decentralise some functions through different 
mechanisms, whilst holding on to others. Mills (1990) argues that the four types of 
decentralisation are not clearly distinct from each other: some countries may pursue more 
than one of these types of decentralisation, for example deconcentration and devolution, 
which she says may overlap mainly because of central government retaining influence over 
policy direction and mobilisation of resources. Another example was highlighted by Conyers, 
(1986b) who showed that autonomy by local governments may not be entirely achieved 
within particular forms of decentralisation. Yet, one by-product of disjointed or multivariate 
decentralisation is that this is often deemed to hinder the progression of local government’s 
ability to make independent decisions - and in the end can help to derail decentralisation 
(Schneider, 2003). Thus, many proponents of decentralisation fiercely oppose piecemeal 
decentralisation (for example where administrative functions are given to the periphery 
whilst fiscal control is retained by the centre), while those that argue against decentralisation 
see a more mixed approach as sensible, since policy directions are highly complex and, in their 
view, need to be directed at the national rather than local level (See Vries, 2000). 
Regardless of such ongoing debates, the public administration framework has been useful in 
demonstrating the different theoretical and practical elements of decentralisation. As will be 
expanded upon in Chapters Five and Six of this thesis, aspects of public administrative 
modelling provide helpful baseline analytical tools for case study analysis and for helping to 
determine the various ways that contextual factors create unique forms and delivery of 
decentralisation.   
A brief history of decentralisation policies 
 
Most literature on decentralisation makes reference to the decision of countries to 
decentralise being based on a commonly held view of decentralisation promoting localised 







(cf. Mills, 1990). In more recent times, there has been a strong association made between 
decentralisation and good governance, especially in the context of public policy in developing 
countries (Rondinelli, 1981). Though these purported values are key to understanding why 
decentralisation is often pursued, it is also important to examine the historical emergence 
and development of modern understandings of decentralisation. This is because historical 
analysis helps to point out a variety of (f)actors that lead countries to decentralise and 
explains many of the essential elements behind decentralisation decisions. For example, 
historical analysis can help us better understand the role of donors in driving decentralisation 
policies, or whether these decisions were the product of domestic grassroots movements to 
regain political autonomy and control (Smith, 1985, p82). Within this thesis, historical analysis 
forms part of the analytical framework to be used to observe and analyse decentralisation 
trends over time, and to better understand why contemporary issues and debates around 
decentralisation are the way they are (cf. Bernstein, 2017).  This could be understood in two 
ways: factors that push countries to decentralise, and factors that pull countries to 
decentralise. These issues are contextualised in Chapter Three, which traces the history of 
decentralisation policies in Zambia.  
  
As history has it, decentralisation policies emanate from the deemed failures/limitations of 
centralisation (Conyers, 1984a). The Post World War II period, specifically the 1950s and 
1960s, were a period when public administration theories and policies which hinged on 
transforming and modernising political processes and administration were dominant - 
particularly with a view to creating economic growth (Rondinelli, 2017). They were 
accompanied by reforms that were aimed at maximising efficiency in delivering public goods 
and services (Rondinelli, 1983, 1990). In many cases in the 1950s, policies advocated for 
strengthened central governments to control and drive a development agenda that was 
aimed at rebuilding national economies post-World War II (Rondinelli, 2017). However, these 
theories and policies proved to be unsatisfactory in promoting economic growth and, by the 
1970s, most developed countries had started to decentralise their economies, with neoliberal 
policies being the driver behind the decentralisation agenda (Smoke 2003). Neoliberal policies 
had become popular in answering development problems because of their attractiveness in 
advocating for free markets and its corresponding feature of minimal central government 
control to drive the development agenda (see, Wunsch and Olowu, 1989). Furthermore, the 
global economic recession in the late 1970s and early 1980s led developed countries to 
decentralise planning and fiscal control in the belief that the top-down approach to 
development and policy implementation was the reason behind the economic recession and 
other development failures (Olowu, 1989).  
 
As such, decentralisation emerged as a tool that was used in developed countries for 
economic reconstruction and was promoted by the World Bank and other lending institutions 







with (neoliberal) economic reforms that countries were encouraged to adopt, many of which 
had detrimental impacts on the delivery of services (including health services) (see, Gill and 
Benatar, 2016). Even though there was a lack of evidence as to whether decentralisation had 
actually helped to reconstruct the economies of developed countries in the 1950s (Rondinelli, 
1983), it was nevertheless perceived to be the answer to some of the problems of recession 
and sluggish development in the developing world. The result was, decentralisation ideas 
were transferred to the developing world, along with the structures and institutional 
architectures of the western world (Smoke and Lewis, 1996).   
 
Although these policy trends in the 1970s and 1980s may have been the immediate cause of 
the widespread adoption of decentralisation in SSA, literature that discusses the beginning of 
decentralisation in African countries often traces it further back to its colonial routes 
(Conyers, 1984b; Mills, 1990). These literatures point out that decentralisation in most African 
states in the postcolonial period mirrored the models of decentralisation of their colonisers. 
For example, countries that had been colonised by the British tended to mirror Britain’s 
approach to decentralisation, and the same was true of those colonised by the French (cf. 
Mills, 1990). As a consequence of colonial political arrangements, in most African countries 
the centralised forms of governance were similar to those of developed countries in the 
1950s, and thus the transitions from centralisation to decentralisation were again highly 
influenced and reflective of western styles of governance (Conyers, 2007), only that in the 
latter decentralisation became synonymous to development and fixing inadequacies within 
systems. 
 
The early post-colonial period saw most African governments lean towards centralised forms 
of governance, which was rational, because the principal aim was to consolidate power and 
national unity and stimulate economic growth (Mills, 1990, Smoke, 1993). Central 
governments emerged as the strongest providers of social services, including health, 
education and water and sanitation in developing economies (Conyers, 1984a). Most of the 
economies in the region were dominated by state owned industries and parastatals, leading 
to even greater centralisation of power (Rondinelli, 1983). There was often suspicion of local 
jurisdictions, which were seen to be a threat to central governments because local authorities 
represented small sects of ethnic and religious representation (Leonard & Marshall, 1996). 
Thus, for fear of reprisal and social upheaval, developing country governments opted for 
centralisation as a means of consolidating governance by controlling funds, administration 
and political authority from the centre (Smoke, 2003). Not only was central control seen by 
most governments in SSA as ideal at that time, but it was also necessary to have central 
political commitment to initiate development projects, although widespread support and 
participation (though in some ways feared) was also needed to implement and sustain 








In recognition of this need for community support to promote development, some traits of 
decentralisation started to emerge in African countries in the late 1970s. This was seen, for 
example, in Tanzania and Zambia, where Ujamaa (a political concept of socialism) and 
Humanism respectively were the mantra (Olowu, 1989). Though these philosophies were 
centred on promoting community welfare and social cohesion to attain development, they 
were also seen to have been used to promote what were seen to be dictatorial governments 
with highly centralised political and economic control (see Smoke and Lewis, 1996).  In 
addition, though these philosophies aimed to garner local support for central government in 
implementing development work, they were not in line with theories of democratic 
governance that were promoted by the West as a means of attaining economic growth and 
reinforcing democratic governance (Olowu, 1989). As a result, demands for more localised 
voices to be heard became increasing prevalent, which normatively undermined the claims 
for strong centralised governance. 
Whilst it’s true that most African economies shrunk in the post-colonial period, and therefore 
were looking to multilateral and bilateral organisations for help, these institutions in return 
demanded political and organisational reforms within countries in order for them to qualify 
for assistance (Wunsch and Olowu, 1989). As part of this, governments were encouraged by 
donors to loosen their control over the provision of public services and generally to loosen 
the shackles of central government dominance - with decentralisation at the core of the 
reforms to attain the purported benefits of efficiency and democratisation. As a result, 
decentralisation models emerged in developing countries in the post-colonial era and have 
now firmly rooted themselves within many African states (cf. Hartmann and Crawford, 2008).  
However, an interesting debate has arisen over the pros and cons of this policy transfer to 
the developing world: Olowu and Wunsh (2004, p. 310) labelled this kind of policy 
entrepreneurship ‘notorious’, while Hartmann and Crawford (2008) by contrast put an 
emphasis on its ability to foster participatory governance. Either way, as the ‘piper calls the 
tune’, it is doubted whether the decentralisation reforms that were introduced recognised 
some of the already existing decentralisation programmes that African countries had earlier 
embarked upon (Rondinelli, 1983a). In short, African countries were pushed to adopt a replica 
of decentralisation reforms that had been implemented in developed countries, with several 
limitations, and with limited acknowledgement of the contextual factors that moderate how 
supposedly universalistic decentralisation models apply in practice (Olowu, 1989). Lately 
these doubts have extended to criticise how donor reforms and programmes. 
It is undeniable that decentralisation had a huge impact on African countries, being 
implemented widely in the public sector and in the delivery of services (Conyers, 2007). But 
there were a number of challenges in implementing decentralisation policies in Africa. From 
the outset, failures of development programmes in the developing world have largely been 
blamed on the lack of contextualisation of policy templates. As Rondinelli (1983) discusses, 







transferred to developing countries attached to structural reform processes and promises of 
change (Helmsing, 2003), and the African institutional environment was often not taken into 
account when policies were transferred. Later in the thesis, in discussing whether 
decentralisation works or not, we will return to examine these critiques in detail5.  
As alluded to earlier, though the principal aim of many governments in both developed and 
developing countries in the 1950’s - through to the early 1970’s - was to consolidate power, 
the inefficiencies of central fiscal control and administrative decision-making were gradually 
admitted, and governments sought to find answers to emerging problems of stagnation and 
poor economic performance (Conyers, 2007). In this period, the World Bank and its 
underwriters often suggested decentralisation as the best means for addressing these 
problems and boosting development (Conyers, 1984b). In many ways, governments were 
being pushed to relinquish fiscal and administrative controls as a way of managing economic 
growth effectively and efficiently (Rondinelli, 1983, Smoke, 2003, Olowu, 2003). As the World 
Bank was pushing the decentralisation agenda forward, embedded in major economic 
reforms such as the structural adjustment, developing nations were heavily indebted and 
incapable of providing local social services, and thus the shifting of such responsibilities to 
local authorities became the rational (and often only) response (Conyers, 1984b). Though 
such developments seemed rational, local authorities in most developing countries at the 
time had significantly weakened, with the population questioning the legitimacy of locally 
elected officials. Thus, it was increasingly difficult to democratise service delivery (cf. 
Hartmann and Crawford, 2008, McConnell, 2010). This observation is of key relevance to this 
thesis as it establishes in later chapters the importance local authorities’ perceived legitimacy 
in fostering local participation).   
Moreover, in developed countries, decentralisation policies were widely supported and 
advanced by both right and left-wing politics. The right justified it as a means of increasing 
efficiency in government operations, with conservatives in countries like Britain and the USA 
opposing the dominance of growing power and dominance of fiscal control by central 
governments (Conyers 1984b). Meanwhile, the left justified decentralisation as an 
appropriate means of providing better services to the people (Mills, 1990). Developed 
countries were offering substantial bilateral support to African countries, thus also having 
huge stakes in driving the decentralisation agenda in African countries (Hartmann and 
Crawford, 2008).   
 
By the 1980s and 1990s countries in SSA that had not adopted the decentralisation agenda 
were widely criticised and were often deemed ineligible for multilateral and bilateral support 
(Osei-Kufuor et.al, 2013). The situation was compounded by centrally run governments and 
state-owned enterprises’ inability to offer quality local services to the people in most 
 
5 The discussions will be revisited in Chapters Five and Six where the thesis uses empirical evidence to show 







developing nations, thus failing to fulfil government mandates. State-owned enterprises were 
ultimately a huge cost to most governments (Rondinelli et.al, 1983). Further, lending 
institutions criticised governments in the developing world for concentrating more on 
macroeconomic policies and political stability rather than investing in local social services. In 
many countries, poor roads, poor sanitation, poor staffing in schools and run-down 
infrastructure were blamed on the government management of resources centrally (Ribot, 
2002). 
 
While the drivers of decentralisation in developed and developing countries are explained 
only briefly here, the common ground between them is a shared understanding about the 
failures of central governance. The bureaucratic structures of central governments were 
mainly criticised for delayed decision making, thus impeding development programmes and 
innovations (Hartmann and Crawford, 2008). In addition, central governments’ grip on power 
and the political process resulted in reduced political participation and neglect of grassroot 
views and needs. Corruption was also seen to flourish where central governments dominated 
(Rondinelli, 2017).  
 
However, this set of ideas was also questioned. Some doubted whether highly centralised 
structures resulted in greater corruption, since corruption was also found in countries with 
highly decentralised structures (see Smith, 1985, p83, Olowu, 1989). For some, the pressure 
for western style decentralisation was influenced by colonialism (Olowu, 1989). Others 
highlighted the practical difficulties:  because many central governments were unwilling to 
relinquish power to local governments, for fear of losing their control of resources and/or 
empowering opposition groups, it was difficult to implement decentralisation (Fesler, 1965, 
Ouedraogo, 2003).   
 
Why was decentralisation supported? 
This section, expanding on the brief discussion in the introduction, reviews the literature to 
more fully understand why decentralisation has been so widely supported (i.e., what its 
supposed benefits are). However, in doing so it is important to note that empirical findings 
on decentralisation policy outcomes are contradictory across different contexts (Adams, 
2016). As already explained, the thesis believes that analysis of structural and institutional 
arrangements within case specific contexts will generate much more value that theorise 
decentralisation’s effectiveness in general terms. In doing so, it is important to understand 
how a particular decentralisation process was arrived at, its specific aims, and the 
environment in which it was meant to operate. As Smoke contends, if decentralisation 
arguments are left at just investigating the advantages and disadvantages in general terms, it 
becomes problematic because such arguments are based on limited appreciation of 








“Much of the decentralisation literature focuses on its often-problematic performance 
and positive writings tend to be based on anecdotal instances of success or enthusiastic 
rhetoric about its benefits”. 
 
Nevertheless, the presumed benefits of decentralisation are essential to understanding why, 
despite decentralisation policies being in existence for more than five decades and in many 
cases having yielded minimal results, they continue to be supported. 
 
The is no single reason – and indeed, among academics and technocrats, there has often been 
a lack of agreement regarding the benefits and positive outcomes that decentralisation is 
thought to produce (Saltman and Bankauskaite, 2006). Broadly speaking, for advocates, the 
benefits and positive outcomes associated with decentralisation are that it: reduces 
administrative and decision making burdens at the central level; creates unity and stability via 
local ‘buy-in’; enhances political participation; improves the mobilisation of resources; 
improves coordination of local development activities; empowers the poor; enhances 
efficiency in the delivery of public services; improves responsiveness to local needs; and  
creates social cohesion (Smith, 1990). The remainder of this section examines how these 
benefits have been portrayed in the academic literature. 
 
First, decentralisation is argued by advocates to improve administrative efficiency, as it 
lessens the burden of micromanagement by central government (Rondinelli, 1981, Smith, 
1990). The underlying principle of pursuing decentralisation is that, on one hand, it lessens 
the burden of micromanagement from central governments, and, on the other hand, it 
encourages participation and self-governance at local levels (Rondinelli et.al, 1983; Mills, 
1990). Philosophically and ideologically, decentralisation is deemed by its proponents to be a 
sensible political tool for governments to improve participation and encourage self-
sustenance at community levels (Mills, 1990).  
 
Second, decentralisation is seen to foster democratic governance in undemocratic countries 
- especially in developing countries (Romeo & Spyckerella 2014). It is seen as a tool that can 
build national solidarity because, politically, decentralisation is a means by which central 
governments can distribute power more evenly across geographic territories (Smith, 1985, 
p22), enhancing the democratic rights of local communities. Hence advocates believe that 
decentralisation is an effective enabler of power sharing and a means to promoting 
democratic governance because it builds confidence in local leadership, by which citizens 
participate to build national unity (Schneider, 2003). Further, within the context of the 
international development literature, decentralisation is also perceived as a means of 
attaining good governance and strengthening accountability. Other literatures advance the 







and strengthening federal governance systems, especially as opposed to having unitary or 
authoritarian states (Smoke, 2003). Bossert and Mitchell (2010) state that decentralisation 
legitimises the power of locally elected officials, who can in turn influence and contribute to 
policy design. This understanding of decentralisation resonates with arguments that suggest 
that a key aspect and positive of decentralisation is that it enhances development through 
local participation (Magnussen et.al, 2007), helping government to communicate directly 
with local people. This apparent promotion of local participation is a key reason that donor 
agencies continue to promote decentralisation as an approach to localised development 
(Ribot, 2003).  
 
Third, it is widely argued that because decentralisation encourages local participation it leads 
to better delivery of services as accountability is enforced by local/grassroot structures 
(Adams, 2016). This belief fits in with literature that states that local authorities/structures 
tend to be more responsive and less corrupt than central level structures (Crook,2003).  
Although such expectations are held to be true by supporters of decentralisation, it has been 
argued that they can create problematic beliefs about what decentralisation can achieve in 
broad terms (Prud’homme 2003), overlooking the fact that these benefits, according to 
Smoke, only emerge if there is adequate governance through elected councils and other 
accountability mechanisms, and adequate capacity of local governments to meet their 
responsibilities (cf. Smoke, 2003, p. 9). These arguments relate closely to literature that states 
that community/local empowerment generates social cohesion (cf. Walsh et.al, 2012). 
 
Fourth, many advocates of decentralisation feel that it speeds up decision making and 
promotes innovative means of mobilising resources (Smoke, 2003, Olowu, 2003). These 
arguments are further accentuated by claims (often made by multilateral and bilateral 
organisations) that it improves effective resource utilisation (See Osei-Kufuor et.al, 2013). The 
assumptions here are that local communities become more responsible in the use of 
resources because they are involved in mobilising the resources and fully participate in their 
use (Bae 2016). In turn, this is seen to increase client satisfaction, increase quality service 
provision, increase service utilisation, and ultimately contribute to national economic 
development (Lindblom, 1965; Rondinelli et.al, 1983).  
 
Fifth, decentralisation is said to result to better planning of social services because the 
involvement of local voices in managing service delivery is often seen to lead to a system more 
likely to meet service needs and demands (Rondinelli et.al, 1983; Mills, 1990). In other words, 
that local people know their problems best and are thus in a better position to address them 
and to promote their own welfare (Hutchcroft, 2000). 
 
It is for these reasons that decentralisation came to be interpreted by multilateral and 







(cf. Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). As discussed in the section on history above, these claims follow 
from a series of prior claims about the inefficiencies of centralisation and the ineffectiveness 
of national-level public sector bureaucracies (cf. Olowu, 2003) Although authors such as 
Smoke (2003) have critiqued the pressure exerted by donor agencies, and the fact that a 
compelling evidence base for many of these claims is lacking, it is certainly the case that a 
belief in these arguments meant that the promotion of decentralisation in countries like 
Zambia (where public services were in a deplorable state, yet the government clung to power 
(see Simutanyi, 1996) was rational. 
 
Critiques of Decentralisation  
 
Detractors of decentralisation argue against decentralisation because they deem it too 
ambitious and vague to produce the benefits and outcomes that are claimed for it (see De 
Vries, 2000). Specifically, detractors of decentralisation generally make five arguments 
against the benefits of decentralisation.  
 
First, administratively, staff at local levels will not possess the expert knowledge required to 
address complex policy issues, and as such it is argued that local levels will always depend on 
the centre to provide policy direction (De Vries, 2000). 
 
Second, decentralisation does not in practice translate into increased local participation 
because bureaucrats and politicians at local levels seek to control decentralisation functions 
rather than to facilitate wider distributions of power. As a result, decentralisation at local 
levels will tend to favour certain individuals and groups that are politically aligned to local 
party politics and power, in many cases those supporting the central government and acting 
as local power brokers for central elites. In short, decentralisation is said by its critics to 
reinforce elite politics (Smith, 1985 p42). 
 
Third, although decentralisation claims to promote good governance through distributing 
political decisions and operations to lower levels, critics argue that decentralisation can be 
overshadowed by local political elitism (Crook, 2003, Smoke 2003) which can create 
fragmented power elites pursuing separatist tendencies at local levels. What happens is that 
due to the emergence of local elites, these elites tend to side with central powers to shore up 
strength, or, become separatist. Either way, these local elites consolidate central power, not 
decentralise it (Johnson, 2002). 
 
Fourth, whilst it is often suggested that local ownership of service can help in the mobilization 
of resources (Smoke, 2015), critics argue that often local governments do not have the 
capacity to raise resources to fund the delivery of some social services, such as primary health 







leads local governments to demand more from the community so as to meet the costs of 
providing services (c.f. De Vries, 2000; Smoke, 2015), for example through charging of out-of 
–pocket user fees – a feature of many developing countries health systems. As a result, ‘local 
ownership’ can often in practice further marginalise poor people, making it more difficult for 
them to access basic social amenities, therefore defeating the purpose of more effective 
delivery of social services (Andrew and Schroeder, 2003). 
 
Fifth, as already pointed out, despite decentralisation’s popularity, there is very little 
empirical evidence to support its effectiveness, and lit benefits in practice that it purports to 
deliver (see Smoke, 2003). The result has often been a series of experiments conducted in 
developing countries, with real implications for the health and wellbeing of populations. As 
Agrawal and Ribot (1999, p. 1) observe: 
 
“Decentralisation is a word that has been used by different people to mean 
many different things. But what do we see in practice? Experiments with local 
government that end in chaos and bankruptcy; ‘decentralised’ structures of 
administration that only act as a more effective tool for centralising power; 
regional and district committees in which government officials make decisions 
while the local representatives sit silent; village councils where local people 
participate but have no resources to allocate”. 
 
Too often, critics argue, decentralisation in developing countries ends up not fulfilling the 
goals of poverty reduction or improved delivery of services at local levels, but instead creates 
bloated structures at lower levels which are poorly funded by central government, given very 
little power to mobilise resources to operate, or worse still may not have any means to 
generate income to initiate the needed development or support the programmes that they 
may want to run. In other words, central government may use decentralisation as a way of 
getting out of its responsibilities – ‘passing the buck’ (Wunsch and Olowu, 1989; Wunsch, 
2001).  Some literature further states that if decentralised structures lack the necessary power 
and resources to exercise grassroot governance, they fail to deliver services to communities 
(Tordoff, 1994). Because this is a common feature in many developing countries, it has led to 
many critics of decentralisation concluding that decentralisation doesn’t work (see, Crook, 
2003). 
In a nutshell, critiques of decentralisation suggest that decentralisation is not an absolute 
good as is often suggested, since the state plays a greater role in determining development 
programmes, while the community plays an obscure role. Furthermore, the state may use 
decentralisation to dominate subnational political entities (cf. Adams 2016). In the end, as 
argued by Smith, it is likely that resource distribution will reward those that have local political 







However, Smoke warns that these criticisms should not lead to blindly supporting 
centralisation, since that may perpetuate authoritarian regimes who deny people basic rights 
such as democracy and the right to education and health. He concludes that decentralisation 
can work if properly designed and applied, though he recognises that it is “certainly not a 
panacea for public sector ills or a natural enemy of effective government” (2003).  Olowu 
argues for the same, citing that tight fiscal central controls have not worked well in African 
countries, but have rather advanced dictatorial tendencies where the central government 
delays the release of funds to local governments as a means of settling scores. This has 
impinged on the democratic rights of local governments. He notes that “the common failure 
of such accountability arrangements is one of the most important grounds for reform” (2003 
p46). Lastly, an array of literature highlights the fact that the experience of decentralisation 
is not uniform across all countries, or indeed within all parts of a country, or within all sectors 
Prud’homme, 2003; Pollitt, 1991). In other words, context matters. As described above, the 
aim of this thesis is to examine decentralisation within the Zambian health system so as to 
generate insights on the aforementioned debates and their saliency to ‘lived practice’ in this 
particular case.  
Contextualising decentralisation 
 
Despite its relatively long history in theory and practice, the debates around decentralisation 
sketched out above remain inconclusive and keep evolving. Yet, despite this, decentralisation 
of various kinds has been, and continues to be, widely applied in African countries. Countries 
have introduced a range of different policy approaches, involving mix of delegation, 
privatisation and deconcentration (although generally leaving out devolution (Adams, 2016)).  
A wide range of literature has recently been generated that highlights the difficulty of 
modelling experiences of decentralisation (Bossert and Mitchell (2010); Brinkerhoff, 2015; 
Kelly, et.al, 2016), and has (like this thesis)) attempted to understand the contexts in which 
decentralisation has been attempted – and how process of policy transfer via multilateral and 
bilateral donors often do not reflect local politics, grassroots interests, power relations and 
institutions, which tend to be contextually specific (see, Adams, 2016; Kelley et.al, 2016 ). This 
lends credibility to the argument that the reason that most African countries have not 
benefitted from globally popular decentralisation policies is because the inherent conditions 
of their domestic institutional arrangements are not taken into account as critical elements 
(Olowu, 1989). Smith (1990) furthers this critique, suggesting that weak administrative 
structures and weak fiscal capacities are inherent features in most developing economies, but 
the need to strengthen them prior to policy implementation are ignored. Schneider (2003) 
concurs, arguing that states with strong institutional capacities are necessary as 
decentralisation functions to facilitate national development. The assumption is that when 







be played by central and local government can be created, which in turn promotes the 
successful implementation of decentralisation policies and programmes. 
However, this is not to say that policy transfer attempts to deliberately ignore these existing 
factors. Rather, they underplay the active agency of African governments. In relation to that, 
this thesis (see Chapters Five and Six) makes the argument that one of the factors that has 
led to the failure to implement decentralisation successfully in Zambia political patronage 
politics (cf. Norad, 2008).  
Another interesting debate around the implementation of the  concept of decentralisation is 
whether decentralisation should be discussed within the confines of vertical processes that 
entail shifting responsibilities and resources from the central state level to designated 
territorial sub-national levels of government, or whether the concept should also include the 
horizontal process of decentralising abilities and resources at a given level of government 
through processes such as delegation and privatisation (Hartman and Crawford, 2008). 
Rondinelli et al.’s (1983) persuasive works first suggested a wide-ranging typology of 
decentralisation to include both the horizontal and vertical dimensions and the importance 
of embracing specific types where needed. However, Rondinelli et.al, came under strong 
attack by Slater (1989) who criticised him for having ignored some of the fundamental 
questions of decentralisation, such as to whom power is transferred and whether capacity 
exists within the structures to which power and responsibilities are transferred. This 
highlights the fact that, to provide meaningful conclusions regarding the pros and cons of 
decentralisation, empirical research needs to be grounded in a theory that generates research 
questions and hypotheses addressing the specific causal mechanisms at play when 
decentralisation is attempted. To add to the debate, De Vries (2002) discusses how the 
experience of decentralisation in some European countries generated mixed results, where 
what was seen in one country as a positive experience would be deemed as negative in 
another. This adds to the ways in which decentralisation can be context specific.  
Although these more case specific debates are quite recent, the old arguments regarding 
questions about the concept of decentralisation – particularly its legitimacy, use, application 
and prerogatives - still dominate the discussions (see Ohemeng and Ayee, 2016). As 
decentralisation has rooted itself in most African countries, it seems that its detractors have 
lost the argument. However, their critiques provide an important contribution to examining 
the operation of decentralisation specific political, economic, social and cultural settings 
(Hartmann and Crawford, 2008). 
 
Health sector decentralisation 
Just as the experience of decentralisation can vary widely across different national contexts, 
so can it differ between different sectors. This section examines why, in the context of 







has taken on a particular significance in the health sector – helping explain this thesis’ focus 
on health sector decentralisation in Zambia (i.e., a particular sector within a particular 
national context). 
 
Low-income countries have long struggled to ensure the provision of adequate health care to 
their populations as a result of a variety of factors including adverse economic circumstances 
and limited government capacity, as well as a challenging international policy environment 
(Mohammed et.al, 2009). In countries like Zambia, the situation has been further 
compounded by the fact that health sector reform has been driven by wider macroeconomic 
policy; for example, the health reform programme in Zambia was driven by implementation 
of structural adjustment programmes which required reductions in public expenditure and 
changes in public and private sector institutional structures (World Bank 2001).  
Despite these limitations and the problems African countries are faced with, they continue to 
attempt to implement decentralisation programmes in the health sector, of one kind of 
another. Mills states that that the type of decentralisation that a country decides to 
implement for its health sector will determine the outcomes. She details the implications of 
deconcentrating, devolving, delegating and privatising, and relates them to fiscal, political and 
administrative decentralisation. For example, she states that;  
“In developed countries devolution tends to give power to local hospitals with high 
technology and they in turn tend to influence public opinion and thus weakening the 
decisions of central governments whilst in a developing country deconcentrating may 
disfavour the local community because the decisions will be made by the higher 
authorities at hospitals who are seen as having the expert knowledge therefore 
divorcing local participation. As such in developing countries devolution is preferred 
because it encourages local participation by engaging of local bodies and community 
in the management of health services” (1990) 
 
For the World Bank, a key advantage of health sector decentralisation relates to health 
infrastructure development at local levels (i.e. within districts and provinces) that can help 
address existing health infrastructure disparities, where rural areas are underserved 
compared to urban ones (see World Bank, 2011, 2018). Thus, for the World Bank, one of the 
key premises of decentralisation is to take services closer to the people and to tap into local 
resources and knowledge to enhance the welfare of communities (Walsh et.al, 2012). The 
purported benefits of decentralisation described earlier in this chapter are still prominent in 
discussion of health sector reform in SSA to this day: (i) from an administrative point of view,  
decentralised health systems are seen as responsive and bring about innovative service 
management to meet local needs; (ii) from a fiscal point of view, decentralised health systems 







capital perspective, decentralised health systems are believed to foster citizen participation 
in planning and provision of health needs (see, Dwicaksono and Fox, 2018). 
Based on these understandings, health sector decentralisation is continually being promoted 
by the WHO by placing emphasis on strengthening district health systems. As briefly 
introduced in Chapter one, health sector decentralisation was affirmed by the Alma Ata 
declaration of 1978 as a way of engaging not only governments but also citizens in health 
services delivery, with the goals of achieving equity and improved service delivery (WHO, 
1978).  This arguably set an agenda according to which health systems decentralisation is 
justified to date. Lately, this has aligned with thinking on health service governance that puts 
an emphasis on governance not being about governments alone, but a combination of 
processes, institutions and citizens participation (WHO, 2014). In this regard, the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) explains governance to be means by which a 
country is managed politically, administratively and through which citizens’ rights are 
expressed (UNDP, 1999).  Evidently, by putting an emphasis on citizens participation, 
literature on health governance mirrors the ethos of the Alma Ata declaration, and 
contributes to the continuing popularity of health sector decentralisation as a policy 
approach.  
Contemporary health governance literature focuses on explaining the functions exercised by 
multiple actors within the health systems and how they each express their agency.  
Brinkerhoff and Bossert (2013) posit that the needs of citizens are expressed both to 
government and bureaucratic actors – to governments through voting and payment of taxes, 
and to bureaucratic actors through accountability mechanisms and expressions of needs, as 
figure 1 shows (c.f. Brinkerhoff and Bossert, 2013). Thus, the thesis is also interested in 
interrogating the agency exercised by local levels and communities and the resulting effects 






























A key concern for this thesis is whether and how heath sector decentralisation can possibly 
lead to the attainment of health systems goals in Zambia. In Chapters Five and Six, the focus 
is on outlining factors that may influence and support the attainment of decentralisation’s 
stated goals at local levels, such as the design of the policies. In reference to case studies such 
as Walsh et.al (2012) that evaluated the sustainability of Community Based Organisations for 
HIV/AIDS in a rural district in Zambia, the main argument is that communities will always 
respond to their own problems even in the absence of outside intervention (state, donors, 
civil society etc). As such, outside interventions will only work when in agreement with 
community principles and needs. Thus, for decentralisation policies to work they should be 
designed in such a way as to harness already existing social structures, not to replace them.    
 
Conclusion 
As we have seen in this chapter, the arguments for the benefits of decentralisation (including 
health sector decentralisation) are contested. It seems clear at the very least that the 
purported benefits are not being automatic or guaranteed. Many scholars have advocated for 
more thorough theoretical and practical evidence that can drive health sector 
decentralisation to achieve desired outcomes (see, Bossert, 1998; Bossert and Mitchell, 
2010). Elsewhere, it has also been argued that the continuing weakness of health systems in 
many countries in SSA is not only about decentralisation failing to deliver the needed 







(Conyers, 2007). What is needed, and often missing, is focused study on decentralisation in 
practice. Its local rationales, drivers, and contextual factors as these either aid or limit its 
ability to act as an effective or useful reform tool. Thus, this thesis is interested in establishing 
how health sector decentralisation has been (and can be) implemented in Zambia, taking into 
account the readiness of the Zambian economy and health sector to facilitate 
decentralisation.   
 
In summary, the case of health sector decentralisation in Zambia will allow for the thesis to 
explain why decentralisation was chosen as a policy option by several successive Zambian 
governments, and why it has produced the results that it has. Zambia provides a useful case 
in which to study decentralisation because the health sector decentralisation process has 
been the main feature of the long-running health sector reforms, which commenced in 1992. 
However, the agenda has inadvertently been implemented in isolation of the broader 
national decentralisation process that is yet to be implemented.  As explained in the 
introduction and the later theory chapter, these discussions will be embedded in the health 
policy triangle framework where the policy objectives, and key political, managerial, technical 
and structural issues that have characterized the health sector reforms and decentralisation 
processes in Zambia will be reviewed.  
 
Of interest to this thesis is how decentralisation has been employed over time as a reform 
tool for improving health services; garnering local participation; creating local institutions for 
governance; and above all as a political power sharing tool. Specifically, from an empirical 
point of view, the primary interest of the thesis is the governing and management of the 
health sector. 
From the foregoing discussions in this chapter several key issues have been established, all of 
which are important foundations for subsequent discussions in the thesis: 
a. The history of decentralisation is useful or understanding why decentralisation was 
introduced in the development lexicon and how it has been used over time as a policy 
management tool.  
b. The various arguments advanced in terms of support of decentralisation, and the 
critiques of it, provide an important set of questions that can be applied to the 
empirical case. In the later chapters of the thesis, we examine questions related to 
health sector decentralisation in Zambia based on the foundations of the support and 
critiques highlighted.  
c. Debates on the merits and demerits of decentralisation have too often been at an 
abstract theoretical level and have not been sufficiently based on case country studies. 
In this thesis, we therefore note that the merits and demerits of decentralisation 







useful information in examining health sector decentralisation in this particular 
context. By doing so the thesis aims to generate rich contextual data based on 
practical backgrounds on the nature of decentralisation policies. Our aim in this regard 
is to contribute to better understandings of decentralisation in context.    
d. There are several arguments as to why and when decentralisation policies succeed (or 
fail). As the literature suggests, institutional capacity and political support are 
paramount to the success of decentralisation, and these stand out as prerequisites for 
successful decentralisation. 
e. In this thesis, one of the key elements is how to differentiate what is deemed as 
successful or unsuccessful decentralisation. Considering that Zambia has 
implemented different forms of health sector decentralisation and is still attempting 
to do so, the case study that this research has embarked upon will be useful to 
highlight policy dynamics and contextual moderators involved in more or less 
successful decentralisations.  Thus, this thesis embarks on an intellectual journey to 
assess how decentralisation models in sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries like Zambia 
are shaped by the economy, income level, social structure and political choices.  
f. Ultimately what the thesis attempts to do is to bring to bear the lessons of theory and 
of historical experience to help countries like Zambia define their own health system 
reform strategies (Prud’homme, 2003). Decentralisation in SSA will remain on the 
agenda for many years—a key task is to identify the ways in which it can be 














































Positions the rise of decentralisation policies in Zambia in a historical context 
 
Traces the roles played by actors in fostering the decentralisation agenda 
 
Discusses why and how decentralisation has been promoted on the agenda to govern 
health services – what factors promote decentralisation? 
 
Reflects how these factors have influenced how policymaking is construed and used to 





As argued in Chapter One, decentralisation has persistently featured as a policy reform tool 
to govern health services by successive Zambian governments. Although decentralisation was 
practised earlier in Zambia, pre- and post-independence, it was not explicitly associated with 
good governance, as it came to be in the late 1980s through to the early 1990s (Quedraogo, 
2003). Decentralisation rose to prominence as a health governance tool after what has been 
called the ‘third wave’6 of democratisation in sub-Saharan African countries (see Schraeder, 
1995). The importance attached to it by multilateral and bilateral organisations was signified 
by both technical support and monetary investments that were committed to implementing 
decentralisation policies (cf. Smoke, 2003). In addition, during the same period, from early 
1980s through to the late 1990s, the World Bank and World Health Organisation (WHO) had 
conducted several extensive studies to justify the need to implement decentralisation in 
developing countries’ health systems, including providing guidance on how developing 
countries could design decentralisation to achieve optimal results. Scholars provided 
consultancy for these organisations; for example, Mills (1990), provided case studies for WHO 
on how decentralisation should be implemented, while Litvack et.al’s (1998) work for the 
World Bank focused on designing and overcoming the institutional challenges that were 
identified to have been a deterrent to implementing decentralisation in developing 
 
6 "Third wave" was signified by the removal of governments that had been in power since Africa’s wave of independence 








economies. Other case studies supported by WHO were specific to Zambia. For example, 
Kalumba (1994) assessed the state of primary health care, including the need to implement 
health reforms in Zambia, and Kalumba et.al again (1997) justified the implementation of 
health reforms in Zambia and the need to continue with such an agenda.  
 
By understanding these earlier episodes of decentralisation in Zambia, we may better 
appreciate the diverse international and local political relationships that continue to define 
contemporary decentralisation efforts. This chapter reveals how international policies have 
historically had an upper hand in promoting decentralisation in Zambia under the rubric of 
political and socioeconomic reforms (just, as will be shown in later chapters, international 
policy frameworks continue to run through contemporary decentralisation issues in Zambia).  
Although the thesis does not attempt to argue that the poor state of health systems in 
developing countries like Zambia rests entirely on the problems of international policy 
transfer, it will be argued here that the evolution of the decentralisation policy agenda in 
Zambia has to a great extent reflected donor ideologies (see, Attaran, 2003). This is why 
tracing the history of decentralisation is so important to this thesis; because that history 
shows how actors have consistently exercised their power and interests in pursuit of 
implementing decentralisation. As will be seen in the examination of contemporary 
decentralisation policies in Chapters Five and Six, donor programmes continue to dominate 
health sector programmes. This means that lessons that can be learnt from the history of 
decentralisation efforts that have relevance for contemporary problems of health system 
governance.  
 
Henceforth this chapter demonstrates how successive Zambian governments have appeared 
to be in conformity with the ethos of decentralisation of health services, yet systemic 
weaknesses have continually undermined their ability to implement decentralisation 
successfully. The first sections of the chapter give a historical account of decentralisation in 
Zambia demonstrating how decentralisation policies have been included in national 
development plans, adopted and implemented at a national scale by three political regimes: 
the United National Independence Party (UNIP), the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy 
(MMD), and the Patriotic Front (PF). The intentions of the various decentralisation plans, and 
the factors that enabled or impinged the processes of decentralisation, will also form part of 
the discussions. In doing so, the Chapter demonstrates how attempts at policy reform under 
the one-party state (UNIP government) were frustrated, while with the introduction of multi-
party politics (the MMD government), despite having showed commitment to implementing 
decentralisation, weak political institutions undermined the outcomes of the reform agenda. 
Finally, with the PF government, the delays in proceeding with the decentralisation policy 
agenda and the effects on policy legitimacy provide evidence of how political obstacles tend 
to undermine reform. The final sections of the chapter begin a critical analysis of whether 







context, using the arguments of the norms of policymaking (according to the policy cycle). In 
doing so, the chapter reflects the politics of ‘doing policy’, that is to say how local actors in 
developing countries like Zambia draw on what is presented to them – ideas - and how they 
navigate through these ideas considering their interests and relationships (both existing and 
new ones) in the policy arena that may promote/constrain policy legitimacy (cf. Buse et.al, 
2012, p.195).  
 
The discussions in Chapter Two explored the arguments have been made for decentralisation, 
and the positive outcomes that it’s intended to produce in the health sector – although it also 
showed that some are wary of decentralisation, arguing that it does not necessarily improve 
service provision and that its success/failure is moderated by contextual factors (Prudhomme, 
1995; Lankina, 2008). In addition, it was argued that there is little concrete evidence that 
exists to date that tracks the specific impacts of decentralisation on particular health care 
systems (Mohammed et.al, 2016). 
 
This is true of Zambia: although decentralisation has been a main feature of health policy for 
decades, there is limited literature that examines why decentralisation policies continue to 
be pursued by various Zambian governments despite the failures recorded. Given this, this 
chapter describes the series of attempts at decentralisation processes that Zambia has 
previously embarked upon at different periods in time. The chapter describes the rationale 
for these health reforms and the end result of the reforms in the Zambian context so as to 
deconstruct the decisions that influence the choice of decentralisation policies by successive 
Zambian governments.  
 
As already established in Chapters One and Two, the arguments surrounding decentralisation 
as a policy choice suggest that its successes are dependent on the type of decentralisation 
used in specific contexts (Rondinelli et.al 1983) and how these strategies relate to in-country 
institutional arrangements and capacities (Lankina, 2008). It should be noted that three 
successive Zambian governments embraced decentralisation policies as means to improve 
health service delivery, from the mid-1980s to 2016. Some of these attempts to decentralise 
are considered not to have yielded the expected results, but others are seen as a having 
achieved pockets of success (Chikulo, 2010b). Thus, in this chapter narratives of what is/was 
deemed as successful and/or unsuccessful in the Zambian context by various political regimes 
are provided as a foundation for later arguments (in Chapters Five and Six) that examine why 
decentralisation in the health sector still matters in Zambia today. despite having yielded so 
few previous successes.  
 
Central to this chapter is that decentralisation in the health sector in Zambia has surpassed 
all other sectors. But even the health sector has not had a single, monolithic experience: as 







health sector and national decentralisation plans. Furthermore, there have been other 
organisational and institutional reforms within the health sector that equate to 
decentralisation, for example the creation of additional districts and the attempted 
reorganisation of maternal and child health services that were implemented by the PF upon 
having formed government in 2011.  
To understand these key issues, the next three sections of this chapter focus on explaining 
how decentralisation was/has been addressed by three successive political parties (focusing 
on their approach to policy in general and governing of health services in particular) that have 
ruled Zambia since independence in 1964. 
 
Health service governance during the UNIP era: 1964 – 1991 
 
Like many other countries in Africa, Zambia’s governance system in the early post-colonial 
period fostered centralisation (Olowu, 2003). As already highlighted in Chapter Two, 
centralisation was seen by central governments as more favourable because they felt 
threatened by local authorities that often represented ethnic and religious groupings that 
were potential sources of opposition (Smith, 1985, p61). In the context of fears of reprisal and 
social upheaval, centralisation offered a means of consolidating governance by controlling 
funds, administration and political authority from the centre (Conyers, 1981). The period also 
coincided with the dominance of 1950s and 1960s development theories that advocated for 
tightened centralised resource control to drive development (Mills, 1990).  
Due to the centralised resource control, the Zambian government in the post-independence 
era emerged as the sole provider of social services, including health, education and water and 
sanitation (see, Chikulo, 2009a). The economy was dominated by state-owned industries and 
parastatals, which were also used as avenues for service provision. For instance, the mining 
industry was chiefly a parastatal industry with a mandate for providing social services, with 
health being one of the key services provided (see, Craig, 2000). 
Since independence from Britain in 1964, Zambia’s territorial administration was (and is still) 
divided into provinces and districts, with the central government at the helm (GRZ, 2009). The 
provinces are a larger unit of administration, each of which is divided into several districts. 
Administration at provincial and district levels has continuously transformed according to 
political interests and ideologies that successive central governments have adopted (GRZ, 
2009).  The operational relationship between central level and the lower levels are described 
in a range of policy documents and strategic plans (cf. Fifth National Development Plan; First 
National Health Strategic Plan; Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper and Vison 2030).  
According to the Zambian constitution, as first adopted by the UNIP government, central 
government primarily consists of government ministries and its agencies, while the provinces 







in 1964, the UNIP government’s approach to provincial administration was through appointed 
officials, while the districts were run by elected officials (this has remained the same through 
successive governments). The key difference between then and now is that, in 1964, the 
country had inherited a robust economy that many cite as a reason for the efficient delivery 
of public services at the time (Chikulo, 2009a). However, by the mid-1980s there was an 
economic downturn that led to a significant reduction of service provision by both the central 
government and local authorities, which influenced government’s policy shift at district level 
to a mix of locally elected officials and appointed party officials (Conyers, 1981). This led to 
the introduction of reforms aimed at increasing public participation through a system that 
was referred to as ‘integrated’ to manage local administration. The councils largely provided 
social services and were adequately funded by central government to do so. This situation 
changed in 1973 as a result of the decrease in their financial base as central’s government 
resources were drying up, which in turn reduced the funds available to local government (see, 
Freund, 1986).  
 
In the health sector, meanwhile, the services provided in the colonial era were deemed to be 
more curative than preventive. This recognition led to a shift in the organisation of health 
services after independence. When health care organisational structures were established in 
1966, they consisted of the Central Administration, Provincial Administration and 
coordinating committees. The Central Administration (Medical, Preventive and Administrative 
divisions) was responsible for formulating health policy, planning, issuing policy guidelines, 
and allocation of funds (Freund, 1986 p. 879).  
 
This centralised structure meant that the apparent failures of councils to provide services are 
mostly attributed to Central Government (MLGH, 2009). The decline in funding for councils 
to provide social services affected the health sector in various ways – the lack of infrastructure 
development, failure to respond to the disease burden, poor medical supply chain and poor 
human resource management (MoH, 2001). The councils that were formally managed by 
locally elected officials were replaced by district councils that were composed of a 
combination of locally elected councillors and officials appointed by the UNIP party 
headquarters under the chairmanship of the district governor, an appointed official who was 
the head of the party and the government at district level (Conyers, 1981). Although this was 
referred to as decentralisation, the centre seemed to have had an upper hand in 
administrative control due to the presence of party elected officials at local level.  
 
The result was that, although the reforms were presented as a decentralisation with the aim 
of improving public participation through participatory democracy and at the same time 
enhancing administrative efficiency, the reforms did little to achieve the intended outcomes 
(cf. Conyers, 1981). Thus, by the late 1980s, there were massive calls to reform government 







(Chikulo, 1993). Furthermore, the provincial and district administrative officers were seen by 
critics as nothing more than loyalists to the party that strengthened party structures at lower 
levels, rather than enhancing democratic participation (Mushingeh, 1994). As already 
highlighted in Chapter One, the call for change of government in Zambia coincided with 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), economic reforms that the Bretton Woods 
institutions were promoting as means to enhance economic growth in developing countries 
(Loxley, 1990). Hence the main opposition party, the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy 
(MMD), gained political ground on promises of economic reforms based on economic 
liberalisation and better delivery of and access to social services for the Zambian masses 
(Baylies & Szeftel, 1992). The economic failures and the deplorable state of social services 
were blamed by the MMD on the UNIP government’s hesitation to implement SAPs. As 
Simutanyi (1996) notes; “economic grievances were used to express political grievances”.  
Although the decline in service provision and the quest to improve the operations of 
provincial, district and council administration in dispensing services triggered the UNIP 
government to implement decentralisation policies, the way it was structured failed to meet 
the purpose, partly because of the poor economy and also the dominance of local party 
officials at district level. Chapter Five returns to these issues of how UNIP loyalists undermined 
the decentralisation reforms. Therefore, in this case, the failures of decentralisation are 
closely related to political practices and weak socio-economic conditions (See Chapters One 
and Two).   
Decentralisation under the MMD Government (1991 – 2011) 
The MMD was elected to government in 1991. Although the MMD ran its campaign based on 
restoring Zambia’s economy, some academics point out that problems that emerged later 
during their administration were a result of their campaign having over-promised, with no 
clear policy clarity: the promises were many, but how they were to be achieved was not clear. 
(Chikulo, 1993; Simutanyi, 1996).  
By the time the MMD assumed power in 1991, the UNIP government had implemented three 
national development plans. The Fourth National Development Plan had been launched in 
1989 but was abandoned in 1991 in preference for an open market system that brought 
significant changes in Zambia (Kalumba, 1994). One of the important lessons learnt from the 
1990s was the realisation that, even in a liberalised economy, development planning is 
necessary for guiding priority setting and resource allocation (cf. Bossert et.al, 2003). The 
absence of planning drove the country to concentrate on short-term needs representing 
narrow sectional interests, thus denying the country the opportunity to attain broad based 
socio-economic development (FNDP – 2006 -2010) 
While the MMD government introduced the Public Service Reform Programme (PSRP), which 
triggered a number of reforms intended to improve efficiency in public service delivery and 







plans depended on external funds - and were constructed with the help of external 
technocrats (World Bank, 2018). These included, among others, the National Decentralisation 
Policy (NDP) whose thrust was on sectoral devolution or transfer of functions, power and 
authority with matching resources from the centre to autonomous local bodies. The NDP was 
approved in 2002 and launched for implementation in 2004. It was revised and re-launched 
in 2012. As indicated in the introductory chapter, the devolution plan continues to be under 
revision to date (revised DIP, 2009) 
From the NDP, the Sector Devolution Action Plan (SDAP) for primary health care (PHC) 
functions was developed to provide the framework for the health sector to devolve PHC 
functions; that is, to designate responsibilities to local councils as well as to identify and clarify 
those functions which are to be retained by the Central Government through the Ministry of 
Health (revised DIP, 2009). To do so, the SDAP first assessed the organisational structure, 
human resource, financial, assets, policy and legislation implications of devolution on the 
Ministry/Department and councils and then recommended policy actions or directions for 
dealing with all identified implications. This was followed by an implementation (devolution) 
plan which indicated how and when the Ministry will devolve the identified specific activities 
of PHC to the councils, and with what resources. The plan also identifies and lists the specific 
activities or elements of PHC which should be devolved to councils and those which should 
remain with the Ministry. Consequently, the organisational structure of the Ministry of Health 
was to change, and councils were expected to alter their structures to accommodate the 
operations of the new Department of Health Services (Health sector devolution Plan; 
unpublished).  
Although health and education were a priority for the MMD government from the outset, 
they were a challenge for the new government to address both in monetary and structural 
terms as the country was undergoing radical reforms such as reduction of the size of the civil 
service, privatisation of parastatal companies, and the withdrawal of funds from large city 
councils so that they could raise revenue through rents, rates and fees to support their 
operations (Baylies & Szeftel, 1992, Crook and Manor, 2001, Chikulo, 2009a). The operations 
of councils were already resource constrained under the UNIP government and it is claimed 
that with the MMD government the situation worsened (MLGH, 2003). The implications of 
these reforms meant that service provision did not in fact change much, and the new 
government continued to struggle to provide adequate social services. Indeed, by the early 
1990s the health system was near collapse, characterised by poor performance of primary 
health care services, with the problem having been further compounded by the emergence 
of the HIV/AIDS scourge.   
Consequently, various reforms were adopted as means to improve government functions at 
all levels, with the health sector being one of the target sectors. The health sector reforms 
aimed to address the widespread poor health indicators signified by poor maternal and child 







also faced with a decline in human resources for health as a result of poor conditions of 
service and HIV/AIDS. Thus, the MMD government painted the situation as dire and sought 
to transform the health sector by coming up with the Zambia National Health Policies and 
Strategies (ZNHPS: 1993) that spelt out how the operations of the health sector were to 
change. But at the time, Zambia was experiencing high poverty levels due to economic 
reforms coupled with the burden of HIV and AIDS. (MoH, 1993).   
As already discussed, evidence shows that the health reform process targeted to build 
systems as figure 2. demonstrates. The structures built by the process were also legally bound 
by Zambian law through an Act of Parliament but still success was not attained (See Chapter 
Three). Although Brinkerhoff argues that policy should not focus on debating what success 
consists of but should look at who gains and who doesn’t, in the health reform process losses 
were widespread because the health workers resisted and communities could not afford to 
spend on health services out of their pockets (Brinkerhoff, 2015). However, such arguments 
are difficult to substantiate decentralisation policy operations in Zambia because the gains of 
improved health service delivery are rarely attained.  
Figure 2: Ministry of Health Structures - Health Reforms Period 
 
However even though the decentralised systems were designed to be legally binding, they 
failed to achieve the mandate and to a large extent could not operate within the legal 
frameworks in which they were designed to (see, Chapter Five). This is because the health 
reforms were implemented together with economic reforms as argued throughout the thesis, 
which significantly affected the purchasing power and livelihoods of individuals and 







how the plan succumbed to the existing household poverty levels during implementation will 
be discussed in Chapters Five and Six.   
Political implications of Health Sector Reforms and Decentralisation (Moving from one Party 
to multi-party: 1991 – 2011) 
In reforming the health sector, the main concern for the MMD Government was to develop 
policies that would fundamentally guide and address the problems that were inherent in the 
health sector. The aim was to put in place strategies for improvement in Primary Health Care 
and Hospital services across the country as well as better management and improvements in 
quality of service (NHSP, 1992).  
This was so because evidence pointed to the fact that, since attaining independence from 
British rule, Zambia inherited a health system focused on curative care and with public health 
facilities distributed in favour of urban populations (which is still the case to date) (Freund, 
1986; Chansa, 2009, p, 22). The public health system was also characterized by centralized 
planning and decision-making, in which primary health care programmes (especially for rural 
areas) were not prioritized. As a result, health planning and service delivery were not linked 
to the needs of the communities. There were also issues with governance, including poor 
accountability and transparency, and a proliferation of externally funded health projects 
(WHO, 2009). These projects were being implemented outside the public health system and 
were not linked to the national development goals (MoH, 1996). Although the UNIP 
government between 1964 and 1990 had responded to some of these challenges by providing 
free medical care and constructing new health facilities in rural areas, with the situation 
improving in the initial years, by the end of the 1980s the health care system had crumbled 
and was characterized by a chronic shortage of drugs, run down infrastructure and 
equipment, and migration of health personnel to foreign countries.  This in turn led to a rise 
in disease related morbidity and mortality indicators (NHSP, 1992).  
The MMD government’s first comprehensive health sector reforms in 1992 had a vision of 
“providing equity of access to cost-effective, quality health care, as close to the family as 
possible” (MoH, 1993). The health reforms were centred on the delivery of primary health 
care through a decentralized health system, including planning for health services with 
community involvement and fiscal decentralisation (direct disbursement of funds to the 
districts). The health reforms also initiated a purchaser-provider split through a re-definition 
of the role of the Ministry of Health, whose mandate remained that of policy development, 
strategic planning, legislation, resource mobilization, external relations, and monitoring and 
evaluation (MoH, 1996). Through the reforms, the Central Board of Health (CBoH) was 
created in 1996 as an autonomous body responsible for the delivery of health services. Its 
functions included the commissioning of health services to district and hospital boards. The 







principles. This commitment to reform was reaffirmed in the MMD’s 1996 manifesto (MMD 
Manifesto 1996).  
Since the aim of the reforms was to decentralize health service delivery, based on the primary 
health care approach (MoH, 1992), new community structures were established, including 
Health Centre Committees and Neighbourhood Health Committees (MoH, 1992), and district 
management structures (Health Management Teams and Health Boards) were created to 
support the community level structures (MoH, 1992). The provincial and district health 
structures were also given new mandates through Cabinet Circular No 1 of 1995 to facilitate 
planning and co-ordination of development at the provincial level through Provincial 
Development Co-ordination Committees (PDCC). At District level, the performance of public 
functions was split between the District Administration and a democratically elected Council. 
Cabinet Circular No 1 of 1995 also provided for coordination between the District 
Development Co-ordination Committees (DDCC) and the local councils.7 The operational 
structures within the Ministry of Health were revised to accommodate the reforms, with 
strong emphasis on community engagement (MoH, 2000) 
  
The MMD government were highly commended by the donor community for the bold steps 
they took towards improving health service provision (WHO, 2010). Notably the health 
reforms were praised for: (i) articulation of the National Health Policies and Strategies, which 
was developed through a higly consultative process in 1991 and was approved by Cabinet 
Office in 1992; (ii) the enactment of the National Health Services Act of 1995 by Parliament 
and subsequent development of the National Health Strategic Plan, where the Act provided 
for the establishment of autonomous health boards through which the Central Board of 
Health (CBoH) was formed as a technical arm of the Ministry of Health with the mandate to 
interpret and implement policies and; (iii) the creation of District Health Boards and Hospital 
Management Boards. The aim of these was to transfer management for quality to district 
level through managerial, and professional, autonomy (MoH, 2001). 
 
Indeed, as the health reforms commenced, Zambia became recognized globally as a model 
for the health sector reform movement (WHO, 2008). Besides gaining international 
recognition, the reforms prompted expectations locally, and the Zambian public expected all 
health problems to be solved (Gilson, 2000). When that was not forthcoming, there was a 
public outcry calling for the health sector reforms to be halted. The MMD government, which 
referred to itself as a ‘listening government’, was under pressure to heed to the people’s call 
(see Chikulo, 1993). Consequently, the Health Services Act was repealed in 1995 with the 
 
7 The operations of councils had already been amended under the Local Government Act of 1991, under which 
councils were charged with responsibility for delivering a broad range of services including Housing, Urban 
Land Development services, Water and Sanitation as well as Urban and Feeder Roads development and 







abolition of the CBoH. A report by the Swedish International Development Cooperation 
(1998) pointed out that the health sector reform in Zambia had been attempted at a time 
when the internal and external environment was not very favourable to reform.  
The difficulties faced, however, may not all have been contextual – they may also have been 
political. Evidently the anticipation surrounding the health reforms had been quite high, with 
policy observers having noted that the MMD’s vision for the health sector embodied the 
ideologies of leadership, accountability and partnership (see Lake and Musumali, 1999). 
However political scientists as early as 1992 were wary of such reforms being implemented 
by inexperienced government structures. For example, Bratton (1992) questioned the 
stability of the MMD government because the politics they employed seemed to resonate 
most with the urban elites. In addition, Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2002) questioned the 
rapid transformation of politics from a one-party to a multi-party system, especially within 
the context of weak democratic values that would require a significant amount of time to 
become established. He noted that the transitions to multiparty politics were not enough to 
protect countries like Zambia from resource looting and abuse by the executive.   
While decentralisation had been the main feature of the health sector reform process in 
Zambia, this agenda was largely implemented outside the broader national decentralisation 
process – as stated earlier on in Chapter One. This was to change in 2004 when the National 
Decentralisation Policy was launched. Yet, as we will see below. this policy remains 
unimplemented.  The impetus for decentralisation after 2002 withered. Some scholars 
attribute this to what was happening on the global level, where decentralisation was no 
longer seen as a priority (Prudhomme, 2003). However, this was the period during which HIV 
and AIDS was highly prioritised on the global agenda. Countries like Zambia with high 
prevalence of HIV and AIDS were required to create structured country response 
mechanisms. The community was considered as the centre of response, and hence the 
decentralisation of HIV/AIDS sector was prioritised. What arose, in effect, was a separate and 
disease-specific decentralisation process which happened within the HIV/AIDS sector, and in 
a way that was largely separated from the broader context of health sector reforms (and 
which overlapped between the MMD government discussed in this section, and the PF 
government that followed it and is the focus of the next section). 
 
HIV/AIDS Decentralisation Implementation– 1987 – 2014 
 
The development of a national response to HIV/AIDS and the creation of decentralized 
HIV/AIDS systems and structures began in 1986 when the Zambian Government established 
the National AIDS Prevention and Control Programme (National AIDS Council, 2003). 
Thereafter, three short- and medium-term HIV/AIDS plans were developed and implemented 
between 1987 and 1998 (MoH, 2003). In 2002, the Zambian Government and other 







multi-sectoral approach was required to address the epidemic (National AIDS Council, 2006a). 
At the same time, the WHO was urging countries ravaged by HIV/AIDS to mount responses 
that were broad-based (WHO, 2006). 
 
Parliamentary Act No. 10 of 2002 established the National AIDS Council (NAC) and its 
Secretariat to co-ordinate a multi-sectoral response against HIV/AIDS (National AIDS Council, 
2006b). The NAC was created as a ‘quasi-government’ corporate body with powers to 
coordinate, monitor, and evaluate the impact of HIV/AIDS programmes and interventions 
(WHO, 2006). As part of the strategy, a Cabinet Committee on HIV/AIDS was created to 
provide policy direction, political leadership and advocacy. As can be noticed, the NAC was 
created as a horizontally decentralised structure delegated with governing HIV/AIDS services. 
 
The establishment of the NAC in 2002 prompted the development of a multisectoral approach 
and the creation of decentralized HIV/AIDS systems and structures, which together aimed to 
reduce the personal, social and economic impacts of HIV and AIDS (Ndubani et al, 2007). As 
part of its mandate, NAC was given the responsibility of coordinating HIV/AIDS activities 
within line ministries, and at provincial, district, and community levels (NAC, 2000), which was 
often a very difficult task because Ministries were mandated to form an HIV/AIDS taskforce 
headed by a focal point person, however these focal point persons had other responsibilities 
making it difficult for them to conduct HIV/AIDS activities. It prompted the United Nations 
Against HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) to employ focal persons stationed in key ministries to effectively 
meet the mandate (Ndubani et. al, 2007). 
 
NAC sub-structures at provincial and district level operate through the Provincial and District 
Development Coordinating Committees and consist of: Provincial AIDS Task Forces (PATF), 
District AIDS Task Forces (DATF), and Community AIDS Task Forces (CATFs); see Figure 3 
(National AIDS Council, 2006b). The HIV/AIDS decentralisation process ran alongside the 
health sector decentralisation process. However, it should be noted that these functions were 






















Figure 3: Decentralized Structures for HIV/AIDS Programme implementation in Zambia  
 
Source with modification by Author: National AIDS Council, 2006b 
 
Planning and Funding for HIV/AIDS programmes in Zambia 
 
The 2002 legislation led to the development and implementation of a National HIV/AIDS 
Strategic Framework 2001-2003, and a National HIV/AIDS Intervention Strategic Plan (NAISP) 
2002-2005 (National AIDS Council, 2006b). This Plan built on political commitment at the 
highest level, and also outlined a broad framework and specific interventions for multi-
sectoral, participatory, and rights-based approaches involving all sections of society (MoH, 
2000). Its main goal was to reduce the HIV prevalence rate among Zambians by 10% and to 
improve the health status of people living with HIV/AIDS (National AIDS Council, 2003). This 
was to be achieved by reducing HIV/AIDS transmission, mitigating the socio-economic 
impacts of HIV/AIDS, and by developing multi-sectoral coordination mechanisms. After the 
expiry of the 2002-2005 National Plan, the National AIDS Strategic Framework (NASF) 2006-
2010 was developed, focusing on service delivery and promotion of community-led life-saving 
activities (National AIDS Council, 2006a). 
 
The Zambian Government applied for and received a grant of US $42 million from the World 
Bank through the Zambia National Response to HIV/AIDS (ZANARA) project to implement 
HIV/AIDS activities over a period of five years, beginning in 2003 (World Bank, 2009). The 
ZANARA project was part of the World Bank’s Multi-Country AIDS Program in Africa (MAP), 
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which was launched in 2000 (see, World Bank, 2009). The MAP was different from traditional 
World Bank lending in that it was designed to be community oriented and demand-driven, 
and without the long planning cycle that typically characterised World Bank loans (MoH, 
2000). Projects were intended to fit within the country’s existing development strategy and 
the Bank’s strategy for overall lending in that country (Ndubani, et. al, 2007). The ZANARA 
Project had four components: support to the National AIDS Council and secretariat, support 
to line Ministries, Support to the MoH National Programme, and the Community Response to 
HIV/AIDS (CRAIDS), which was designed to respond to the HIV/AIDS crisis at community level 
in line with the 2002-2005 National Strategic Plan (World Bank, 2009). The main objective of 
the CRAIDS Initiative, which ran from 2003 to 2008, was to mobilize and strengthen the 
capacity of communities and the private sector to respond to the HIV/AIDS epidemic (World 
Bank 2009, Miyano et.al, 2017). At community level, the focus was on the provision of 
financial and technical support to Community Based Initiatives which were to be identified, 
planned, managed and operated by the communities themselves. The appraisal, approval and 
disbursement mechanisms are outlined in Figure 4 below.  
 
Figure 4: CRAIDS Appraisal, Approval and Disbursement Mechanisms  
 
Source with modification by Author: National AIDS Council, 2006b 
 
 Zambia’s approach to HIV/AIDS control, supported by the World Bank MAP, was grounded 
on there being strong collaboration, coordination, partnerships and networking with 
stakeholders at all levels; and on a decentralised response. The World Bank ‘Implementation 
Completion and Results Report’ (2009) reported that CRAIDS was a success and that it 
provided a lifeline to the decentralized HIV/AIDS structures through the NAC. The report 
identified the need for a case study on CRAIDS to shed more light on the enabling factors for 
community initiatives (World Bank, 2009). Some of the issues which were suggested for 
review were: the nature of the involvement of community members in CBOs; CBOs' activities; 
effectiveness of accountability mechanisms; and cost-effectiveness of CRAIDS and its 
activities (World Bank, 2009).  
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The perceived success of this programme offers some insights for decentralisation more 
widely. First, the success of the HIV/AIDS model mounted by the World Bank to support 
HIV/AIDS programmes at community level relied on the structures that were established 
under the 1996 health reforms (which, as the MoH (2007) noted, had some success in creating 
solid community structures for health service delivery). This fits with literature that highlights 
the coherence of key policy decisions that were undertaken locally, nationally and 
internationally. A range of steps that were undertaken have been stated, which include: 
meeting donor set requirements and conditions, sufficient resources, government’s 
commitment to provide leadership, comprehensive plans that identify the needs and how the 
needs are to be addressed, the right skills and an empowered community willing to get 
involved (see, for example Smoke, 2006; Crook, 2003).  
Second, decentralisation supports community development when it delegates 
responsibilities, and especially resources, to local governing bodies and other community 
entities, thereby enabling communities to identify priorities, which is the starting point of a 
development cycle (Gaye, et al., 2001). Pollack (2015), states that decentralisation is good for 
communities only if communities are given the power to control the resources. In the case of 
the HIV/AIDS sector, the resources were externally provided with pre-set conditions by the 
World Bank. One of these conditions was to set up funding mechanisms to disburse funds 
directly to communities, which the Zambian government was obliged to do (World Bank, 
2002). As reported by Walsh et.al (2012), communities felt empowered to lead the response 
to HIV/AIDS to address local priorities since funds were directly disbursed to CBOs.8 In the 
absence of resources, it is much less likely that decentralisation will foster community 
participation.  
Decentralisation under the PF government – 2011 to 2019 
It is worth reiterating at this point that the decentralisation witnesses in the HIV/AIDS sector 
in Zambia worked in isolation of any wider national health sector decentralisation plans for 
more than two decades. 
 
Nevertheless, a renewed impetus for the wider decentralisation plan came with the election 
of the PF government in 2011. Although the plan had been there since 2004, the PF 
government made several steps towards implementing decentralised service delivery - 
especially health services. According to the PF manifesto, good health is an essential 
prerequisite for national development. Through its manifesto, the PF government declared 
its intent to develop the health sector in Zambia using the six health systems building blocks 
as recommended by the World Health Organisation (PF Manifesto, 2009). These ‘building 
 
8 Although communities in Zambia felt that they addressed some of the needs through empowerment projects as 
part of CRAIDS, the sustainability of most of the CBOs beyond the CRAIDS programme was seen to be a 








blocks’ are service delivery, human resources, medicines and technology, health financing, 
health information systems, and leadership and governance. Determined to ‘put more money 
in people’s pockets’, the PF government outlined a number of policy measures and strategies 
designed to reduce catastrophic health expenditures and the impoverishing effects of ill-
health. This included the abolition of user fees and co-payments; increasing the government 
budget for the health sector according to the Abuja Target of 15% of the government national 
budget; promoting public-private partnerships in the financing of health services; and 
providing basic health care based on need and not ability to pay. The PF government had 
clearly outlined their intent to improve health service provision, and decentralisation lay at 
the heart of this promise (PF Manifesto, 2010).  
 
The above notwithstanding, it was recognised that the PF government had taken over 
government at a time when there was weak governance and accountability, reduced donor 
support to the health sector, and a looming global economic crisis.  The PF government 
inherited structural and functional problems from the MMD government, which had set the 
course through the Sixth National Development Plan 2011-2015, and the National Health 
Strategic Plan 2011-2015. Nevertheless, the PF government was committed to take forward 
the implementation of decentralisation across government, not only in the health sector. The 
Revised National Decentralisation Policy (R-NDP) was launched on 16th June 2013 with the 
mission statement: “to promote a decentralised and democratically elected system of 
governance which enhances community participation in decision-making” (LG Parliamentary 
Committee, 2014). Cabinet Office Circular No.10 of December 2014 provided guidelines on 
the implementation of the R-NDP based on a sector-wide phased approach over a period of 
three years (2015-2017).  
While the R-NDP had been presented to parliament and was waiting for ratification, the PF 
government went ahead to re-organise the roles and functions of the Ministry of Health and 
the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services in 2011. This process was not 
subjected to a comprehensive restructuring procedure as outlined by the Management 
Development Division at Cabinet Office. The Government made it clear that the assignment 
of some functions of the MoH to the MCDSS (which was later renamed the Ministry of 
Community Development, Mother and Child Health - MCDMCH) was transitional.  
Consequently, there were two scenarios playing out simultaneously: the MoH and MCDMCH 
realignment of functions; and the pending devolution of health services to local government. 
But there was no clear plan of how the two ministries and the government in general were 
going to be coordinating activities (Chansa, 2013). For example, from 2011 through to 2013, 
the creation of additional districts (which had already been embarked upon as part of the 
decentralisation process) was no doubt going to affect health financing (especially resource 
mobilization and allocation); management support systems (finance, procurement, and 







and overall service delivery. In this respect, clear guidance, change management, and capacity 
building was key. On another front, the health sector devolution plan was fully fledged with 
assessment having been completed with regards to organisational structure, human 
resource, financial, assets, policy and legislative implications of devolution on the 
Ministry/Department and councils, and the recommended policy actions or directions for 
dealing with all identified implications.  
 
The MoH presented a plan to parliament that showed how the Ministry was to devolve 
specific activities of Primary Health Care (PHC) to the councils, and with what resources (LG 
Committee Parliament Report, 2011). The plan presented by MoH further indicated that the 
organisational structure changes within MoH and their implications were not yet figured. 
However, it was agreed by government and stakeholders that the councils had to alter their 
structures, including the creation of a separate and new department of health services, to 
accommodate the devolved PHC functions (MoH, 2014)  
 
On human resources, the MoH had stated that they were to devolve responsibility for 
personnel to district level, including those serving at the District Medical Office, health centres 
and health posts. On finance and assets, councils were to receive enhanced funding directly 
from the treasury. Recommendations were made for the development of new infrastructure 
especially for the newly created districts. Under legal and policy issues, within the health 
sector devolution plan it was recognised that there are policy and legislative implications for 
both the MoH and Councils - and thus it was recommended policy be amended at both 
National and Council level (MoH, 2012).  
On the financing reforms, Zambia abolished user fees in all public and mission health facilities 
in 2006 (rural areas), 2007 (peri-urban areas), and 2012 (entire primary health care services). 
This move was meant to increase the utilization of health services by the poor, after evidence 
showed low utilization and poor health outcomes among the poor (NHP, 2010). Relatedly, an 
earmarked tax on the interest on savings (medical levy), which had been introduced in 2003 
to raise additional revenues for the health sector, was abolished in 2013 in an attempt to 
restore the culture of saving and investing among the general populace (cf. GRZ, 2009; 
Chansa, 2013). Despite all this change in the health sector, the National Decentralisation Plan 




This overview of Zambia’s history of attempts to decentralise the health sector reiterates the 
claim made in the previous chapter that decentralisation is a highly contextualised tool and 
that in studying decentralisation there is a need to examine a wide range of factors such as 







in the government and vice-versa, solvency of the district councils, and local resource 
mobilisation potential etc. (see Rondinelli, 1990, Mitchell and Bossert, 2010). In addition, for 
a policy to successfully operate within such a framework there has to be strong commitment 
from the various actors involved. However, Zambia presents a weak case in that regard. A 
study conducted by Transparency International revealed that Zambia’s political systems are 
weak and foster centralisation, in that the government is a powerful machinery that operates 
within weakened civil society. Furthermore, the previously strong media which Zambia 
boasted to have built in the last two decades has evidently been weakened (TIZ, 2008).  
 
The public sector reforms that the Zambian government has implemented have been 
supported by various bilateral and multilateral agencies. This continues to this day. For 
example, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) is currently supporting 
human resource reforms within the public sector. The European Union is supporting the 
reform and strengthening of Public Financial Management (PFM). PFM has often been cited 
in the literature as a key determinant of the success/failure of decentralisation policies 
(Andrews and Schroeder, 2003). But as well as providing resources and technical support, 
donors also criticise the Zambian government. For example, the Norwegian government 
describes Zambia as a ‘neo patrimonial state’ that is detrimental to development because 
power is centralised, and access to resources is for a privileged few who are not accountable 
for the misuse of resources. Though development agendas may appear strong, the 
implementation is often weakened by the lack of wider representation of stakeholders 
(Norad, 2008, Cheeseman 2016). While this is in many ways true, it is also important to 
understand that central government still has a key role to play even in a decentralised system. 
The role of central government as funder and steward of health service delivery cannot be 
over emphasised. Furthermore, the nature of mobilising resources for health requires 
massive experience and a more coordinated central response. However, in a highly 
centralised state, central governments use the very excuse of being the funder and steward 
to tightly control lower levels (Pollack, 2015). Ideally in a decentralised plan, the roles of each 
entity are clearly spelled out and are not static over time. To elaborate on the argument, 
(Mitchell and Bossert, 2010) highlights that decentralisation should not be seen as a form of 
governing in itself but as a subset of centralisation.  
While the health reforms of 1996 were hyped by government and were widely expected by 
the public to improve health service delivery, the current devolution plan (that can be traced 
from 2002) is much more low-profile, and most senior servants remain in the dark about how 
it will be ultimately implemented.  
To conclude the chapter, the implementation of numerous reforms within a short period of 
time has, to some extent, weakened the legal and regulatory environment, leading to 
inconsistency in governance of the health sector and a fragmented health system. Successive 







democratically elected system of governance characterised by open, predictable and 
transparent policy making and implementation processes, effective community participation 
in decision making and administration of their local affairs, while maintaining sufficient 
linkages between the central level structures and the periphery (MoH, 2015). The will to do 
so seems to be strongly held by parties when in opposition, but when the party forms 
government the inertia sets in. For example, the National Decentralisation Policy was 
launched in 2004 having been earlier approved in 2002.  The policy was revised by the PF 
government after it came to power in 2011 and was approved for implementation in 2013. 
Yet the policy has not been implemented to date.  The reasons could be that decentralisation 
policies are complex to implement, and also require significant resources.  Despite the various 
reforms, the legal and regulatory provision as it exists today in Zambia is largely inappropriate.  
Throughout the health reforms process (1990s to 2000s), most of the statutory 
(service/regulatory) boards have not really been part of the health reform agenda. 
Consequently, the statutory systems and structures required in the districts and hospitals 
have not been established at all. The coordination challenge has been exacerbated by the 
repeal (without replacement) of the 1995 National Health Services Act. The lack of an Act to 
provide a framework for the organisation of health services has created a legislative ‘vacuum’ 
i.e., all the institutions in the health sector currently operate without a legal mandate. 
Chapters Five and Six demonstrate the impact that these historical factors have had on 
decentralisation in practice, highlighting actors’ perspectives with regards to their 























































Explains the research strategy and methods used 
 
Justifies the importance of the research to Zambia’s development aspirations  
 
Explains the significance of the research to decentralisation policy development and to 
Zambia’s health systems development 
 





The two previous Chapters provided the essential background for the remainder of the thesis. 
Chapter Two examined the conceptual difficulties around decentralisation and the 
consequences that may arise from these debates. Chapter Three examined the history of 
decentralisation efforts in Zambia, and the factors that have ensured decentralisation 
remained on the agenda, as well as those that have hindered its implementation. A key insight 
of these chapters is that the outcomes produced by decentralisation policies will depend on 
the ideas that are introduced and the context into which they’re introduced. 
For this thesis, the key approach draws on critical realism to address the central research 
question, which is:  
Why has decentralisation persistently featured in policy discussions over health service 
delivery in Zambia, and how have decentralisation efforts affected, and been affected 
by, the governance of health service delivery in practice?  
This question is based on what ideas decentralisation introduces, how and why they are 
introduced, and how they function according to the existing social, political and economic 
conditions (cf. Pawson and Tilley 1997; p56). The study is exploratory in nature as it is 
investigating a problem which is not clearly defined, - how decentralisation efforts 
affect/have been affected by health service governance (Yin, 1994). Nevertheless, it’s being 
conducted so that we have a better understanding of why decentralisation persistently 
features in policy discussions in the Zambian context to govern health services. The underlying 







and actors that work to design and implement decentralisation (see Chapter One). As Chapter 
Two highlighted, decentralisation is a generalised concept that is often claimed to promote 
several development goals but is also highly contested. Therefore, the ontological orientation 
of the research is driven towards understanding the views and perspectives of actors in health 
decentralisation policies so as to make meaning of why decentralisation has yielded the 
results that it has in Zambia and whether it’s accepted norms and values reflect with how it 
has been practiced in Zambia.  Thus, Chapter Three set the background for how we can 
understand the Zambian context by proving a historical analysis (the value of historical 
analysis to this research has been highlighted in the later sections of the chapter). In addition, 
policy and document reviews and interviews were conducted as epistemological stand points 
so that we can know about the social processes, changes, actors’ views and how we can make 
meaning of them, as detailed later in this chapter.  
The study has not set out to provide conclusive or generalisable results: that was not the aim. 
Instead, it identifies and explores issues that can improve (or hinder) health service 
governance, the way decentralisation is implemented and, ultimately, health service delivery. 
In the conclusion, it also identifies issues that can be the focus of future research (see, Yin, 
1994; Gilson et. al, 2018). 
Yin (1999) posits that good case studies should employ an operational framework. As briefly 
described in Chapter One, to introduce and situate these discussions, the study used the 
health policy triangle framework developed by Walt and Gilson in 1994 (see also Buse et.al, 
2012, p.4) to generate ways of understanding the complexities and contexts of phenomena, 
and capacities to build social explanation and generalisation (see, Yin, 1999).  
Thus, the Zambian case study was designed to answer the stated research question using a 
qualitative research strategy with the aim of providing some critical thinking towards 
knowledge development within the Zambian context (See, Yin, 2016, p.4). In this regard, it’s 
argued that the qualitative approach was used because qualitative studies are said to attend 
to the contextual richness of case study settings that can derive insights on how and why the 
phenomenon came to exist. (Yin, 2016, p.4). Qualitative methods were appropriate for use in 
investigating the research question because they provided rich and unique historical contexts 
to understand the evolution of decentralisation processes in Zambia for example the views 
from the key informants were important in determining how policy actors see themselves 
influencing the decentralisation agenda and how they relate with other policy actors in driving 
the decentralisation agenda in Zambia.  Additionally, the literature review enabled the study 
to systematically analyse the debates surrounding the worth of implementing 
decentralisation policies , while reviewing decentralisation policy documents – the HIV/AIDS 
/STI/TB policy (MoH, 2002), National Health Policies and Strategies (Health Reform) policy 
(MoH, 1991), Health Sector Devolution Plan (unpublished) and the Revised National 
Decentralisation Plan (Cabinet Office, 2002) enable the study to locate the content of 







document review is its ability to address the research question in a more focused way.  
Considering that the research needed to focus on locating the context of decentralisation in 
Zambia, the content of the policies, the central role of actors, and the processes initiated to 
implement decentralisation, the methods provided the pathway to do so because through 
the review of documents the study was able to understand the actors that have been involved 
in decentralisation processes, why the policies were/are implemented and why they 
produced the results that they have had. 
Thus, the purpose of this Chapter is to explain in detail the approaches that have been utilised 
to address the research question. The Chapter begins by justifying why a qualitative research 
strategy was suitable to answer the research question. It then moves on to discuss the 
research design in more detail: the specific methods that were used in order to generate data 
and insights into decentralisation and why it remains popular as a health sector management 
tool. The chapter concludes by outlining how the research framework (the policy triangle) fits 
within the research strategy, providing a lens for answering the research question using the 
empirical data presented in Chapters Five and Six.   
Justification of a qualitative research strategy  
As already highlighted above, the research applied a qualitative research strategy because 
such a strategy provides the techniques and methods required to answer the given research 
question, and to arrive at the conclusions discussed in the conclusion Chapter (Seven) (cf. 
Strauss and Corbin 1998, p. 8). Before going further into making justifications on the 
appropriateness of the qualitative study approach to the research, it’s important that we first 
understand what qualitative research entails in the conduct of research.  
Yin (2016, p. 4) postulates that doing qualitative research means conducting original research 
with three important objectives: transparency, thorough methodical approaches, and 
adherence to evidence. This is because qualitative research in the past has been deemed to 
lack rigour, and thus has been criticised for the failure to critically outline what was done, how 
and why (see, Bryman 2008, p.392). For the purposes of this thesis, to offset the identified 
weaknesses of qualitative studies, a flexible study approach was used to allow for freedom of 
movement between the steps of data collection and data analysis, an iterative approach, that 
helped the research in using new information to fine tune concepts, sampling and analysis 
(see, Sarantakos, 2005). For example, when conducting the initial analysis for interviews, the 
researcher sought clarity from interviewees if the information given was either not very clear 
or did not match or was in conflict with other sources of data, for example data obtained from 
document review.    
An additional important point about qualitative studies is their ability to incorporate case 
studies as a method. For this research, which is a case study, the method defines the 
boundaries within which the study was conducted. Specifically, the Zambian case study in this 







current devolution plan which started in 2002 but is yet to be fully implemented. These two 
processes serve as examples of how decentralisation has been used to manage health services 
in Zambia.  
Case studies are also suited to explain historical and contemporary events (Yin, 1994), and in 
the case of this thesis, a historical analysis was given in Chapter Three. Historical analysis is 
currently said to be popular with health policymakers because of its ability to improve 
policymaking and service delivery (Sheard, 2017). The assumption is that:  
“…by focusing on the actual process of policymaking and implementation, especially 
what happens when earlier policies have been forgotten or deliberately side-lined, 
historical analysis helps to open up wider opportunities” (Sheard, 2017) 
In the case of this thesis, a historical analysis was applied to understand how and why 
decentralisation policies were introduced in the Zambian context. The basic assumption is 
that by tracing how decentralisation was introduced, the thesis was able to locate some 
normative goods that were intended to change the governing of health services (i.e. what the 
intended benefits of decentralisation were). By tracing how decentralisation progressed in 
practice in these two time periods, the other half of the research question can be answered: 
how have decentralisation efforts affected, and been affected by, the governance of health 
service delivery in practice? Ultimately, the interest was to point out what went wrong and 
how future decisions can be improved to yield better outcomes.  
To summarise, the case is an exploratory study focusing on understanding decentralisation in 
the Zambian context and not really concerned with making generalisations (see, Lazar and 
Hochheiser, 2017.) 
Yin (1984, p.23), considers a case study to be:  
“…the most flexible of all research designs, which allows the researcher to retain 
complete characteristics of real-life events while investigating empirical events. 
 In general, he considers a case study as an empirical inquiry which:  
“…investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context: when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which 
multiple sources of evidence are used”.  
He further adds that case studies are: 
“…best suited to considering the how and why questions, or when the investigator has 
little control over events” (Yin, 1984, p.24) 
Yin, (2016, p.9) summarises why qualitative studies are suitable, because they: 







2. Represent the views and perspectives of study participants 
3. Ability to account for real world contextual conditions 
4. Contribute to insights from existing or new concepts that may help to explain social 
behaviour and thinking and  
5. Acknowledging the potential relevance of multiple sources of evidence rather 
relying on a single source alone  
 
Having set out what qualitative studies entail and their ability to encompass case studies, the 
next section detail how they were applied in this research. 
Research design 
One of the highlighted strengths of case studies is their ability to generate understandings of 
how people relate to their settings, as well as the ability to appreciate the contextual richness 
of settings and how people relate to them – so to say; how people respond to situations under 
the circumstances they find themselves in (cf. Yin, 2016, p. 4). As suggested above, the thesis 
is a case study focusing on decentralisation and governance of health services in Zambia. The 
thesis projects two case studies of decentralisation in discussing how decentralisation policies 
have been implemented in Zambia for the benefit of the health sector – the health reform 
programme (1992 -2006) and the devolution process (2002 -to date). A case study design was 
suitable due to the complex nature of the topic under consideration. Keen and Packwood 
(1995, p.444), state that;  
“…case study evaluations are valuable where broad, complex questions have to be 
addressed in complex circumstances”.   
The research study area would be deemed as complex because of the debates surrounding 
the implementation of decentralisation policies in developing countries like Zambia. Critics 
often view the failures of decentralisation as being a result of over-optimism about what it 
can deliver, which fails to provide a solid basis for making informed judgements (Smith, 1985, 
p71). In addition, the institutional arrangements and structures in countries are varied, and 
decentralisation has also been criticised for not taking into account these factors. It’s often 
said that international institutions that advance decentralisation in developing countries fail 
to appreciate the unique contextual moderators to which it may be subjected (Smoke, 2003). 
Another factor that makes the study complex is that it studies the institutions and structures 
– the socio-political/socio economic factors.  
Despite the positive attributes of case studies, Park (1992) criticises them with regards to the 
difficulties they present when gaining access to interviewees, because interviewees for case 
studies are selected based on specific knowledge that they possess or their familiarity with 
the subject of inquiry. Moreso the research study had set parameters in selecting 







at any level, national, provincial, district and community to qualify as a participant. As such 
there was a uniqueness to the interviewee’s characteristics as they were all ‘actors’ in 
decentralisation processes and that the results discussed their actions and perceptions; so to 
say, interviewees were considered as insiders to the processes. Therefore, the views 
discussed in the empirical chapters were about; their actions/reactions; relationships with the 
institutions and systems; views about their responses to the systems; relationships with other 
actors etc.  
Ayres et.al (2008), bring out another criticism stating that case studies are weak because the 
researcher has no control over the data collected. The weaknesses presented are not inherent 
to this research because the research study used the snowballing technique to identify 
interviewees and relied upon the researcher’s strong professional network built over time. In 
addition, the researcher was able to examine data closely through the steps outlined in the 
data analysis approach section (below), and hence was able to critically analyse the data and 
triangulate with other sources where doubts were raised.  
Nevertheless, despite the weaknesses highlighted, the strengths of case studies were deemed 
ideal in which to situate the study. Decentralisation and health service governance is a useful 
topic on which to focus the research for both academic and practical reasons. From an 
academic perspective, decentralisation of health services in Zambia is within what Bryman 
(2004, p. 51) pronounces as a typical case, as the context is ideal to answer the research 
questions and give useful explanations, given that Zambia has been grappling with 
implementation of the broad decentralisation plan since 1992, as well the health sector 
decentralisation plans which also commenced during the same period (c.f. Chapter Three). 
For practical reasons - as highlighted in Chapter One - the thesis concerns itself with 
understanding various contextual issues within the Zambian context: socio-political processes 
- power and politics being a central concern in understanding policy processes, including 
power relations amongst actors; economic conditions; and how these factors affect the 
operations of health decentralisation, and in turn how health sector decentralisation affects 
their operations. 
  
As observed by Sriram et al. (2018), policy processes are engulfed by power. Therefore, 
understanding how power replicates itself in the Zambian policy field explained how and why 
successive governments have employed decentralisation policies in an attempt to transform 
the health sector (see, Gilson et. al, 2018). In addition, there is also a recognition that power 
and policy processes in developing countries are continually shaped by international 
institutions in terms of policy formulation and resource mobilisation (Walt et.al, 2008). Some 
of the issues the research was faced with were: what should we know about decentralisation 
in Zambia and how it’s influenced by politics; how does power emerge and manifest itself in 
policy production; why do certain policy actors have more influence than others – including 







generate discussions on how political influence can lead to successful transformations of 
health systems in developing countries if the right ideas are applied to the right context; and 
on the other hand, how politics can lead to policy failures (Walt et.al, 2008).  
In addition, and specific to Zambia, the thesis provided explanations as to why 
decentralisation has failed to yield the needed development for the health sector despite 
repeated attempts by various governments to achieve better health outcomes. The 
discussions recognise that although decentralisation policies have yielded limited results in 
Zambia, they are conducted within comprehensive national development plans that are 
developed prior to the implementation process (See Chapters One and Three). These 
interrogations shaped the foundations of the intellectual journey that helped to focus more 
on how political power has promoted and inhibited the progression of decentralisation for 
health services through the provision of historical tracing of decentralisation, as outlined in 
Chapter Three, while leading the researcher to understand the ideas of power; how it’s 
exercised and how actors wield power with regards to policy implementation (Buse et.al, 
2012, p.12). Chapters Five and Six use the health policy triangle to explore these issues 
empirically. In addition, the historical tracing of decentralisation policies helped to locate their 
evolution within broader fields of socio-political ideals and institutions that are subject to 
changing historical events within the Zambian context (see, Grundy et.al, 2013).  
How the policy triangle is applied to the case study. 
 
Yin (1999) highlights that good case studies should include some operational framework to 
establish what is to be studied, the questions to be asked, and subsequently provide logical 
explanations of how and why certain things happened. This thesis employed the health policy 
triangle framework to set the boundaries of what was to be studied and the questions to be 
asked (see, Appendix One). But most importantly, the health policy triangle framework was 
used as an analytical framework into which the debates of the research results were 
embedded.  
As outlined by Walt & Gilson (1994), the health policy triangle is a framework that explains 
three interactions of: i) what a policy stipulates and what it’s supposed to do (content); ii) the 
environment in which the stated policy is implemented and why (context) and; iii) how the 
policy is/will be actualised (process). At the centre of the three are actors. In this thesis, the 
approach to the study recognised that actors being at the centre, first, determine the content 
of policy at design stage, second, shape and are shaped by context through the agency 
exercised and third, they guide, control and shape policy processes at implementation stage 
as figure 5 demonstrates. In summary the framework explores the roles, interactions and 
influence of actors on each other and how their relationships and interactions ultimately 









Figure 5: Application of Health Policy Triangle Framework in conducting the study 
 
Within decentralisation policy’s development and implementation in Zambia, the thesis 
identifies the relevant actors as: (i) politicians (politicians that hold the power to direct the 
course of policy action at national level, such as a Minister of Health); (ii) high level civil 
servants (bureaucrats, who are often appointed by politicians, such as permanent secretaries, 
directors in ministries and high ranking civil servants); (iii) mid-level civil servants (directors at 
provincial and district levels and managers within ministries, some of them appointed by 
politicians); (iv) external actors (individuals working in donor agencies, both expatriates and 
local); (v) politicians at lower levels (district commissioners, mayors and councillors etc) and; 
(vi) community (ward chairperson and neighbourhood health committees). This 
categorisation of actors is specific to this thesis in order for it to advance the arguments that 
it intends to; ordinarily health system actors are identified differently from those identified in 
this thesis (see, Frenk 1994; WHO 2000). This thesis’ categorisation of actors is based on the 
mapping of actors prior to conducting fieldwork and confirmed through the empirical 
fieldwork findings. The categories define and differentiate roles, responsibilities and 
interactions among actors that enable pathways through which decentralisation becomes 
operational – the choices, implementation and outcomes. Beyond the identification of actors, 
analyses from interviews further provided direction on the level of influence that actors 
possess in decentralisation policy regarding choice, implementation and outcomes.  
 
In health policy, the policy triangle framework has been used in several studies to interrogate 
the validity of assumptions and ideas about policy change, and to understand not only the 
outcomes that are produced by interventions, but also how they are produced, and the 







Most studies posit that, through focusing on context, the assumptions about the process 
through which change occurs is normally the focus of investigations, while also specifying the 
ways in which the early and intermediate outcomes related to achieving the desired long-
term change associated with policy change is actualized and documented (cf. Buse et.al, 2012 
p. 4 - 6). Such an approach is applicable to this thesis because it falls within the boundaries of 
critical realism, which form the philosophical underpinnings of this research. 
 
In the production of policy outcomes, “programs work (have successful outcomes) only in so 
far as they introduce the appropriate ideas and opportunities (mechanisms) to groups in the 
appropriate social and cultural conditions (contexts); mechanism + context = outcomes” 
(Pawson and Tilley 1997; p56). And thus, for this thesis to embed the discussions of results in 
the health policy framework, Ritzer’s integrative theory of social analysis (Ritzer, 2008) 
provides a useful starting point in which to situate the study. It presents two axes for 
understanding context: one ranging from objective (society) to subjective (political, social and 
economic conditions); the other ranging from the macro-level (social change) to the micro-
level (ideas represented). Following Ritzer’s integrative steps, the discussions of how 
decentralisation policies have been employed to manage health services in Zambia are 
discussed according to the varying degree of policy change across the national level setting in 
reference to how national institutions transform to accommodate the introduced policy 
(Sheard, et.al, 2018).  
 
As already mentioned, the thesis considers that power dynamics are a central consideration 
in framing debates within the policy triangle. Therefore, taking into account the commitments 
of this research, the model provides for opportunities to conduct analysis that incorporates 
the content (or rather the intentions) of decentralisation policies as designed by stakeholders; 
the contexts (that is the socio-economic and political factors, disease burden etc); the 
processes by which decentralisation policies are designed, promoted and initiated (including 
resource availability and from whom); and the actors involved. By applying this framework, 
the research was able to make valid assessments of how reform is conducted in Zambia as 
well as critically analyse why reforms have produced the results that they have. The model 
can be used both retrospectively and prospectively (Walt and Gilson, 1994): in this thesis it 
has been used to understand multiple decentralisation policy experiences in Zambia using 
descriptive narratives and empirical data. The health policy triangle framework is used to 
explain how political actors in Zambia create ambitious health decentralisation policies prior 
to ascending to power. Furthermore, the framework explains the complex interactions 
between political actors in power and technocrats in legitimatising and implementing 
decentralisation policies. Two key debates arise in this regard: (i) how political actors engage 
with technocrats; and (ii) how technocrats react to political decisions in policy making. The 
two arguments create an understanding of why ‘good’ health policies on paper tend to fail to 








Another attractive feature of the health policy triangle framework is its ability to draw in ideas 
from public policy analysis and the political economy of development (see, Walt et.al, 2008). 
In doing so, it provides wider knowledge and explanations of policy and policy processes that 
are contested, involving multiple actors with different concerns, interests and values, often 
in competition with each other and influenced by a range of contextual factors and also by, 
for example, the timing of policy change and the content – the forms and focus – of specific 
policies (Gilson et.al, 2018).  
 
As will be demonstrated in the next section, a combination of qualitative research methods 
was used as a mechanism for triangulation.  The specific attributes of using a case study 
research design added value to the research process by providing a variety of different 
insights into the research context, which may not have been possible using one method alone. 
It also challenged perceptions, or verified impressions, thereby forming a broad basis upon 
which conclusions could be formed (Bryman, 2004; Manheim et al., 2006, p.334).  
To summarise, the study design for this research involved: A case study addressing historical 
and contemporary examples of how decentralisation has repeatedly appeared in policy 
discussions to govern health services in Zambia (see Chapters One and Three). Two 
decentralisation cases are used to demonstrate how decentralisation works according to 
what the context presents: how decentralisation affects socio-political processes and vice 
versa how socio-political processes affect the implementation of decentralisation. The 
arguments about how decentralisation is presented takes into consideration why the ideas 
are introduced, the context into which they are introduced, and how the processes evolve to 
achieve (or not) what decentralisation programmes intend to produce as the empirical 
chapters Five and Six will demonstrate. 
Methods 
Before moving forward, it is important to establish the specific methods that were used to 
generate data on how decentralisation processes have operated in practice within the 
Zambian context.   
Qualitative research is highly regarded for its ability to develop new concepts which may help 
to explain social processes, provide useful explanations and to form platforms for debate and 
new inquiries (Yin, 1999). Qualitative studies also represent contemporary varied cultural and 
social commonalities and differences and how political and social institutions respond to 
these conditions; these attributes of qualitative research contribute to understanding of 
interactions between actors within social contexts (cf. Yin, 2016)  
In addition, Yin (1994) indicates that the strength of qualitative study designs is that they are 
not automatically associated with any one data collection method.  The result is that they can 







obtained, thereby adding more meaning to data triangulation (see, Yin, 1994). Because the 
research question had two broad thematic areas for discussion – establishing i) why 
decentralisation policy discussions persistently feature on government health service delivery 
agenda (this is about interpreting policy implementation, actions and experiences); and ii) how 
decentralisation affects/and is affected by the governance of health services (this is about 
interpreting the results of policy action and experiences). Thus, they fit within the logic of 
qualitative research that calls for multiple methods to be used to address a research question. 
For this research the methods that were used are justified below.  
Literature Review 
First, a literature review (presented in Chapter 2) was conducted between November 2016 – 
May 2017 to understand the conceptual debates over decentralisation; identify the claimed 
benefits of decentralisation; and identify the critiques it has been subjected to. The literature 
review was carried out by adopting a systematic approach that is by searching literature of 
published articles using google scholar. The search results were then indexed in a diary by 
author and title. The next process involved a further search of the actual article or book either 
by title or author’s name using the University of Sheffield library. The process was conducted 
according to Hart (1998); Petticrew and Roberts (2006) recommendations on conducting 
systematic literature review. 
The literature review process resulted in a narrative review of why and how decentralisation 
is applied in general as a development tool. Through reviewing the literature, the theoretical 
underpinnings of decentralisation were understood, and why the concept is popular yet 
subjected to numerous criticisms was revealed. Literature reviewing also helped to gain an 
understanding about what decentralisation claims to do and how it’s applied to attain health 
system goals especially in developing countries. Overall, some of the key literature that was 
reviewed was based on: 
• Public policy reform 
• Decentralisation and health systems policy reform 
• Decentralisation and politics of managing health care services 
• Health sector reform in Africa/Zambia – key empirical data for the thesis 
• Decentralisation of health systems – most useful to determine why 
decentralisation is implemented 
• Change and reform and impact on health systems development – key 
literature to determining the impact of decentralisation, both good and bad. 













Site selection 9 
Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 34) suggest six site sampling strategies based on: relevance to 
the conceptual framework; ability to generate rich information; ability to enhance 
generalisability; ability to produce believable descriptions; ethical considerations; and 
feasibility. Although site selection for the study took into account most of the issues proposed 
by Miles and Huberman, what prominently stood out is that the sites were selected based on 
their ability to generate rich data because of the presence of interviewees and uniquely 
placed characteristics in terms of socio-economic transformations related to delivery of 
health services.   
 
 Lusaka, the capital city of Zambia, was an automatic selection because central 
government agencies, all the donor agencies, big Civil Society Organisations are all 
based in Lusaka.  
 Copperbelt Province is a Metropolitan province with a combination of City and 
Municipal Councils, urban and peri-urban areas which provided unique characteristics 
in determining the readiness of Local authorities to manage health services.  
 North-Western Province, although predominantly rural, is one of the fastest growing 
Provinces, run by Municipal Councils but the presence of big international mining 
corporations signifies the potential for local councils’ resource mobilisation.  In fact, 
historically, mining has been an important activity in Zambia, comprising of a sector 
that has contributed to health care service delivery and financing (see, Freund, 1986). 
 
Interviewee selection 
Interviewees were initially identified through a stakeholder mapping process conducted by 
the researcher10. Interviewees were identified through academic literature, donor reports, 
researcher’s professional networks, and previous professional interactions. The research used 
a purposive sampling strategy as explained by Bryman (2008, p.458) - purposive sampling 
implies being strategic as it requires that the researcher interviews people who are relevant 
to the subject of inquiry. Thus, interviewees were purposively selected, in that interviewees 
needed to have previously worked with or were currently working with decentralisation 
processes. Hence, having prior knowledge was key to selecting interviewees. Interviewees 
included both former and current officials/post-holders.  
The process of referral, or ‘snow-balling’, was also relied upon while in the field, in order to 
reach a much broader network of interviewees than would be possible relying on the data 
bases at Ministry of Health and the Decentralisation Secretariat. And in addition, as Etikan 
 
9  See Appendix six  







et.al, (2015) state; the snowballing technique helps to reveal hidden interviewees that the 
researcher may know but may not be able to locate. Considering that the period of study 
spans as far back as 30 years ago, most interviewees were either retired or former politicians 
out of the limelight. Hence the researcher heavily relied upon the snowballing technique to 
reach out to them. In some cases, certain interviewees pointed the researcher to other 
potential interviewees that the researcher did not intend to meet with or were not identified 
as key stakeholders in decentralisation processes.  
National level (Lusaka): Interviewees from the cabinet office, which is a direct wing of the 
government in charge of structural and organisation reforms within the government sector, 
were regarded as key, as well as individuals representing, the National Assembly of Zambia, 
donor agencies – both bilateral and Multilateral - the Ministry of health, Ministry of Local 
Government and Housing, the Decentralisation Secretariat – a body constituted by 
government to oversee the implementation of the devolution plan - and representatives from 
NGO’s and academic institutions. Other key interviewees included retired politicians, 
government officials and academics. Most of these interviewees were regarded as National 
level interviewees because they worked at national level or they previously held positions 
that are regarded to be at national level (see Appendix three for the comprehensive list of 
organisations represented).   
Sub-national level: Other interviewees included Ministry of Health District Health Directors, 
Local Government District Directors, Councillors and Community Ward Development 
representatives in the selected districts. District and community interviewees were selected 
based on the assumption that they held important views with regards to how the national 
devolution plan has been conducted in terms of transferring power and responsibilities from 
national to local levels. Retired government officials and politicians were regarded as key to 
giving information on historical evolutions and understandings of decentralisation processes, 
including the relationships among actors in the health policy arena, although it depended on 
the length of time they had served in their positions for them to provide relevant information 
to the research.  
The limitations to the stakeholder mapping of interviewee selection were that some key 
interviewees had moved on to other countries (especially donor agency interviewees). Some 
worked on decentralisation more than twenty years ago, and hence were not able to 
accurately recall certain details. In such instances, the researcher asked the interviewee if 
they could suggest individuals who were able to give an accurate picture of what they could 
not recall, or an alternative source to obtain the missing information.  
Data collection: Semi-structured interviews 
In-depth interviews with those who were currently or had previously been involved in 
decentralisation processes were conducted. Interviews are considered the most suitable for 







(Sarantakos, 2005).  Individuals from government ministries, civil society and donor agencies 
involved in decentralisation in Zambia were interviewed by the researcher. Informed consent 
was obtained in all cases. The interview guide11 was developed based on the literature review, 
and a stakeholder analysis using the policy triangle framework (specifically actors’ 
involvement in decentralisation processes).  
Each interviewee was pre-approached via email, letter, telephone or face-to-face contact to 
set an appointment date and venue at their convenience. The researcher would then follow-
up with an email to remind the interviewee to keep the appointment date. The researcher 
kept the appointment dates on written file as well as on google calendar and set a reminder 
for that. On the day of the scheduled interview, the alarm was set to remind the researcher 
an hour before the interview would take place. The researcher would then make a phone call 
to the interviewee to remind them of the interview time.  
 
Interviews lasted approximately one hour, depending on the availability of the interviewee. 
All interviews were recorded except for one conducted with an interviewee from a bilateral 
agency who requested that the interview not be recorded. 
 
Research Population and Sample Size 
The interviewee sample size was initially estimated at 50 as the maximum. Ritchie et al’s 
(2003:84) seven criteria for potential sample size was taken into consideration including: 
heterogeneity of the population; groups of special interest that require intensive study; and 
the need for multiple categories and therefore multiple sub-samples within one study.  The 
approximate figure of 50 was large enough for a qualitative sample and certainly reflected 
the likelihood of diversity of views and wide range of experiences given the different 
characteristics of the interviewees such as: professional backgrounds, level of involvement in 
the decentralisation processes, and length of experience with decentralisation processes (i.e. 
those who have been involved in the processes with successive political regimes and various 
donor support programmes).   
In the end, a total of 43 interviewees were interviewed and this met the estimate of the 
number of qualitative interviews required in order to identify and explore the key issues 
arising for understanding experiences of decentralisation processes in Zambia (i.e. to reach 
the point of data saturation – that is the point where an appropriate sample size has been 
reached with no additional perspectives or issues emerging from additional interviews 
(Mason, 2010)). This was in line with keeping estimate sizes of good practice for qualitative 
studies (Mason, 2002; Morse, 2000). The aim was to select participants with a wider 
representation of views based on their characteristics, roles and experiences, and not to 
generalise across the public, but to shed light on the range of issues relevant to the research 
 







questions. Thus, the research was cautious to select interviewees with a rich background of 
experiences in implementing decentralisation policies in a variety of sectors within Zambia.  
Therefore, exact numbers were not rigidly fixed prior to the commencement of the study 
(Mason, 2010).  
All the interviews were conducted at secure premises mostly at interviewee’s offices within 
working hours. Confidentiality and anonymity of interviewees was adhered to throughout the 
conduct of the study as required by ethical practices.  
 
Limitations of the interviews 
There were a number of difficulties encountered in securing key informant interviews.  First, 
the interviewees that were initially identified, including donor agency staff, government 
officials and NGO staff, were hesitant to commit to interviews or to supply information. In 
many cases it took persistence and several visits to their offices for them to consent to the 
interview. In this regard the skills acquired as a researcher for the last ten years became handy 
to secure the interviews. Bilateral agency interviewees were the most difficult interviewees 
to persuade, often citing busy schedules as the reason for their unavailability. However, when 
contacted by the researcher’s networks from a bilateral and a multilateral agency, they 
generally willingly consented. The researcher was also able to tap into previous scholarship 
(Beit/Chevening) networks to secure interviews from donor agencies. 
With other interviewees, especially retired high-level politicians, persistence and creativity 
paid off to gain access. For example, the researcher interviewed two former very high-level 
politicians as a result of using the snowballing technique. Given that the fieldwork period was 
a total of 6 months, it provided sufficient time to conduct an appropriate breadth of 
interviews across different actors involved with decentralisation processes. Fortunately, I 
managed to interview two key people who were the pioneers of health reforms and were 
spoken about by nearly all the interviewees interviewed in the Ministry of Health.   
As with any interviews, the researcher was cautious of the possibility of dishonesty in the 
responses of interviewees. The researcher was aware that such issues would lead to 
inaccuracy in data analysis and presentation.  Thus, the problem that these issues presented 
were minimised by the strategy of triangulating sources of evidence and also by employing 
judgement in the interpretation and analysis of the responses.  For most of the recorded 
interviews, interviewees were given a copy of the recorded audio and some interviewees 
made an effort to give additional information where they felt that they were gaps in the 
information given. The researcher also sought clarity through second interviews where the 
information given was not clear. Although taxing, most second interview processes were 









Ethical clearance was obtained from the Universities of Sheffield and Zambia, which is a 
requirement to conduct any health-related research in Zambia12. The two ethics clearance 
letters were presented to the Permanent Secretary (PS) at the Ministry of Health Zambia 
(MoH) along with a letter written by the Director at the University of Zambia, Institute of 
Economic & Social Research (INESOR) to introduce the researcher and the study stating that 
the research findings were important to Zambia’s health sector development agenda. The PS 
then wrote a letter to authorise the study13, which had to be submitted to the Zambia 
National Health Research Council (ZNHRC) for Approval. Subsequently, a letter was issued by 
ZNHRC to all Provincial and District Health Directors in the study sites to inform them of the 
imminent study and that the researcher should be given the required support14.  
 
With regards to gaining access to local authority bodies, Cabinet office and donor institutions, 
a generic letter was written by the Director at INESOR to be presented to donor and 
government agencies along with ethical clearance letters, with the exception of Parliament 
where a letter had to be specifically written to the Clerk of the National Assembly in order to 
gain access. To that, Cabinet Office through the Decentralisation Secretariat then issued 
written directives to all local authorities in the study sites to allow the researcher to gain 
access to documents as well as interviewees from province to community level15. The process 
of gaining access to institutions lasted for a month due to delayed ethical clearance by the 
University of Zambia, because the designated Ethics committee could not be convened on 
time due to technical difficulties.  
 
Interviewee anonymity and confidentiality was maintained throughout the research. At the 
interview appointment, the interviewee was given the opportunity of confidentiality and/or 
anonymity. A research information sheet that outlined the key areas of study was made 
available to all the interviewees before the interview. Consent was sought before the 
interview took place, where the information sheet and consent form were read to all 
interviewees and were signed as proof of them having consented to the interview. A copy of 
the information sheet was left with the interviewee for them to keep.  
 
Before the interview took place, the researcher assured the respondent that the interview 
material would be treated with strict confidentiality considering that most respondents were 
high level government and donor agency officials, thus whatever they say with regards to 
health and politics have a huge impact on their personal relationship with other actors and 
the institutions they represent. And thus, the researcher was cautions of what was at stake. 
 
12 See Appendices One and Two 
13 See Appendix Four 
14 See Appendix Five 







The researcher was also sensitive to interviewees who insisted that anonymity be maintained 
to the highest level because some of the issues they brought up were political and went 
against the ethos of being serving government officials – where they asked the researcher to 
speak off record. One interesting thing about maintaining confidentiality in the health sector 
relationships is that donor representatives were mostly sceptical of bringing out the negative 
experiences of decentralisation processes in Zambia. The researcher too was sensitive of the 
stakes involved when it comes to government and donor relationships.  
 
Document analysis 
Document analysis comprised of a comprehensive review of national, provincial, and district 
level secondary and raw data on decentralisation in general, and decentralisation of health 
service delivery in particular. Materials were gathered from global and national health 
systems development groups and websites like the World Health Organisation, from Google 
Search Engine, academic studies, government statistics, as well as from reports generated by 
donor agencies and NGOs. 
Most of the documents were accessed easily, especially those from the Ministry of Health 
where the researcher previously worked and has established contacts. Reports from donor 
agencies were fairly difficult to access but having had experience in research and networking 
with individuals from donor agencies, the researcher was able to build rapport over time and 
managed to obtain the required documents. With other government agencies, the researcher 
sought help from the institution where she works - University of Zambia, Institute of Economic 
& Social Research. The institute’s support in drafting the letters in support of the research 
made it easy to obtain documents; in this regard institutional support/affiliation is key to 
conducting research in the Zambian context.    
 
The analysis process involved detailed mapping and contextual analysis of policy and other 
documents on decentralisation processes in Zambia. Analysis of the documents also included 
an understanding of how and why the documents were produced, in order to minimise bias 
(Patton, 2002 p498). To understand how and why decentralisation policies are/were 
introduced and by whom, and to generally fully grasp the evolution of decentralisation 
processes in Zambia, analytical content of the following policy documents was conducted: the 
Vision 2030 (2012); the Revised National Decentralisation Policy (Ministry of Local 
Government and Housing, 2013); National Health Policies and Strategies (MoH, 1991); and 
the National Health Policy (MoH, 2012). Furthermore, textual analysis of national and health 
sector strategic plans, and thematic plans on decentralisation was conducted being: the Fifth 
National Development Plan (Ministry of Finance, 2006); Sixth National Development Plan 
(Ministry of Finance, 2011); Seventh National Development Plan (Ministry of National 
Development Planning, 2017); Fifth National Health Strategic Plan (Ministry of Health, 2011); 







Strategic Plan (2017), National Decentralisation Implementation Plan (2009-2013) Ministry of 
Local Government and Housing, (2009); and the Health Sector Devolution Plan (unpublished).  
 
Data Analysis Approach 
  
Data analysis was undertaken on an ongoing basis starting with the data collection phase. The 
process of ongoing data analysis enabled the researcher to locate emerging themes to which 
she familiarised herself with.  The approach followed is in line with the deductive-inductive 
approach. The themes were arrived at both inductively – obtained gradually from the data; 
and deductively – at the beginning of the study. Further familiarisation took place after the 
data collection phase via analysis of interview transcripts. For the analysis, the policy triangle 
framework was applied, which assisted in identifying the key emerging issues, concepts and 
themes (Pope et al, 2000). The five steps of the Framework Approach as set out by Pope et al 
(2000) were followed. This involved: familiarisation: immersion in the raw data; developing a 
thematic framework; indexing; charting; mapping and interpretation.  
Researcher’s positionality and disposition 
As highlighted above, the qualitative research strategy used to approach this study has its 
strengths for its abilities to attend to the contextual richness of the subject settings (see, Yin, 
2016, p.4). Attending to contextual richness implies the researcher’s connection to study a 
subject that they care about in their personal or professional life, for example studying 
organisations and cultures and how the phenomenon the researcher wants to study came to 
exist (c.f. Yin, 2016, p.4). And because the research strategy requires the researcher to 
immerse themselves in the research processes, reflexivity is an important practice in this 
regard. Finlay (1998) refers to reflexivity in research as: 
“The examination of one’s own beliefs, judgments and practices during the research 
process and how these may have influenced the research”. 
In Chapter One, it was stated that the research question for the PhD thesis emerged as a result 
of the researcher’s professional and personal interests in health systems development in 
Zambia. In addition, the professional experience of the researcher, being a researcher in 
health promotion programmes and having worked at the Ministry of health, may affect 
interpretations of results as many scholars posit that any good research should not entirely 
be influenced by the values and beliefs of the researcher but should be guided knowledge of 
the wider discipline (see, Winter, 1989). And thus, reflexivity in research should go beyond a 
researcher’s conduct while taking into consideration their knowledge and interests in the 
subject of inquiry. 
Thus, in conducting the research, positionality and dispositions of the researcher were 







affiliated institution (the Institute of Economic and Social Research), a former Ministry of 
Health mid-level official, a former member of Ministry of Health Technical Working Group on 
HIV/AIDS resource tracking, a Commonwealth Scholar and a PhD student at the University of 
Sheffield Department of Politics and International Relations and the School of Health and 
Health Related Research (ScHARR).  
Positionality by definition is concerned with relationships in reference to concepts such as 
insider/outsider. It can also be understood through a “wider range of complex intersectional 
categories such as ethnic and class background, and gender” (Fasavalu and Reynolds, 2019), 
while disposition concerns itself with the issues that may arise from positionality – which 
should be resolved to ensure that ethical conduct is adhered to in doing research (Fasavalu 
and Reynolds, 2019).  
Considering that the researcher was aware of the many problems faced by the health sector 
in Zambia with regards to governance and the intersection with politics, no assumptions were 
made prior to formulating the research questions; about selection of interviewees; which 
questions to ask or not; or which data to review or not according to the knowledge possessed. 
But caution was applied during all the processes to ensure objectivity in conducting the 
research, for example with regards to the interview guide, each question was considered 
carefully and was included on the guide because it contributed to answering the research 
question. In distancing from such biasness, the interviews elicited some responses that the 
research would have not benefited from, had it been assumed that such knowledge was 
already known to the researcher. More so, historicism and critical realism into which the 
study embeds itself requires the researcher to understand what is being studied to make 
meaningful interpretations (see, Dobson, 2002).  
Being an ‘insider’ 
Being an ‘insider’ (as a researcher in health promotion and a former member of staff in the 
Ministry of Health), served as an advantage when it came to obtaining clearance for health 
research at the ZNHRC  due to familiarity with existing protocols regarding obtaining research 
clearance and in addition the presence of colleagues within the systems played a role in 
accessing people to sign letters of introduction and documents that needed to be reviewed 
as part of the research. Established networks within the health system also played a role in 
enabling the snowballing technique because so often colleagues within the Ministry of Health 
served as contact points to access interviewees.  
Considering that INESOR is a quasi-government institution, interviewees were more 
responsive to the research in that the letters of introduction stated the benefits of the 
research to the institution, health systems development, and to Zambia’s development 
agenda in general. As Amundsen et.al, (2017) points out, “a researcher’s access can closely 
depend on the power dynamics of a gatekeeper or guide’s relationship with the researcher 







However, the position of being an insider also served as a disadvantage with some 
interviewees because of familiarity outside the professional context, whereas it was 
appreciated with familiar interviewees that informal discussions were conducted, the 
researcher had to ensure that the interviews were not regarded as casual chats. The point 
being underscored here is that being an insider within the Zambian contexts lessens the 
burdens of accessing the required resources to conduct research. Networks and familiarity 
play a key role to navigating the research systems which ordinarily take a longer period of 
time and thus may have cost implications on the researcher and the research as well the 
timeframe in which to conduct the research.  
Being an ‘outsider’   
While carrying out the PhD research, I was based at the University of Sheffield as a 
Commonwealth Scholar under the Zambian government scheme. Some of the key questions 
a prospective Commonwealth scholar has to answer to are: the relevance of their research to 
Zambia’s development agenda; the impact of the study and; how the impact will be initiated. 
In addressing the responses, the relevance of the study was given prominence because the 
research addresses key issues with regards to health sector development because of the 
repeated decentralisation programmes and the absence of a guiding legal framework to 
govern health services. Therefore, the researcher stated that it was the intention of the 
research to advocate for effective implementation of the Zambia National Decentralisation 
Policy, specifically the health functions which are supposed to be devolved to the local 
government. It was envisaged that the results from the PhD study would provide the historical 
perspective, implementation readiness, and status of implementing the new decentralisation 
policy. The researcher hoped to use the results from the PhD to provide guidance to 
counterparts/networks within government and the health sector on implementing the 
imminent devolution plan as the researcher has an already existing platform on which to 
advocate for decentralisation implementation being a Research Fellow at INESOR. 
Being a PhD student at the University of Sheffield at the department of Politics and 
International Relations and the School of Health and Health Related Research also added 
merit to conducting the study because some actors were of the view that international 
knowledge would add value to solving some of the problems that the Zambian health sector 
is faced with. Indeed, the supervisors and lecturers (whom the researcher interacted with at 
various forums) were able to relate to political developmental problems in Zambia - both 
theory and practice, and this helped the researcher to sharpen skills and knowledge in 
political studies. In addition, the department of Politics and International Relations at the 
University of Sheffield has a strong track record in health policy studies in African countries 
including Zambia hence the researcher’s skills and knowledge were shaped in a way that they 
were able to confidently approach the study area. However, some actors were sceptical of 
the study being based in a foreign country, based on the grounds that the researcher may 







address local health sector problems. One of the interviewees stated that: “…I hope that this 
study will focus on generating results to inform the health sector here in Zambia than most of 
the international PhD’s I am familiar with where individuals focus more on their personal 
development by attending numerous conferences without bringing back the ideas from the 
study to develop Zambia” (Inter. 24 May 2018, former high-level politician). Nevertheless, 
considering that the researcher acquired sufficient training to conduct the PhD studies, results 
for the study will be disseminated in various meetings at national level in Zambia.  
Familiarity with the research context and genesis of the project 
As already highlighted in Chapter One, the PhD research project was conceived as a result of 
the researcher’s interests in health systems functioning in relation to politics and policy 
development in Zambia. Having the knowledge on how health systems are managed both at 
professional and personal levels served as a great resource in enriching the study findings but 
was not without difficulties. Speaking from such a perspective Yin (2016 p. 7), points out that 
researchers can also bring their own belief systems or world view as the motivating force for 
defining and constructing qualitive research studies in the first place but should apply 
objectivity in data collection and analysis.  
Considering the background of the research idea, in constructing the research question, 
opinions and world forms of the researcher largely played a role in setting the study 
parameters. When the idea was first expressed to senior colleagues at INESOR, including a 
Research Associate Professor in health promotions, it was criticised for raising issues that 
were past with no possibility of being revived. One colleague pointed out that health reforms 
in Zambia had reached their ceiling and there was no way anyone would be interested in 
hearing about them again.  
However, the convictions of the researcher were that the study was highly relevant 
considering that the PF government were seeking re-election in 2016, so, again, the 
devolution agenda was at the fore of their campaigns in 2015.  The timing of the PF messaging 
regarding devolution coincided with the United States 2016 election campaigns where Donald 
Trump repeatedly threatened to repeal Obama Care upon winning the 2016 election. Hence 
in reference to health care reform reaching its ceiling in Zambia the assumptions were not 
practical because even a relatively developed country like the USA was still debating health 
care reform. 
Such cases added to building up the research parameters and led to questioning how policy 
agendas emerge in the Zambian context. In this regard, the researcher was led to believe that 
there is little attention given to policy pronouncements that political parties make when 
campaigning to be elected partly because accountability mechanisms to hold politicians to 
fulfil their campaign promises are weak and/or because no one pays attention, implying that 
Zambians are used to party-political rhetoric regarding policy change. As such, the research 







initiatives that start from within Zambia. Is it because donors have the resources to implement 
the programmes? Is it because donor agenda are backed by powerful political forces? If so, 
why it is that several literatures (written by Zambians) criticise donor aided programmes for 
implementing programmes that do not reflect local aspirations, while neglecting 
considerations of how local policy entrepreneurship emerges/fails to emerge (c.f. Chitah, 
2006).  
And when donor programmes are implemented, who benefits the most? Is it the 
implementers or the populations being served? What do the repeated corruption scandals in 
the Ministry of Health tell us about agency exercised by bureaucrats to address the needs of 
the population? And if donors withdraw their funding in the health sectors what are the 
effects? Chansa and Negin (2015) observed that when donor funding was withdrawn in 2008 
in the health sector due to corruption allegations, government expenditure on health 
increased but overall funding for health services remained insufficient.   
Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the methodological strategy upon which the parameters of the 
research were set and upon which the research question was addressed. The chapter 
provided justifications to why the qualitative research strategy was suitable to answer the 
substantive research question. The chapter explained how the broad research strategy relates 
to the study designs and the specific methods utilised by the research. The chapter also 
explained how the analytical framework fits within the research strategy to make valid and 
conclusive results as outlined in Chapter Seven. The analytical framework is now utilised to 























Decentralisation and health service governance in practice: Health Reform 
Process (by delegation) 1992-2006 
 
The first of the empirical chapters about the practice of decentralisation and health 
governance (Contextual matters) 
 
Analyses how decentralisation ideas emerged in Zambia as it relates to practice (Content 
and Context) 
 
Considers how various local actors contribute to decentralisation processes in terms of how 
they understand and interpret the policy ideas in practice (Actors’ involvement).  
 
Explains how decentralisation as a policy practice shapes health sector development 
(Processes)  
 
Explores how actors respond to institutional transformations brought about by socio-
political processes that facilitate health decentralisation processes (Actors and Context) 
 
Analyses the failures of health policy and health reform processes in Zambia 
  
 
This chapter discusses the impact of the health reform process that began in 1992 and 
repealed in 2006 on health service governance in Zambia. Having established in Chapter Three 
that the economic downturn and the lack of good policy practice led to poor social services in 
Zambia, the politics of the day had also largely influenced policies such as decentralisation of 
health care that aimed to localise decision making (see Conyers, 1981). Although the poor 
state of health infrastructures and the lack of consistent policies to manage health services 
did lead to poor delivery of health services post-independence in Zambia, that is the period 
between 1972 – 1990, policies that were implemented after 1991 to remedy the previous 
inadequacies in the health sector were highly influenced by external agendas determined by 
the political practice of the incumbent government. However, like much of the literature that 
critiques the neoliberal policies that drove the development agenda in sub-Saharan Africa in 
this period, this thesis recognises that the health reforms were embedded in neoliberal 
political and economic ideas both at the national and international levels through policies, 
and the resulting efforts were inadequate to fully address the problems in service delivery 








This Chapter examines the process that led to the adoption and implementation of 
decentralisation in the Zambian health system. The discussions in this chapter are based on 
empirical data that was collected between February 2018 to August 2018 and textual analysis 
of government of Zambia health policy documents. They highlight: first, from a macro level, 
the social changes that were expected and what eventually happened as a result of having 
introduced the health reform process; and second, from a micro level, the ideas that were 
represented (see, Chapter Four). The approach to the discussions is according to Ritzer’s 
integrative theory of social analysis (Ritzer, 2008), as explained in Chapter Three. As the 
chapter explores, how and why decentralisation policy agenda was popularised in Zambia 
(see, Chapters Two and Three), the analysis is presented using the health policy triangle 
framework (HPTF) in line with the analytical framework for the research. In framing the 
discussions, the chapter approaches the analysis as follows:  
 
1. Context: examines the socio-political conditions that led to the appearance of the 
health reforms on national agenda.  
2. Content: examines what contained in the health reform agenda in relation to the 
context – that is in relation to the socio-political conditions to aimed to address.  
3. Process: examines how the health reforms were introduced on the national agenda 
leading to its acceptance by stakeholders national wide and more specifically within 
the health sector. 
4. Actors:  Who were the actors that shaped the policy and how did they get to be key players 
in the process? How did they respond to each other and the institutions that were formed to 
implement the policy process? According to the HPTF actors are at the centre of driving policy 
process and thus the thesis will examine actors’ roles in the health reform process as follows: 
 Context        Actors: how did actors express their agency in response to the 
policy ideas (processes and the institutions)?  
 Content             Actors: How did actor relationships form at agenda setting? Which 
actors had more influence in designing policy ideas and why?  
 Process                Actors: Which actors were involved in the implementation process 
and why? How did actors’ relationships evolve at implementation stage through to 
policy termination? What (f)actors changed in comparison to the agenda setting 
stage? (cf. Figure 5, Chapter Four), (see, Buse et.al, 2012, p. 1-9) 
 
The analytical approach conforms with the HPTF as it outlines how actors are at the centre, 
determine the content of policy at design stage, second, shape and are shaped by context 
through the agency exercised and third, they guide, control and shape policy processes at 
implementation stage as figure 5 demonstrates. In summary the framework explores the 
roles, interactions and influence of actors on each other and how their relationships and 








The Chapter begins by discussing why the health reforms appeared on the Zambian 
government agenda. In this regard, the chapter examines what those involved were hoping 
to achieve through the reform process. Nonetheless, as the legislation that facilitated the 
operation of the health reform process was repealed in 2006, the thesis is also interested in 
establishing why that happened – why did the reforms fail and what factors led to the failure?  
 
Thus, the overall aim of this Chapter is to demonstrate how and why the health reform 
process was created, and why it failed, in Zambia and contribute to answering the following 
sub questions: (a) what has driven the adoption of decentralisation policies in Zambia’s health 
sector? (b) what factors have enabled/inhibited Zambia’s health sector decentralisation 
processes? (c) how has political and bureaucratic action at different governance levels 
influenced health decentralisation policymaking? (d) how has political and bureaucratic 
action at different governance levels influenced health decentralisation policy 
implementation? 
 
Contextual Factors: Political and socio-economic crises – the background to the MMD’s 
reforms in the 1990s 
 
As Chapters One and Three already highlighted, the economic turmoil experienced in Zambia 
from the early 1970’s to the late 1980’s was a total opposite of the robust economy that had 
been inherited just after independence in 1964. This economic turmoil drove the country to 
become one of the most heavily indebted countries in the world (c.f. Burnell, 2001, p.142). 
Because of the poor economic conditions, coupled with the debt crisis, social sectors - 
especially health and education - were in a poor state and were unable to meet the demands 
of the citizenry (see Freund, 1986; Craig, 2000). As already established in Chapter Three, 
Zambia was a one-party state at the time, run by the United National Independence Party 
(UNIP) which was in power for twenty-seven years from 1964 to 1991 under the leadership 
of Kenneth Kaunda. Some interviewees reported that the checks and balances in the way 
government planned for services was poor. For example, an interviewee who had worked as 
a planner for local authorities in various districts reported that:  
“…planning for health services by the UNIP government was basic. The health policy 
guiding document was three pages that simply outlined that health services were to 
be provided for free…” (Inter. 15 June 2018, former high-level manager MoH). 
Another interviewee reported that there were attempts by the UNIP government in its later 
stages to improve health services. For example, they had drawn up a health policy called the 
ten-year health plan which embedded the ethos of decentralisation out of which community 
structures such as village health committees were created (Inter. 24 May 2018, former high-
level politician). Furthermore, the interviewee reported that, at the same time, the WHO and 







on which created confusion at implementing levels because health care providers were more 
attentive to the WHO and UNICEF guidelines which did not put much emphasis on 
incorporating community voices in health services delivery (Inter. 24 May 2018, former high-
level politician).    
Hence the UNIP government’s lack of robust health policy was a contributing factor to the 
poor governance of the health sector. Returning to the issue raised in Chapter Three, with 
regards to how the UNIP government attempted to implement decentralisation policies for 
the purposes of governing health services, their political interests surpassed the need to 
implement working policies for the health sector (see Freund, 1986). For example, although 
on a macro level the UNIP government was struggling with structuring policy to deliver health 
services, on a micro level they were trying to incorporate community participation in service 
delivery, as documented by Twumasi and Freund (1982), in recognition that socio-economic 
factors limited the achievement of primary health care goals. This is because while the UNIP 
government was interested in pursuing socialist policies which were supposedly for the 
benefit of the population, they were also trying to stay relevant to the electorate. But in 
practice their decentralisation policies included appointing unelected party officials to be part 
of the district level management, and these party officials were more loyal to the centre than 
serving the interests of their localities (see, Conyers, 1981). In addition to poor policies and 
uncoordinated efforts to implement decentralisation, the situation was further worsened by 
falling government revenue due to falling of copper prices on the international market in the 
mid 1970’s16. Ultimately, all these factors worked against the UNIP government’s ability to 
effectively implement health decentralisation policies (see, Freund, 1986). 
The UNIP government had sought help in 1973 from the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank to address the tumbling economy and began implementing Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAP) (Simutanyi, 1996). However, as Simutanyi highlights, the UNIP 
government was not fully committed to the reforms and conditions of the SAP, often failing 
to meet the agreed targets and cancelling or suspending the agreements (Simutanyi, 1996). 
As a result, Zambia’s debts were getting to unsustainable levels with the economic situation 
worsening. One of the main deterrent factors to implementing the SAPs were the socialist 
philosophies of humanism of the UNIP government, which ran contrary to the SAPs’ 
neoliberal free market agenda (Craig, 2000). As it was, the UNIP government’s socialist 
principles faced wide criticism both home and abroad. As earlier alluded to, the economic 
conditions that existed failed to satisfy the wider population and thus heightened political 
tensions with repeated riots. Many commentators regarded this period to have opened up a 
window of opportunity for political change as Simutanyi (1996) states that the demand for 
 
16 Zambia’s economy depended and still depends on copper as a foreign exchange commodity 
(see, Freund, 1986). As a result of falling copper prices on international, it significantly 







democratisation of governance in Zambia (like many other African countries) can be 
attributed to the promises of SAPs, such as improved governance and economic conditions.  
Thus the UNIP government’s failures to decentralise health services were as a result of (i) their 
socialist policies where services like health were regarded as essential and were supposed to 
be accessed by the wider population for free (see, Freund, 1986), (ii) their political interests 
that led them to practice ‘centrist decentralisation’ where unelected officials served as party 
watchdogs at lower levels (see Conyers, 1981), (iii) the economic crisis due to the falling of 
copper prices that led to low government revenue (see, Simutanyi, 1996), and (iv) inadequate 
policies to effectively govern the health sector (Inter. 15 June 2018, former high level manager 
MoH-pioneer of health reforms).  
Therefore, the existing contextual factors paved way for SAPs agenda and values because at 
the time, not only did the UNIP government face pressure from international organisations 
to introduce economic and political reforms, but they also faced domestic pressure with most 
of the population calling for change of government (see, Chapter Three). The UNIP 
government eventually succumbed to the pressure, initiating constitutional and governance 
reforms that paved way for plural politics (Baylies & Szeftel, 1992). Presidential and 
parliamentary elections were held in November 1991 and the UNIP government was defeated 
by the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD).  
Upon attaining power, the MMD government had the zeal to implement the SAP economic 
reforms, and straight away hit shifted the country from UNIP’s socialist principles to capitalist 
principles (Burnell, 2001, p.146). State owned companies, especially the mines, were 
privatised (mostly to foreign investors) and the state rolled back the provision of services to 
allow private entities to emerge (Tordoff and Young, 1994). The MMD government further 
reduced health expenditure and initiated public sector wage freezes (Lake and Musumali, 
1999). The economic reforms not only implemented massive changes in the economic sector 
but also in the social sectors and civil service structures as well (Craig 2000). The idea of health 
sector reform resonated with the ethos of rolling back the state. The ideals that influenced 
the health reforms can be seen from this quote by then Minister of Health Dr B. Kawimbe in 
affirming the first ever health policy comprehensive document – the national health policies 
and strategies document: 
“The Movement for Multiparty Democracy Government (MMD) has developed a radical 
and reforming policy for the future direction of health services. The ruling party manifesto 
amounts to a fundamental change towards improvements in Primary Health Care and in 
Hospital Services.  The main thrust of the reforms is for better management and 
improvements in quality of service. We wish to avoid adopting an autocratic approach 
and for this reason extensive powers for operational management have been delegated 
to the new autonomous District Health Boards and Boards of Management in certain 







value for money and above all improvements in quality and quantity of services. We wish 
to see more initiative, more enterprise and much great flexibility (MoH, 1991 p. 1).  
Because of the widespread economic and political grievances at the end of the UNIP 
government, the MMD had gained support from the trade unions and bureaucratic actors 
within which the group of experts emerged. Thus, as a result of the contextual factors (low 
investments in the health sector with regards to planning and financing), the reforms were a 
priority of the MMD government agenda. As the reforms had widespread appeal both locally 
and internationally, a group of experts (as I will refer to them in the chapter because of the 
knowledge and technical skills they possessed; a mix of bureaucratic, political and 
international actors) had emerged to be at the fore of directing the course of health services 
delivery (their central role as actors as stipulated by the HPTF will be discussed later in the 
chapter). The group of experts had the goal of reforming the health sector to align with global 
standards.  An interviewee reported that:  
 
“…as most of us who had been exposed to the outside world where we experienced 
how service planning should be conducted, we knew that UNIP was not willing to 
engage with what we were suggesting. So, for us, the new MMD government paved 
the way to put those ideas to use” (Inter. 14 June 2018, multilateral representative, 
former high level MoH official).  
 
Another interviewee reported that:  
 
“…although I was a bureaucrat, I had a hand in drafting the MMD manifesto’s plan on 
health service delivery and it emerged as the strongest statement of intent” (Inter. 15 
June 2018, former high-level manager MoH-health reforms). 
 
Thus, equipped with the political capital, affirmation of international agenda and the 
confidence of the electorate, the MMD embarked on charting the way forward for the health 
reform agenda as documented in the 1991 Ministry of National Health Policies and Strategies 
Paper (cf. MoH, 1991). The next section outlines the content of the national health reform 
agenda and how the whole agenda was constructed to address the in adequacies of the health 
sector. 
 
The content and actors of the health reform process – shaping agenda setting 
 
The 1992 -2006 health policy reform agenda was shaped from several points. First, the MMD 
had already built a critical mass in support of reforms by identifying like-minded individuals 
domestically, coupled with donor support. These groups provided strong leadership for 
agenda setting of the health reforms. This started with the first ever policy guiding document 







in governing health services in Zambia. The development of the document was financially 
supported by the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) while technical assistance 
was given by WHO and United National Emergency Children’s Fund (UNICEF) (MoH, 1991). The 
document reflected the intentions of the government to refocus on health service provision. The 
drafting of the document was followed by its launch to which all health system stakeholders 
were invited. However, the government’s primary aim was to align health services with the 
public service reform agenda of reducing costs in service delivery while maintaining effectiveness 
and efficiency (MoH, 1991), while the donors were more interested in accountability both for 
resource utilisation and improved health service delivery (MoH, 2005). Together with the 
donors, the government aimed to design health services that were more responsive to the needs 
of the population as the health services that were provided by the UNIP government were 
considered to have failed the objective of meeting individual and community health needs (MoH, 
1991). Henceforth, these aspirations met with those of high-level technocrats, among which two 
played an instrumental role in designing the health reform agenda. The involvement of the two 
individuals in the reform process propelled them to take on key positions after the MMD came 
to power: one became a senior manager within CBoH, and after it was dissolved, he went on 
to work with the World Health Organisation’s Southern African Region as an expert on health 
reforms. The other became a politician and, since Zambia was respected as a pioneer of health 
reforms, also served as consultant at WHO headquarters. He reported that he coined the 
mantra which the Ministry of Health in Zambia uses to this day “taking health services as close 
to the family as possible” (cf. Inter. Inters. 24 May 2018, former high-level politician). 
These two high-level technocrats recognised that the guiding policy frameworks and 
regulatory policies were insufficient to manage and improve health sector performance 
(MoH, 2006). The influence of these two individuals mentioned by almost all interviewees from 
the health sector, who saw them as the architects and proponents of the health reform agenda 
in Zambia (i.e., inters. 12 June 2018 bilateral representative, former mid-level manager MoH; 
14 June 2018, high level central level bureaucrat). The two individuals as interviewees gave 
their perspectives on how they got involved in the reform agenda, including their perspectives 
on how they are/were regarded by other actors (cf. Inters. 24 May 2018, former high-level 
politician; Inter. 15 June 2018, former high-level manager MoH-health reforms). The two 
played a key role in designing the health reform agenda and identifying how health problems 
could be addressed from central to community levels. Their views coincided with the wave of 
demand for political change that was being demanded both home and abroad as the UNIP 
government was deemed to be both autocratic and failing to deliver (Lake and Musumali, 
1999). 
Consequently, the guiding document that shaped the health reforms policy, the National 
Health Policies and Strategies document, was developed through a highly consultative 
process in 1990-1. As one interviewee reported, the consultative process was important so as 







services provision like the Catholic Church (Inter. 24 May 2018, former high-level politician). 
The policy was later approved by Cabinet Office in 1992, followed by the enactment of the 
National Health Services Act of 1995 by Parliament where the Act provided for the 
establishment of autonomous health boards through which the Central Board of Health 
(CBoH) was formed as a technical arm of the Ministry of health with the mandate to interpret 
and implement policies and; creation of District Health Boards and Hospital Management 
Boards to manage health services in districts by linking district management teams, hospital 
boards, health centre Committees and Neighbourhood Health Committees (NHCs). The aim 
was to transfer management for quality to district level through managerial, and professional 
autonomy (MoH, 2001), as one respondent stated:  
 
… the MMD Chiluba’s government was a strong agent of change in that, the way the 
health reforms were initiated was for the purposes of promoting the medical 
profession, to create a pool of medical professionals to run health services and at the 
same time promote community ownership of health services, … what the MMD 
government implied is that people should look after themselves, run the services 
themselves, each person should be a mini ministry of health supported by a pool of 
professionals” ” (Inter 14 June 2018 former mid-level manager, MoH).  
“it was important that the health reforms were legislated by an act of parliament because 
that process legally legimated the mandate of the board and the premise was that it was given 
autonomous powers and permanence at least for the moment” (Inter 14 June 2018 former 
mid-level manager, MoH).  
Thus the aim of the health reform process was to provide democratised public health services 
by fully implementing the concept of popular participatory structures legimated by the 
National Health Services Act, of 1995 (cf. NHSP; 1998 – 2000). Henceforth, it entailed that the 
district health management teams were to independently manage the provision of health 
services in the districts and provide oversight to district and hospital boards and health 
facilities. The district health boards had to establish area boards of health within their 
jurisdictions.  In addition, all referral hospitals within the districts were to be managed 
autonomously (MoH, 1991).   
 
Referring back to the discussions in Chapters One and Two, the architecture of the health 
reforms reflected the ethos of the Alma Ata declaration of promoting communities/individuals 
having a say in their own health. To ground the ethos of the Alma Ata declaration, the health 
reforms were implemented in such a way that health facilities supervised and met regularly 
with the NHCs. In return, the NHCs reported to the health facility regarding the state of health 
in their communities and also provided feedback to the facilities regarding the health needs 
of the community. Together with health facility staff, the NHCs planned and budgeted for 







budgets were submitted to the district health boards to be aggregated at provincial and 
national levels by the ministry of health (MoH, 1991). The inclusion of participatory 
democracy in service delivery was seen as a key component to improved service deliver as 
several interviewees believed that the UNIP government’s failure to deliver better health 
services was as a result of having divorced itself from the communities. As one interviewee 
stated: 
“…when designing the reform in 1990 we took into consideration the historical failures 
of primary health care approach.  We considered that some populations were 
underserved, especially the rural areas, and then we also considered that we had 
squatter settlements and low-income housing in urban areas with very poor sanitation 
that needed health education. We felt that the best way to understand community 
challenges and deliver services appropriately was to move the institutions of planning 
and management of healthcare to the districts through the district health 
management boards being the institutions of governing health in terms of decision-
making authority, then also have a technical team called the district health 
management team to be responsible for implementing health care services. We 
believed that these structures would foster popular participation at all levels of the 
health care delivery system. (Inter. 24 May 2018, former high-level politician). 
Although the content of the health reform processes reflects the ideals of primary health care 
ethos promoted by the Alma Ata declaration as discussed above, the thesis recognises that 
the formulation and legitimatisation of the policy’s content mainly involved central level 
structures. According to Walt (1991, p.4) structures that formulate and legitimise policy 
content possess the mandate of generating ideas to respond to the identified problems which 
the policy aims to address. Walt further elaborates that if the ideas are coming from actors 
representing different institutions/ideas each presents ideas that correspond with their 
interests (Walt, 1991, p.4). Thus, with the health reform process politicians in the MMD 
government were more interested in fostering an agenda that set them apart from UNIP’s 
socialist policies and in that way they managed to gain donor confidence as well as create a 
model of decentralisation that supposedly addressed the inadequacies of community 
participation. Consequently, because the ideas were a reflection of the political system and 
that of cooperating partners they generated policy outcomes that are viewed differently by 
interviewed actors that worked with the health reform process; for example one actor 
reported that: the donors were mostly interested in meeting their targets and seeing results 
of the ‘new thing’ but little was taken into consideration of how the whole concept was going 
to be received by the health workers (Inter, 27 February 2019, former mid-level Manager 
MoH), while another interviewee reported that the whole health reforms was failed by MoH 
bureaucrats to convince the donors that it would not work when the health reforms were 
actually working (Inter. 24 May 2018, former high-level politician). Though the two 
interviewees had conflicting views on the failure of reform, it is important to note that the 







success. Henceforth, the politicians and high-level actors were faced with the task of 
designing reforms that intended to achieve a mixed of measures, ranging from institutional 
to structural issues. As reforming the health sector required restructuring human resource, 
improve infrastructure, provide incentives for health staff, improve staff retention, create 
efficiency in service delivery, engage with the community in health service provision, create 
innovation and the task of raising revenue the actions/reactions of actors were neglected in 
this regard. As theoretical underpinnings posit, health developmental processes require 
embracing relevant culturally, historically, socially, and economically processes that can 
respond to local needs than injecting techniques that are highly complex (Rifkin and Walt, 
1986).  
The conflicts on the way the health reforms were designed also existed within the health 
sector despite the consensus sought out of the sector to legitimise the reform process, for 
example one out of the two key experts lamented on how the component of community 
accountability was weakened because of the inside conflicts in the health sector with regards 
to legitimation of district health boards being institutionally accountable to the district 
councils that have the legal mandate of  governing with locally elected officials (the 
councillors) by the people at local level. Within the design of the health reforms, the proposal 
was that the district health plans formulated by the district health team and approved by the 
district health board would be submitted to the council for legitimation and further approval 
before being submitted and funded by the central board of health, which was to be guided 
by ministry of health policies (cf. Inter. 24 May 2018, former high-level politician). 
 
Although the principle reflected the ethos of community participation in decentralisation, the 
key expert reported that:  
 
“My superior in the Ministry (him having been minister of health with me being his 
deputy) accepted and approved the structures of the district boards and management 
teams, but he rejected the idea of the two institutions submitting the plans to the 
councils for approval because he thought that the ministry of health was going to be 
subservient to local government. He plainly voiced out that he would not subject the 
‘educated’ medical doctors to reporting to local council officials with very little 
education… As much as we tried at parliamentary level with intervention of the 
republican president for him to accept that clause, he ignored it and did not table it 
before parliament. The president had intervened that he includes that particular clause 
but since he was the minister and the only one by law who could table the bill before 
parliament, he ignored that clause and that is how it was lost in the design” (Inter. 24 








…relating to Howlett et. al (2009, p.142); negative decision making, demonstrating that some 
decisions as part of the policy do not move into the implementation stage because some 
actors will not agree to certain decisions, and usually it is the actor with more power that 
succeeds. As such the less powerful actor’s contribution to agenda setting was defeated. He 
thus reported that: 
“I felt that we lost an important component of accountability at district level by failing 
to include the councils as channels where the two health bodies at district level could 
report to. The minister felt that the Ministry of Health was under him, and it should 
not be subjected to other institutions” (Inter. 24 May 2018, former high-level 
politician).  
Related, the interviewee also felt that that’s how central power - political power – can distort 
a technically sound plan because according to him, what they had in mind when designing the 
reform proposal was to have a technically sound and politically acceptable plan that could 
deliver better health services. To the architects, especially the two experts, technical 
soundness of the plan included the principles of accountability which were denied in the 
political acceptability that the minister considered at that time. The Minister didn’t think that 
subjecting his ministry to local government to approve plans for health care was appropriate. 
For the interviewee he felt that it was a question of turf politics and thus reported that: 
 
“As a deputy minister of health, I could only help with formulation of the policy 
document, but the burden of legitimation and approval was with the senior minister. 
The relationship between us was tense which I had to manage as a technical person 
and that was the struggle, I had with formulating the health policy reform. I was very 
technical, but he was a better politician than I was” (Inter. 24 May 2018, former high-
level politician). 
 
Thus, as reported by the interviewee, although he had emerged to be a key actor in shaping 
the reform process his influence on the point of legitimation was limited. His position and 
views in shaping the reform process provide novel insights to the discussion regarding local 
practice of policy shaped by prevailing relationships embedded in local politics within the 
Zambian context. Thus, the thesis is of the view that the discussions above demonstrate how 
narrow the health reform process was in shaping the agenda and implementation processes, 
and hence problems emerged during implementation to the point of the process being 
repealed. It also shows that donors allowed narrow views to prevail, in the first place, leaving 
the power of policymaking in the hands of political figures who could also not agree to terms 
they felt uncomfortable with. Typically, the health reform agenda reflected the political 
principles that the MMD government had pledged to deliver, which in turn reflected the 
democratic and economic principles demanded by the World Bank and the IMF (Lake and 








The political and cooperating partners/donor actors shared much of the economic rationale 
in designing the health sector reforms in that it was widely believed that the reforms 
embedded within the neoliberal agenda could generally grow the economy that could trigger 
improved public service delivery (Lake and Musumali, 1999). To that, the National Health 
Policies and Strategies paper (MoH, 1991, p.9) had stated that:   
“Without adequate and sustainable financing, health services cannot be produced. The 
need to improve the relative value of resources available to the health sector is crucial. 
While external assistance will continue to fill many gaps, the basic needs of our national 
population must be met on the strength of our national government to come up with 
locally sustainable modes of financing.  At local level, many communities make 
contributions to health services, but these are often uncoordinated inputs and vary 
throughout the country. We are proposing a comprehensive system of health sector 
financing”. 
Henceforth the principle of the introduction of user fees in all public and mission health 
facilities was to raise more revenue for the health sector.   
To that an interviewee reported that:  
“…what the government wanted to do was to let the boards grow into a modernised 
technical bodies that could manage health services independently without interference 
from government while the donors were more interested in seeing their ideas put to 
use to increase efficiency and deliver health services effectively that is why the user 
fees were very important to the reform process…for the donors, user fees were a form 
of empowerment of giving a voice to the citizenry on the assumption that when people 
pay for services, they tend to demand to be served in a better way ” (Inter 14 June 
2018 former mid-level manager, MoH).  
Another interviewee reported that:  
“I was one of the key discussants during the stakeholder consultative meetings by MoH 
prior to the implementation of the health reforms. One key issue that donors 
repeatedly emphasised upon was that fee for service was a form of community 
empowerment model, that when citizens pay, they become active participants in 
decision making for health services delivery. In short, the emphasis was that 
community participation also fosters accountability, making health structures more 
responsive to the needs of communities. During the meetings, everybody seemed to 
have agreed with such a model, but we did not foresee that it could go wrong as it 
turned out to be (Inter. 14 June 2018, multilateral representative, former MoH mid-







Although the intention of having introduced user fees were for the purposes of strengthening 
community ownership and participation in health services delivery, user fees turned out to be a 
deterrent factor to accessing health services for the majority of Zambians especially the rural 
populations (cf. Chansa, 2013).  Despite user fees was having been designed to operate based 
on the primary health care approach (MoH, 1992), with the establishment of community 
structures, including Health Centre Committees and Neighbourhood Health Committees 
(MoH, 1992), and district management structures (Health Management Teams and Health 
Boards) to support the community level structures (MoH, 1992), the context into which they 
were introduced failed to support the idea. Looking at what the design of the health reforms 
were in relation to the introduction of user fees, it suffices to point out that the structures 
were elaborate because the operations of councils were amended under the Local 
Government Act of 1991, under which councils were charged with the responsibility for 
delivering a broad range of services including housing, urban land development, water and 
sanitation, as well as road development and maintenance (MLGH, 1996). The operational 
structures within the Ministry of Health were revised to accommodate the reforms with 
strong emphasis on community engagement (MoH, 2000).  
 
Thus, this thesis is of the view that the design of the health reform process mostly adhered to 
the principles of primary health care approaches as suggested by the Alma Ata declaration 
however much of the economic and social rationales – that is the context could not match 
with the suggested principles.  
 
Process factors that shaped the health reform implementation  
As already stated above the ideas of the health reforms processes were largely shaped by 
politicians and high-level bureaucrats intersecting with donor agenda.  And again, as already 
highlighted, the Ministry of Health having convened a stakeholder conference to share the 
vision of the MMD government regarding reforming the health sector was for the purposes 
of disseminating their intentions of rolling out the process (cf. MoH, 1991). The MoH argued 
that the health sector was one of the key indicators of the Zambian economic recession, 
marred with poor infrastructure, poor staff retention, and a shortage of essential medicines 
and equipment (MoH, 1991). Coupled with that, the lack of health policies in Zambia 
prompted several actors - politicians and bureaucrats - to call for reforms (Int. 15 May 2018 
former mid-level manager, MoH). The purpose of the conference was to take stock of the 
existing situation in the health sector by reviewing the performance of the Ministry of Health, 
and to attempt to realign resources and commitments towards objectives which would improve 
the effectiveness and efficiency of the health Care System (MoH, 1991). The impact of the 
planned changes was to reduce the size of the MoH, which in future was to be responsible for 
policy development, setting national goals and targets, reviewing performance, overall control 







and strategies document provided future direction for the health reform operations pending 
publication of the programme for health reforms, which was to contain the timescales and action 
plans (MoH, 1991).  
One of the most prominent arguments brought forward by interviewees was that the 
structures established through the health reform process were well thought out and suitable 
to rollout the health reform plans (in other words, the content of the plan was good). The 
thesis does agree to this, considering that the structures were designed to accommodate the 
basic tenets of community participation (cf. Smoke, 2003).  Despite such an argument being 
supported by this thesis, the structures created through the legislation of the health reform 
process were limited in achieving the health reform goals.  For example, the NHCs are cited 
to have been the most successful component of the process by most interviewees, but, some 
interviewees disputed that, saying that the process did succeed at creating structures (which 
are used to date to deliver community health programmes) but failed to enhance 
accountability (Inter. 5 June 2018, former senior manager MoH). And because of the failure 
to effectively initiate accountability mechanisms, the vision of the reforms as articulated in the 
Health Policies and Strategies paper - to create effective leadership, partnership and 
accountability - were deemed to have failed at all levels. In addition, the Ministry of Health as 
the primary lead and manager of the reform process was supposed to effect collaborations with 
consumers and service providers on how to improve health service delivery and to provide an 
environment that was supposed to foster accountability for consumers, providers and 
government but as said by some interviewees they failed in their mandate. Instead, differences 
arose between MoH and CBoH staff (Inter. 18 May 2018, former mid-level manager Ministry 
of Health). Another interviewee added that: “…the bone of contention were renumerations but 
ultimately that created so many misunderstandings that MoH staff advocated for CBoH to be 
dissolved” (Inter. 16 June 2018 academic; former mid-level manager CBoH). Another 
interviewee pointed out that: “the fact that CBoH was a subordinate body to MoH meant that 
MoH had more legitimacy and power. So how can a boss accept to be remunerated lower than 
their subordinate? I regarded that as a joke. Whoever thought that could work was very wrong” 
(Inter, 12 June 2018, lower-level Manager MoH).  
Although the two actors who were the architects of the health reform process argued that 
there was nothing wrong with the way CBoH was structured and how staff were remunerated 
because the rationale was to encourage high professional standards and motivational levels 
within the health profession – that is the frontline health workers (Inter. 24 May 2018, former 
high-level politician; Inter. 15 June 2018, former high-level manager MoH-pioneer of health 
reforms). 
However most former MoH interviewees disputed that the clause that government had 
initiated to foster the culture of integration and to ensure that the systems that were created 
worked adequately, by putting in place attractive conditions of service to retain professional 







attract professionals that had migrated to work abroad to return to Zambia  including better 
conditions for CBoH staff at central level was costly (see, Van Der Geest et. al, 2000).  An 
interviewee highlighted that it was a waste of money by government to have had such a high 
wage bill while health services at local levels were still deplorable. 
As a mid-level manager at MoH at that time I thought that it was pure daylight robbery 
for CBoH staff to have been getting such huge renumerations while hospitals were 
struggling with basic equipment and infrastructure and most importantly the wage bill 
did not help to retain health staff (Inter. 18 May 2018, former mid-level manager 
MoH).  
Indeed, another interviewee confirmed that despite government’s efforts of improved 
renumerations towards CBoH health facility staff, they were still leaving Zambia to go and 
work outside (Int. 15 May 2018 former mid-level manager, MoH) while in retrospect, the 
intention of better renumerations was to ensure that the health sector maintained a pool of 
motivated health personnel.  Thus, the decision in itself was overstated as it failed to expose 
the underlying issues of what incentives would retain health workers. In the beginning, the 
purposes of delegation (health reforms) were first, to take the decision-making process closer 
to service delivery points, the service delivery points being the district themselves and the 
hospitals; secondly in creating the health boards the government wanted to create a pool of 
health cadres who were not civil servants. So ultimately what the government wanted to be 
done was to retire all the civil servants who were health workers, make them sign contracts 
so that they could be recruited by the health boards (cf. Inter. 14 June 2018, multilateral 
representative, former MoH mid-level manager). Inherently of decentralisation approaches, 
localised decision-making fosters decision space – where local structures are expected to 
make decisions that suit them or respond to localised needs – in short, make rules to suit 
themselves so as to respond effectively to what the local situation presents (see Bossert, 
1998).   
But as Bossert highlights decision space is difficult to achieve because the political and social 
environment may insulate actor’s relationships and responses to what is presented before 
them (c.f. Bossert, 1998). And thus, in the Zambian context, it was acknowledged by a number 
of interviewees that the problems that had to be addressed were multifaceted that localised 
decision making could not foster health worker motivation and retention.  As reported by an 
interviewee:   
“…incentives for health workers failed to work because what ended up happening was 
that there were two types of health workers, those employed under civil service 
conditions and not well paid and then the well paid recruited under health board 
conditions, but they were all doing the same amount of work. So, the ones employed 
under civil service conditions ended up getting frustrated and then government had to 







under board conditions. Government managed to achieve that task at the very 
minimum and most of the workers that were retired ended up leaving Zambia after 
they got their benefits because working outside was better than being rehired under 
board conditions. Based on that, the boards had to be dissolved contributing to 
repealing of the health services act” (Inter. 14 June 2018, multilateral representative, 
former MoH mid-level manager) 
Ultimately the processes that were initiated to achieve local decision making envisaged to 
promote retention of human resources for health fell short. It happened that the plans were 
enmeshed in socio-political issues that could only be resolved centrally, for example, human 
resource retention was more of a national issue that was supposed to be resolved by central 
government and not at district level because central government for long possessed the 
power to train and retain health workers. And in addition, the differences in salaries and 
emoluments in the health reform process that created sour relationships between MoH and 
CBoH staff to the point that it contributed to weakening the reform agenda was more of a 
national level issue. Most interviewees attributed the problems that ensued around 
renumerations during the implementation process to how the reform agenda was structured 
that it favoured CBoH staff especially those that held management positions than health 
workers at health facility levels. In addition, it also failed to address the grievances of central 
level MoH staff.  
 
Based on what was happening with regards to actors’ response to the idea of CBoH, the 
discussions above demonstrate that actors responded to it based on theoretical 
underpinnings of agency. The theory of agency suggests that “agents often pursue interests 
which depart in material ways from those of the principal” (Wiseman et.al, 2012). In this 
regard actors (health facility staff) as agents and the CBoH institution as the principal. The 
understandings are that actors’ relationships intertwined with the ideas that the health 
reform policy presented, and thus the concepts of renumerations and allowances were 
resisted to the point that it contributed to the breakdown of the health reform process. 
Health workers through their unions were more interested in bargaining for better conditions 
of service than sustaining the existence of CBoH, and when that did not happen, it led to 
repeated strike actions, to the point where the matter was taken to court. To that the 
politician actor, an architect of the reform process reported that: 
 
“…the issue of salaries and emoluments was my biggest battle, and I was defeated on 
those terms. The unions mobilised very strong strikes as result of having misinformed 
the nurses that the benefits that they had worked for were going to be lost and that 
was another contentious issue which was not true. Though I won the case in court I 
was defeated by the massive strikes. The pressure was such that Cabinet through the 
President felt that my leadership was creating too much tension and was posing 







being Minister of Health to Minister of Tourism. At the time I was moved, we had 
implemented new financing and administrative systems, new quality assessment 
systems, the financing administrative systems became the standard flag carrier not 
only for the CBoH and the MoH but for the whole civil service” (Inter. 24 May 2018, 
former high-level politician). 
 
Evidently allowances and emoluments were and still are a contentious issue in the health 
sector. With the current devolution plan, district health actors both from the health sector 
and the local governments feel that MoH central level staff are not only afraid of losing the 
power and authority but also the monetary benefits if health services are devolved – these 
issues will be expanded on in the next Chapter (Six). 
 
Henceforth the concept of extra incentives within MoH central level structures have failed to 
translate to tangible policy action for health sector development. For example, for a long time 
since 1992, Zambia has benefited from several global health initiatives’ resources, but the 
health sector remains underdeveloped. As the health reforms and the MMD government 
instigated the origins of donor financial dependence to finance health sector governance, 
how has the health system reacted to that, what synergies have evolved and what behaviours 
have such trends evoked (cf. Dwicaksono and Fox, 2018)? Within the Zambian national 
settings, the understandings are important because they can help to inform a more consistent 
approach to improve health service governance. The thesis is specifically interested in 
understanding the responses by actors to the influx of donor funding and their impact on the 
transformations of health institutions. 
 
Central role of actors in policy action: Actors’ understandings and participation in health 
sector development and reforms  
Evidently, as earlier discussed in this chapter, actors’ involvement in agenda setting was 
propelled by the political climate and for the two experts, their involvement was more to do with 
their experiences and skills possessed with regards to health sector development which were 
recognised both at local and international levels. Hence their involvement in agenda setting is 
reported to have set course and direction for the health reform process. One of the two experts 
felt that his experiences of having worked as a health planner in several district councils 
throughout Zambia during the UNIP era largely influenced his views with regards to health sector 
development. Coupled with that, his experiences around health sector development were also 
shaped by his academic qualifications that he obtained from the United Kingdom with support 
from the World Bank. Clearly, his experiences of having been a pioneer of the health reform 
process shows that donors have for a long time been the lead in charting the course of health 







develop that were at the fore of agenda setting of the health reforms. For example, the expert 
reported that:  
“…my contributions were recognised because I had gained a lot of practical knowledge. 
Hence in 1985, while working at the ministry of health headquarters, I was sponsored 
by the World Bank to study an advanced postgraduate degree in health planning 
management policy at the University of Leeds. In 1986 I studied my master’s degree at 
the University of Leeds again and my dissertation was on decentralisation of health 
services in Zambia. Upon my return to Zambia in 1988, I wanted to change things 
because there was no health policy in the Ministry of Health. The health policy was 
within the UNIP government booklet with minimal details; therefore, I began to make 
a case. However, what I was working on could not be implemented by the UNIP 
government because that was the time there was the change of government” (Inter. 
15 June 2018, former high-level manager MoH-pioneer of health reforms).  
The second expert also expressed similar experiences with regards to his involvement with 
health sector reforms. He reported that:  
“Health reforms have a long history in Zambia since 1945 during the colonial era. The 
minister of health then tried to put forward policies on decentralisation but at the end 
of five years he lamented the failure to implement reforms on account of financial 
stringent from the Ministry of Finance. Later, the public health act was enacted, and 
the central board of health was then formed as a technical body which would help 
coordinate issues of public health… the central board of health was not a foreign 
concept as popular thinking has it.  The central board of health did call upon capacities 
from different fields, so it was multisectoral in its conception I think those features 
attracted me personally to reconsider the ideals for health reforms in the 1990s” (Inter. 
24 May 2018, former high-level politician).  
 
Clearly the ideologies of the two experts were similar. Prompted by donor enthusiasm and 
the change of government the two experts were central to agenda setting of the health 
reform in Zambia as reported by the first expert:  
 
“…Luckily for me there was a colleague with similar interests, a young man coming 
from Canada armed with a PhD, so we linked up. For him he was more interested in 
politics, and I was more on the technical side. Let me say that policy change is a 
partnership, and it cannot work without the political platform. So, we began with 
writing the health component of the MMD manifesto. Our ideas within the manifesto 
proposed that we decentralise health service provision. We worked together until the 
elections in 1991 where the MMD won and later formed government. Thereafter we 
continued to work together in designing the health reform agenda (Inter. 15 June 








The central role played by the two experts is highly recognised in Zambia such that all the 
interviewees who work or had previously worked in the health sector referred to them as key 
drivers of the health reform process.  But like any other policy process, the health reform’s 
agenda shaping did not go without any resistance or conflicts between the actors. As reported 
by the bureaucrat turned politician, the only way he could get things done was to get involved 
in politics at the highest level. He reported that, first he secured the position of Chairman on 
the Health Committee within the MMD party structures where he could influence 
establishment of policy and legislation. He also held the position of Deputy Minister of Health.  
 
The research found actors were central to the operation of the health reform process in 
Zambia, starting with agenda setting to the point the policy was terminated. Actors’ level of 
involvement is tabled in chapter Seven where the thesis examines the reasons behind policy 
failure in Zambia. The relationships of actors in the health reform processes were conceived 
as a result of the creation of the structures that functioned to deliver health services through 
delegation. The government having created the CBoH as an autonomous body to provide 
health services, while policy and supervision were left with the MoH tasked CBoH with the 
responsibility for day to day running of the district health and hospital boards (MoH, 1996). 
CBoH received more attention and funding due to it being a new institution in which both the 
donors and government were invested. It was the belief of all the actors that had worked in 
the health sector prior the health reforms implementation that the landscape of delivering 
health services needed to be reconsidered taking into account the poor state of health 
services delivery as reported by an interviewee: 
 
On the history of health reform proposal 
“The landscape of health service provision in Zambia were such that before 
independence they mostly served the needs of the white population while after 
independence the rural areas were underserved. Hence the primary health care 
approach to service delivery in the 1970’s was designed with the essence of making 
health institutions accessible to service users at the level of planning. However, the 
professional aspect of medical care was more dominant than the social narrative of 
participation. Hence health care did not involve the input of the communities that were 
being served. In addition, the late 70’s through to the 80’s was challenging for health 
sector financing in Zambia due to the economic crisis. That led to poor health outcomes 
with the prevention aspect of health weakened”. (Inter. 24 May 2018, former high-
level politician). 
Actors’ understanding of policies and reforms is important because of their personal 
relationships with the national context and policy environment, which shapes the way they 







by Bernstein corroborate the conceptualisation of the HPTF of actors being at the centre of 
policy action. Considering that the historical context of the Zambian health policies presents 
a rich background, one with a number of decentralisation implemented under different 
political regimes and having benefitted from global health initiatives at a large scale, actors 
views form a key aspect of policy emergence and sustenance invoking their ability to/not to 
support policy agenda as will be demonstrated in Chapter Six. Moreso, Walt suggests that: 
“the exercise of power is central to understanding and explaining the process and outcome of 
policy” (Walt, 1994). In addition, models of policy analysis recognise the intricacies that actors 
are faced with in interacting with policy actions (Berman, 2005). The models recognise that 
actors may be motivated to act in the way they do for the benefits of the group/organisation 
they represent. Actors may also respond in line with their professional ethos to which their 
action may not be of benefit to policy success.  
 
So, one of the fundamental problems the research found out about actors in health 
decentralisation is that they had no uniformity in their understanding of health reforms. For 
example, a high-level politician who served as a key reformer in the health reforms outlined 
that the health reforms were drafted within the manifesto of the MMD with the elements of 
taking health services closer to the people, he also outlined the fact that the formation of the 
1992 health reforms emanated from the Health Services Act in the precolonial era and hence 
the MMD government borrowed some of those elements to include in the drafting of health 
reforms (Inter. 24 May 2018, former high-level politician). Other actors describe it as 
something that the MMD government picked up from outside and implemented without 
wider consultation. For example, a former MoH mid-level interviewee insisted that the health 
reforms were an architect of donor agenda and that the MMD government had little input in 
the agenda (Inter, 27 February 2019, former mid-level manager MoH).  
The conflict over understanding the history of health reforms led some actors to believe that 
policies are just made by politicians without any consultation, and that political interests 
rather than a desire for health improvement drive reforms. A number of interviewees 
commented that frontline health workers regarded the health reform policy as having been 
a mere political interest than what it said its intent was of improving health services and 
improving retention of staff (Inter. 12 June 2018, former high-level manager at ministry of 
Health). However, this research points to the lack of continuity among actors, and a lack of 
institutionalisation of reforms, as having led to these misunderstandings. So, what has 
happened is that the reform agenda has been seen as something new with each political 
regime, yet the basic policy approach has been in existence since the mid 1970’s under the 
UNIP government (Chapter Three). If actors have understood that history, it can lead to the 
realisation that the aligning of health services to the community has been attempted at 
several points, suggesting a continuity of approach rather than health reform just being 








Actors’ contributions to institutional transformation through the health reform policies  
 
Clearly decision making was not a simple, technical and apolitical process but was shaped by 
central political power, as demonstrated above. Thus, it fits within the literature of 
incremental models in decision making that explain that decision making is a political and 
competitive process among actors, and that actors make decisions out of self-interest 
(Howlett, et. al, 2009, p.146). The incremental model departs from the rational actor models 
that assume that actors are rational and seek to make decisions with the best overall outcome 
(Howlett, 2009, p.32). As evidenced by the reform process, actors sought to be rational in the 
choice of policies but exhibited self-interests to push through agenda. For example, the health 
minister who had more power than his deputy discounted the clause on health personnel 
reporting to local authorities on the premise that health personnel, like medical doctors, were 
too well educated to report to council workers who had minimal education (Inter. 24 May 
2018, former high-level politician). The accountability was thus missed at that point. 
   
Bernstein (2017) suggests that health systems should be viewed as “dynamic social constructs 
shaped by changing political and social conditions”. One of the central concerns of this thesis 
is to determine how decentralisation operates in practice (cf. Chapter One). The health 
reforms examined here were implemented through delegation (see Chapter Two on models 
of decentralisation). Pollack (2002) points out that with delegation, it often remains unclear 
whether the bodies to which authority is delegated implement the mandate of government 
without distortion, or whether they implement their own preference, thereby disregarding 
the mandate given to them. The latter is particularly likely if oversight is ineffective and weak. 
In line with this, most interviewees highlighted that district and hospital board managers were 
so often reckless in spending and there were a number of audit queries that ensued as a result 
(Int. 15 May 2018 former mid-level manager, MoH). Perhaps the point being stated here is 
that political actors’ notion of reform had wide appeal, but the ability to ensure effective 
implementation lower down the chain was weak. Although the commitment to formulate and 
legitimise the health reforms by the MMD government was there at the highest level, it 
presented difficulties for lower-level actors who were not invited to add ideas to the process.  
While all this was happening at the national level, there were no mechanisms put in place to 
ensure that actors at lower levels understood the policy rationale.  
 
And thus, the agenda came to be set by central political actors, donors, and high-level 
managers in the health sector. The three had a shared vision. The political actors provided 
the commitment by government while donors provided the link with the international 
community that assured the donor community that Zambia was committed to reform and 
was on the right trajectory (c.f. Human Rights Watch, 1997). It should however be stated that 
without the support of the public and the donor community such a wide political space could 







donor community within which they could express their intentions for governing the country 
(cf. Lake and Musumali, Chitah et.al, 2018). Their platform was mainly their willingness to 
readily initiate economic, social and public service reforms. Key to economic reform was the 
structural adjustment programme. The commitment to the various reforms produced donor 
and public confidence and hence to meet their obligation the MMD government embarked 
on the health reform agenda in 1992.  
 
The realities are that actors are at the centre of policy processes, as espoused by the health 
policy framework, as key drivers of policy. They work to translate policy ideas and knowledge 
into action regardless of the unequal and hierarchical power relations that may exist (see, 
Walt, 1994, p.154; Howlett, et. al, p160). Other political realities that existed in the reform 
process were that political and bureaucratic actors were working more to appease donors 
than their own citizens, in order to avoid facing the situation that the UNIP government found 
themselves in by failing to meet donor obligations and falling out with them (Int. 15 May 2018 
former mid-level manager, MoH). Certainly, the MMD government was aware of the power 
of donor voices because those voices helped to build their political legitimacy (cf. Human 
Rights Watch, 1997). To make matters worse, the MMD government was showing political 
cracks as some party members broke away from it to form another party citing growing 
corruption within the party (Human Rights Watch, 1997). 
 
While donors’, involvement in agenda setting was more aligned with fostering accountability, 
perhaps they concentrated more on accounting for improvement in health indicators than 
the responsibility of the health systems to build resilient mechanisms to interact with the 
populations they serve. For example, a national level interviewee explained that:  
 
“…before the health reforms, there was a large presence of Swedes in the Ministry of 
Health working in the planning departments at central, provincial and district levels. 
When we started advocating for legislation to change the health sector landscape 
there was so much support from the donors, for them they wanted to see their 
resources put to good use. But the problem was that all this was playing out at national 
level. Perhaps the Swedes should have insisted the inclusion of districts because they 
had the experiences of working with them” (Inter. 5 June 2018, former high-level 
manager MoH).  
 
The donors’ main interests were to shape the resource utilisation and sustained programme 
strengthening, mainly at central level. Henceforth the problem of accountability at lower 
levels emerged - as most interviewees reported. Other interviewees also reported that the 
accountability problem was also present at central level because the central level was 
responsible for providing oversight to the boards and management teams but were not 







5 June 2018, former high-level manager MoH. This is one of the reasons cited by almost all 
the interviewees as having led to the failure of the reforms, accountability. Therefore, the 
thesis questions whether accountability would have been more effective had it been that the 
boards and management teams were accountable to local authorities. This is an important 
question to the thesis because the design of the current devolution plan is based on local 
accountability, to which there is a lot of resistance from central level citing the ineffectiveness 
and corruption within local authorities as will be discussed in Chapter six.    
 
Drawing on these discussions, the policy window for health reforms emerged because of the 
shift in political context and the interests presented by donor and bureaucratic actors aligning 
themselves with the MMD party even before they formed government, a sign that the UNIP 
government had weakened, and that their political and socio-economic belief systems had 
eroded the trust of key actors.  Thus, the opportunities that emerged presented the key actors 
with the power to turn their ideas into policy action. For example, as stated by an interviewee:  
“I was aware that the UNIP government had difficulties in achieving health sector goals 
because their health policies were poor…since I was educated in the UK and when there 
was an opportunity for me to draft policy ideas, I turned to my academic supervisors 
in the UK to help with putting my ideas into perspective. For me, my interests were to 
see a pool of empowered health workforce, making decisions and planning for services 
in their localities” (Inter. 15 June 2018, former high-level manager MoH-pioneer of 
health reforms). 
Typically, there were various justifications for the reform process by pioneers and advocates, 
but what was prominent was that the citizenry did not see any benefits.  Crucially, strikes by 
health workers caused the MMD to lose popularity, with them being compared to the 
autocratic approach to manging service delivery of the UNIP government. The Minister of 
Health also had to repeatedly justify the functioning of the reforms because, for many, they 
were pointless as health services were deemed to have plummeted (Inter. 14 June 2018, 
multilateral representative, former MoH mid-level manager). In the end there were calls to 
review the act that legislated the reforms and the whole reform agenda. 
Health reform agenda evaluation and repeal -an issue of contextual matters, policy content, 
implementation processes and actor’s influence.  
Thus, the political capital and government capacity to reform that existed when the health 
reforms were introduced in 1992 cannot be overemphasised. The reforms were deemed to 
have been ‘brave’ by most of the interviewees spoken to at national level. However, what 
should be emphasised is that the health reforms were embedded within the broader 
economic reforms that the newly formed government had undertaken with the then 
incumbent President, Fredrick Chiluba, persistently warning the Zambian people to tighten 








As the MMD’s reforms called for the country to cut spending in the social sectors, in 1992 the 
international donor community granted $1.8 billion to Zambia which was reportedly three 
times the average aid package to other African countries. And in addition, donors continued 
to back President Chiluba’s reform programme with annual aid contributions of up to $1 
billion a year until early 1996. Aid became the largest source of foreign exchange for the 
country and accounted for 70 percent of Gross Domestic Product (Human Rights Watch, 
1997). Despite the increase in aid, the reduction of state expenditures in the social sectors 
negatively affected the functioning of health services and education. As expenditures were 
reduced it was expected that social services were to be self-sustaining through revenue 
collection such as user fees (c.f. Lake and Musumali, 1999). One interviewee pointed out that 
once reforms introduced user fees at health facilities people could not afford to pay, not least 
because there were job losses because of the reforms. Arguably, the end result was that most 
people were too poor to access health services (Inter. 14 June 2018, multilateral 
representative, former high level MoH official). So, although there was an influx of funding in 
the health sector, coupled with implementation of health reforms to govern health services, 
the health sector remained challenged (MoH, 1998). Some interviewees stated that the 
health reforms were implemented needlessly because they came at a huge cost to the 
government, yet they achieved so little.  
 
Nevertheless, some interviewees who worked closely with the government at the time the 
reforms were introduced reported that the reforms needed to happen because service 
provision under the previous government run by the UNIP had been deplorable (Inters. 5 June 
2018, former high-level manager MoH; 14 June 2018 former mid-level manager, MoH), given 
that health expenditure by the UNIP government had significantly reduced due to the falling 
of copper prices in the mid 1970’s through to the 1980’s (see, Freund, 1986, Burnell, 2001, 
p.152)17.  
 
The MMD’s health sector reforms did not produce the intended outcomes but instead 
problems emerged, which can be attributed to a variety of factors: a newly formed 
government that was initiating new institutions of governance, poor economic conditions, a 
rising appetite for human resources for health in developed countries (which made retention 
more difficult), and a sudden influx of donor funds (cf. Lake and Musumali, 1999). These 
discussions will be revisited in the next section when discussing how the health reforms 
shaped health governance in Zambia. Policy evaluation entails policy actors determining the 
 
17 Since the early 1930s, Zambia had been one of the key producers of copper and continued to depend on copper 
till today. However, by the late 1973 as a result of the world economic recession copper prices fell and having been 
a major contributor to GDP at 30% and accounting for at least 95% of foreign earning, the recession significantly 








extent to which the implemented policy delivered what it intended to (Howlett et.al, 2009). 
The key actors who played a major role in evaluating the health reform process were high 
level management and development partners. Though there were a number of successes 
scored by the health reforms, the failures were commonly deemed to have outweighed the 
benefits.  The health reforms were seen as costly in terms of the amount of money that was 
spent on salaries and emoluments. They were costly in that service delivery did not improve, 
especially with maternal and child health indicators (though this is disputed because one 
interviewee said they did improve health indicators as shown by the Zambian demographic 
health survey whilst another disputed that they did nothing to improve service delivery). The 
health reforms were a deterrent to access, in that the fee for service did not foster good 
health seeking behaviour because of a lack of affordability for many people, especially in rural 
areas. The health reforms also defied the code of ‘lean top and heavy bottom’ because the 
high-level structures became bloated. Such critiques led to calls for the re-evaluation of the 
whole concept. Eventually the reforms were halted, and the legislation repealed. 
 
One of the interviewees from Ministry of Health charged with reviewing the health reforms 
reported that: 
  
“…decisions that were being made by the hospital management through the appointed 
boards were in conflict with most of the civil service conditions and procedures. CBoH 
also had a bloated workforce at the central level and government was spending huge 
amounts of money to run it. Keep in mind that all the employees of the CBoH were on 
contract and they were on very superior conditions of service: at the end of every three 
years they had to be paid gratuity and even just their operations to carry out their 
activities it was found that most of the money which was supposed to be spent in the 
districts for district health services, and at the hospitals for health services ,was 
actually being retained at CBoH headquarters to meet the high operational budget. So 
again, that was the other reason for the failure of the decentralisation” (Int. 15 May 
2018 former mid-level manager, MoH)  
 
However, interviewees who were proponents of the health reform process viewed their 
repealing differently. For example, a proponent of the reform process reported that: 
 
“…the conflicts that existed between MoH and CBoH staff were inconceivable that 
things like furniture and office space were big issues. MoH staff complained that CBoH 
staff had better office space and furniture than they had. So, all those things had to be 
resolved. But the bigger issues like emoluments could not be addressed and there was 
so much animosity towards the CBoH as a body. They were complaints that too much 
money was being spent on staff emoluments, things like the Permanent Secretary who 







are professionals and had to be remunerated accordingly. The Director at CBoH was 
appointed because he was an acclaimed medic and that is the trend aimed to set up. 
We aimed to create an expert body of medical staff that could direct health services in 
Zambia, but that chance was never allowed to grow and flourish”. 
 
Another high-level interviewee who worked at the central board also reported that there 
were a lot of personal conflict between ministry of health workers and those that belonged 
to the central board at district and facility levels and that was a source of strife such that there 
were frequent strikes by health workers. One of the architects of the reforms who was the 
minister of health at the time of the strikes reported that: 
 
“We aimed to create different structures for remunerating health staff because if we 
had kept it within the structures of the civil service, we would have not been able to 
remunerate our health workers differently from the rest of the public service. That was 
the key issue in the failure of the health reforms because it threatened fundamental 
interests of public service unionism, the public service unions felt threatened 
fundamentality with the idea of not linking with health workers, we were to move the 
health workers from the civil service bargaining; as you know when the nurses and 
doctors are on strike its easy and quicker for the government to respond. (Inter. 24 
May 2018, former high-level politician). 
 
Ultimately the calls to review the existence of the CBoH were based on the following reasons: 
1. Justification by government to continue the burden of holding huge wage bills 
generated by central board. 
2. Over expenditures and bloated central level 
3. Duplication of functions by ministry of health and central board 
4. The health service structures did not offer much in terms of improving service delivery 
it was said that instead of money going for service delivery it was used for wages and 
administration. 
5. The incentives for health workers created by the boards did not deter health worker 
migration. The brain drain was still a problem. In this thesis I attribute the problem to 
other poor socio-economic conditions. By merely improving the salary of a health 
worker will not guarantee the health worker does not leave the country. They have to 
think about the education and general welfare of their families and foreign countries 
were seemingly more attractive that the packages that the CBoH was offering and 
hence that was an oversight by the system.  
 
Henceforth the team that was composed to review the health reforms concluded that they 
should be repealed. An interviewee who played a key role during the agenda setting 







failure was a result of individual conflicts and people not wanting to acknowledge the 
strengths of the boards. He reported that people who were opposed to the health reforms 
from the outset had personal interests. He also reported that the detractors of the central 
board managed to convince the World Health Organisation (WHO) that it was a bad 
concept, and WHO also composed a team for themselves to assess the efficacy of central 
board. To this he reported that:  
“When they were reviewing the central board of health, it was a funeral for me. By 
then I was in Botswana and the worst thing for me was that they asked me to be part 
of the team to review the central board of health. They used WHO to come and look 
at the central board of health and rubber stamp their decision when they had already 
made up their minds that central board of health was not needed. It was a political 
assassination. There is nothing to me that was technical about abolishing the central 
board” (Inter. 15 June 2018, former high-level manager MoH-pioneer of health 
reforms). 
It is clear that the evaluation process was a crucial stage where the different actors’ interests 
and ideas interacted in terms of forecasting whether the health reform policy had yielded the 
intended results. Evidently, the interests of those who favoured the termination of the health 
reform provided compelling evidence to terminate the reform agenda. Unlike at the agenda 
setting and legitimation stages, where the ideas of actors with the power go through, at 
evaluation stage it is the ideas of those with evidence - especially if the evidence hinges on 
political legitimacy or threatens the political popularity (cf. Marsh and McConnell, 2010).   
Drawing on a comparison by Marsh and Rhodes (1992a) stating that the failure of the 
Thatcher privatisation policies in the UK were a result of political objectivities clashing with 
economic and ideological objectives; the health reform’s political objectives in Zambia 
clashed with the economic objectives in that although the health reforms aimed to foster 
efficiency, accountability and participation to improve service delivery, the context could not 
support attaining the objectives. Furthermore Cairney (2012p 37) explains that policy 
evaluation entails assessing how successful a policy was. He further explains that if a policy is 
being assessed from the top as it were for the health reforms, the approach used is primarily 
to identify if there was any compliance to the implementation process. For the health 
reforms, the committee that was set up by the Ministry of health to review the 
implementation process ultimately concluded that there was no compliance with the ethos 
of the reform, especially at district levels, and hence recommended that the health legislation 
that enacted the health reform process be terminated (Inter. 14 June 2018, multilateral 
representative, former MoH mid-level manager). Another interviewee reported that: 
 
“…I played a crucial role in the reviewing of the decentralisation process, 
fundamentally looking at the challenges that the government was facing with the 







act be repealed. I did support the idea to repeal the health services act because of the 
duplication of functions between the MoH and CBoH, … additionally government could 
not afford to manage the wage bill demanded by the health reform process” (Int. 15 
May 2018 former mid-level manager, MoH 
 
Frenk (2004a) observes that it is unfair to hold health systems accountable for things that 
they are not completely in control of. Although it was observed that the health reforms were 
not functioning as efficiently as they were supposed to, there were other contextual factors 
that led to the failures (see also McConnell, 2015 on defining policy failure). For example, 
some interviewees reported that some of the failures were institutional and infrastructural 
related (Inter 14 June 2018 former mid-level manager, MoH). The ministry of health often 
could not afford to buy drugs for the hospitals. That created lack of confidence between 
communities and points of service delivery. The interviewee continued to say that that 
communities did not see any value for money: “they would pay service charges, yet there were 
no drugs at the hospitals. The infrastructure was also in a deplorable condition, coupled with 
shortage of health staff. HIV/AIDS had also taken a toll on the community” (Inter 14 June 2018 
former mid-level manager, MoH), hence the health reforms could have gathered as much 
leadership and as much momentum, but in essence generated very little to avert community 
health problems. There needed to be a leveraged level of response for the health reforms to 
work.  
 
The health reforms were deemed to have drained government resources, yet there was 
nothing substantive to show for their achievement. Hence there were incessant calls to repeal 
them. After the repeal of the Health Services Act there has not been any legislation to date to 
replace it - and hence the health sector has been operating without any guiding legal 
framework (Chansa, 2013). The quest to decentralise health services did not end with the 
reform process, as already discussed in chapter two the delivery of HIV/AIDS did manage to 
initiate decentralisation (although contested) and in addition there have been several other 
organisational reforms and decentralisations that have had an impact on health service 
governance in Zambia. A high-level politician interviewee stated that he was repeatedly 
attacked for defending the health reforms during parliamentary debates and once, he was 
prompted to ask the house: “is it the failure to reform or the failure of the health reforms that 




The Chapter has established that the health reforms were designed with good intent to 
improve the delivery of health care, where health was supposed to be taken closer to the 
citizenry so that they could provide accountability to the systems as well as take part in service 







influence, the health reform process in Zambia demonstrates that what is key to policy 
success are local contextual factors. The Chapter established that the health reform process 
operated under difficult socio-economic conditions – economic restructuring meant 
government spending cuts towards health services delivery. Before moving on to conclude on 
how the health reforms have shaped future decentralisation policies and the governance of 
health services, it is perhaps useful to briefly summarise the key points that have been made 
in this chapter, that is to explain how the chapter has answered the four key sub questions of 
the thesis: (a)what has driven the adoption of decentralisation policies in Zambia’s health 
sector? (b) What factors have enabled/inhibited Zambia’s health sector decentralisation 
processes? (c) how has political and bureaucratic action at different governance levels 
influenced health decentralisation policymaking? (d) How has political and bureaucratic 
action at different governance levels influenced health decentralisation policy 
implementation? 
 
The chapter has made substantive arguments in answering the four questions. First, 
decentralisation policies for the health reforms were adopted as a result of the political and 
economic shifts that gained prominence in most developing countries, mainly driven by the 
neoliberal agenda. The whole idea of reform gained prominence in the midst of a failing UNIP 
government and a dissatisfied population in terms of the economic and political situations. In 
short, the whole governance system was questioned by various actors both home and abroad. 
Second the chapter shows that political reform paved way for economic reform in which the 
health reform was embedded. There was a ‘window’ of opportunity for such reform to be 
undertaken (cf. Cairney, 2012, p.3). Clearly the government had popular support from actors 
within the civil service and from the donors. Central level actors were responsible for shaping 
the health reform agenda, but that caused the lower levels to resist at the implementation 
stage. This is because CBoH was seen to be benefiting more from the process than any other 
structures. Consequently, there were strained relationships between the CBoH and MoH 
staff. As reported by interviewees, MoH despised the whole concept of the health reform 
process because it did not seem to benefit them. Although the health reforms were based on 
international norms of primary health care, the ideas promoted failed to fit within the 
Zambian context. 
 
Third, the chapter shows that bureaucrats are key to driving policy implementation and, in 
the health reform process, their role as agents between government and the citizenry 
determined the fate of the implementation process.  (cf. Walt et. al, 1994, p74; Howlett et.al, 
2009 p.160). Rational choice theories as used in the chapter demonstrate that the actions of 
bureaucrats contributed to the breakdown of the reform implementation process where 
board management staff interests were cited as having contributed to inefficiencies in health 
reform operation as well as the hidden conflicts between staff at Central Board of health and 







it is also recognised in the chapter that other contextual factors contributed to the difficulties 
that emerged in implementing the reform process. For example, HIV/AIDS was on the 
increase, and the continued declining economy and austerity measures that were adopted by 
the government as part of economic restructuring limited the available resources. In the end, 
the context in which the health reforms were created was unfavourable and meant that the 
reforms could not achieve some of the key objectives such as retention of human resources. 
Furthermore, actors such as trade unions that felt they were outside the policy process and 
did not understand the essence of the reform process generated their own understandings 
and agenda that contributed to the failure of the reforms. In addition, a key aspect of 
accountability was omitted from the outset of the reform process (the clause on bureaucrats 
reporting to locally elected officials) which caused problems where accountability was 
concerned in implementing the reform process. Smoke (2003) highlights that for 
decentralisation to work, local bureaucrats should be accountable to locally elected officials 
and more crucially local people. Finally, the chapter showed that context matters in policy 
implementation. Mosse (cf. 2004) emphasises on understanding the failure and success of 
policy as determined by organisational relationships and inherent interests of implementers.  
 
The observations made in this chapter show that most of the trends that were set by the 
health reform process continue to exist, that is policy making is mostly in the hands of 
politicians with the involvement of a few central level actors. There are conflicting views 
between actors in governing health services, as will be discussed in Chapter Six. Donors 
continue to play a key role in policymaking and financing the health sector. Lately, 
government spending towards health has decreased while donor funding has remained 
steady. Donors continue to innovate other health models, such as bypassing the central level 
to provide services at district level, but so often such models have been criticised for 
duplication of functions and undermining the sovereignty of African governments (see, Kelley, 
et. al, 2017). The discussions established in this chapter are important for the subsequent 
chapter (Six) as it looks at the delayed implementation of the devolution plan, because some 
of the policy trends that manifested in the health reform continue to affect policymaking in 















Decentralisation and health service governance in current practice: National 
Devolution Plan (NDP) – 2002 to date 
  
Overview 
 The second of the empirical chapters about the practice of decentralisation and 
health governance 
 The chapter is about the delayed implementation of the devolution plan – 
specifically the context, content and actors involved in the implementation plan. 
 Shows how historical trends entrench themselves in policy practice – contextual 
issues 
 Shows that changes in political systems affects/directs/determines capacity to 
implement reforms – structural issues concerned with policy processes 
  Highlights the complexities of implementing decentralisation policies within weak 
institutional contexts  
 Shows that changes in political systems affects/directs/determines capacity to 
implement reforms  
 Demonstrates how donor actors continue to exert influence in the health sector – 
actors being central to directing policy action 
 The chapter considers how political context and actors (politicians and 
bureaucrats) have caused the stalling of the devolution implementation plan 
 Discusses how decentralisation policies work in context and how actors determine 




Chapter Six is the second of the two empirically grounded Chapters. While Chapter Five 
focused on discussing the evolution of the health reform process, this Chapter is on the 
current National Devolution Plan (NDP) that was launched in 2004, specifically the devolution 
of health services as a form of decentralisation process. Generally, the devolution plan stems 
from the Zambian government’s interest to utilise a multi sectoral approach to planning and 
programme implementation. As already stated in Chapter One, decentralisation policies are 







HIV/AIDS programme and the health reform policies discussed in Chapters Three and Five 
respectively.  
The HIV/AIDS policy discussed in Chapter Two demonstrated how decentralisation can be 
utilised to achieve health systems goals in that several goals were achieved through 
community participation that triggered community responses to address the HIV/AIDS 
problem. Significantly, applying the HPTF to HIV/AIDS policy reflects how the context 
supported by a global agenda successfully set course for the content of the policy, and the 
structures that were created to roll-out the process. Actors in HIV/AIDS policy were varied 
and each had a role to play according to the sectors they belonged to, for example the Zambia 
National AIDS Network (ZNAN) at national level, funded by the Global Fund, established 
funding mechanisms to disburse funds from the national level to the community level to 
support Community and Faith Based organisations to dispense HIV/AIDS services at 
community level (see Edstrom et.al, 2010; Walsh, et.al, 2012). Clearly the implementation 
process leaned more on fulfilling the global agenda to address the HIV/AIDS problem 
supported by Zambian domestic policies and politics, for example the Mwanawasa 
government in 2002 had pledged to increase budgetary allocations to fight HIV/AIDS for 
prevention programmes (The New Humanitarian, 2002).  This supported the literature that 
suggests that decentralisation initiates democratic participation in health services delivery if 
there are adequate mechanisms to support it, leading to improved services (see, Crook, 2003, 
Walsh, et.al, 2012; Adams, 2016; Chapter Three).   
Meanwhile, with the health reforms, implementing the agenda was anchored on political 
change and transformations from a one-party state to multi-party democracy through 
creation of new institutions with a wider agenda of economic adjustment (c.f Simutanyi, 
1997). Consequently, the context in which the health reform policy was introduced was 
challenging, leading to its failure despite having been a good policy supported by new 
institutional structures to implement it. Thus, the health reforms case is a demonstration of 
literature on the critiques of decentralisation - specifically that it does not necessarily foster 
accountability and local participation unless the context into which its introduced allows for 
local participation to emerge to foster accountability (see, Chapters Two and Five). Therefore, 
the two discussed decentralisation efforts in Zambia demonstrate the success and failures of 
decentralisation, but in both cases the results depended on unique contextual factors 
(although the specifics of content, process and actors were nevertheless important). 
This Chapter brings an additional case of a policy that has been approved on paper (since 
2004) but has failed to be implemented by several governments. Like the previous chapter, 
this chapter draws on an analysis of primary commentaries about the stalled devolution plan 
from various actors that were interviewed (See Chapter One). Specifically, the analysis uses 







1. Content – demonstrates how the devolution plan has evolved over a period of sixteen 
years, with revisions to suit different governments’ aspirations. In addition, it 
demonstrates that the delay in implementing the devolution plan in Zambia has been 
as a result of: i) problems with structuring the implementation plan, for example 
doubts about how the government will go about in transferring human resources 
management from central level to district levels due to lack of funding and capacity of 
government to build the required human resource pool.   
2. Context - the political context in which the devolution plan has been pursued 
(including the fact that since its introduction there have been four presidents from 
two different political parties  
3. Process – how the plan should be implemented effectively for example there are 
doubts about the capacity of the local councils to manage health services in general.  
4. Actors being at the centre - the limited involvement of non-elite actors in the policy 
process as politicians, external partners and bureaucrats at central level have driven 
the whole policy reform process, while the local level and civil society actors have been 
left out, even though they are important stakeholders in the implementation 
processes.     
The first section of the chapter introduces the NDP and how it has prominently featured in 
several governments’ strategies for improving the functioning of social sectors. Second, the 
intentions of the NDP to achieve/deliver coordinated efforts for improved service delivery are 
highlighted, along with how politics has affected NDP implementation. Third, the Chapter 
outlines how actors have affected the implementation of the policy and how they have been 
affected by it. The chapter concludes with highlighting how the devolution agenda has failed 
to be implemented for a long time while the HIV/AIDS and decentralisation agendas were 
implemented with ease – a key lesson to learn from on how external influence has largely 
driven the success of policy implementation in Zambia as the devolution agenda anchors on 
locally driven principles, that is – to be funded by the government of Zambia.   
 
The rise of the devolution agenda - Policy Content  
As Chapter Two of the thesis explained, aspects of public administrative modelling provide 
helpful baseline analytical tools for case study analysis and for helping to determine the 
various ways that contextual factors create unique forms and delivery of decentralisation - as 
this chapter  will go on to demonstrate, the devolution plan aims to transfer primary health 
care responsibilities to local authorities, but the engagement between the health sector 
(Ministry of health) and the local government (Ministry of Local Government and housing) at 
central level appears to be fragmented as there has been no effort to bring the two ministries 
to work closely together, yet at district levels the District Health Offices and the Local Councils 
have begun to consolidate their operations. At central level, most of the interviewees in the 







to local councils because council structures are currently weak and poorly funded. Not only 
that, but they also reported that councils have no financial capacity to manage the volume of 
funds that primary health care requires to be managed, hence the disinterest at central level 
ministry of health (Inter, 12 June 2018, lower level Manager MoH; Inter. 15 June 2018, mid-
level manager, MoH).  
 
As this chapter contributes to answering the key question for the thesis (that is the 
justifications for the use of decentralisation policies in managing health services and the sub-
question on factors that have enabled/inhibited Zambia’s health sector decentralisation 
processes), the considerations here are on how key contextual factors moderate the effect of 
decentralisation in Zambia. As already stated, considering that the changes in government 
have entailed changes in policy direction, the devolution plan is one such policy that has 
undergone various governments each with their plans on how the policy was/is to be 
implemented. In addition, besides the resistance by health sector actors, other bureaucratic 
actors who are supposed to build the process have contributed to stalling the process, in that 
most of them have not supported the process, especially actors that have worked or work in 
the health sector. While this has been the case with bureaucrats, the reform process has 
received bilateral support in terms of capacity building and creating trust in the process.  
 
The quotes below express the perceptions towards the devolution plan: 
 
“…honestly harnessing opportunities to improve health care services have been very 
poor by government. You and I are sitting here asking each other about donor 
involvement in promoting the devolution of health services, why is that? There are 
opportunities for Public-Private Partnerships which can be utilised to fulfil health care 
needs for the Zambian people because the model of devolution cannot work. The 
councils have no capacity to run primary health care services” (Inter. 16 June 2018, 
Political Appointment, former high-level manager at MoH). 
 
“I find it difficult to answer some of the uncertainties surrounding the implementation 
of devolution. I have worked in the Public Service for close to 26 years and this is an 
agenda I am familiar with, yet I do not know some of the answers to the questions like 
the capacity of local authorities to manage health services. I think you need to speak 
to the Vice President to get a well-informed approach with regards to what the 
government has been doing to build local councils’ capacity because it’s a highly 
charged political matter that so many of us are afraid to comment on. But what I know 
is that there is a waste of resources when it comes to management of local authority 
funds. There are opportunities for them to raise resources but that is not being 







that, that is when we can say they can manage primary health care” (Inter. 16 May 
2018, high level manager, Cabinet Office). 
 
“…I do understand why the health sector does not want the devolution of health 
services. It could be rooted in the past failures of the health reform process. They have 
been so cautious to engage with us in devolving health services, but we have been 
proving the support that they need” (Inter. 20 June 2018 bilateral representative). 
 
Although there are widespread criticisms towards the devolution plan as expressed above, 
the NDP has succeeded in designing a considerable DIP and taken further steps to call for 
implementation legislation, the actual implementation process has been far from being 
achieved. As will be discussed in the next section, this is largely due to the types of 
uncertainties expressed by actors in the quotes above. As earlier stated, the policy was first 
approved and launched in 2004, with the official document stating that the plan was to be 
implemented from 2009 to 2013 (see NDP – 2009 -2013). Key to this shift in the agenda was 
the change of leadership under the MMD government from Fredrick Chiluba, who had 
concluded his ten-year term amid controversy and corruption allegations, to Levy 
Mwanawasa, who termed his government a “New Deal” to distance himself from his 
predecessor who had hand picked him to run as president of the MMD party 18. (See Larmer 
and Fraser, 2007).  
 
The government issued Cabinet Circular number ten to amend the public sector operations 
to include devolution in 2002. Lately, the national development agenda (Seventh National 
Development Plan 2013 -2018), the national budget and the constitution were anchored to 
the decentralisation agenda (see figure 6). However, the set period for implementation was 
not achieved, with the policy further revised and relaunched in 2013, while the target 
implementation plan was set for 2016.  The 2016 target was also not met until 2019, when 
the Act of Parliament that provided for devolution of services was proposed to be revised, 
resulting in further delayed implementation.  
The policy content goes further to state that to achieve the set  objectives of the NDP the 
following will be done: (i) community empowerment through the devolution of decision 
making with matching resources; (ii) foster mechanisms for a bottom up approach in 
budgeting and service planning; (iii) improve political and managerial authority at all levels 
 
18 At the time the MMD government was divided and struggling with the party presidency because the incumbent 
president Fredrick Chiluba had declared interest to stay on as party leader and contest the national general elections 
despite the move having been unconstitutional. Chiluba had already served his initial two terms of five years each 
and was not eligible to stand for a re-election. There were divisions within the party with one camp having offered 
support to Chiluba while the other was opposed the move. Chiluba ended up handpicking a successor Levy 
Mwanawasa which led to the party breaking up with one faction going ahead to form the Patriotic Front (PF). The 
MMD government led by Mwanawasa won the 2001 general election, despite Chiluba having handpicked 
Mwanawasa for party presidency, Mwanawasa initiated corruption investigations against Chiluba and most of his 







(central, province, district and community) to ensure effective service delivery; (iv) improve 
accountability and transparency in management and resource utilisation; (v) capacity building 
of local authorities and communities in development planning, financing, coordinating and 
managing the delivery of services in their areas; (vi) build capacity for development and 
maintenance of infrastructure at local level; (vii) introduce of integrated budgeting for district 
development and management; (viii) initiate legal and institutional frameworks to promote 
autonomy in decision-making at local level (NDP, 2009 – 2013).  The ethos outlined for the 
NDP were embedded within the constitution.  
Obviously, constitutionalising decentralisation was intended to counter the arguments that 
African governments decentralise, yet the lower levels of government are not constitutionally 
entrenched, hence the weaknesses in most decentralisation agendas in African states (see 
Conyers, 2015). The decentralisation process has also been aligned to the Public Financial 
Management agenda supported by the European Union. The premise by the German 
Government, which is spearheading the devolution plan, is that the prudent application of 
resources provided by the government through the treasury should be effectively utilised so 
that social services are provided to citizens efficiently (see, GIZ, 2018). 
Figure 6: Decentralisation Implementation activities (2004 – 2017)
 
Source : Zambia National Decentralisation Secretariat, 2016. 
 
Within the revised decentralisation plan (2009-2013) it was acknowledged that the 
implementation of decentralisation policy by devolution had in the past faced structural 
challenges, and therefore a number of propositions were outlined to minimise future risks as 
well as address the past challenges. Key to the risks outlined was the lack of trust in the 
decentralisation reform by actors across government who were resisting the process (revised 
DIP 2009-2013). Therefore, the government proposed to sensitise actors/stakeholders to the 
benefits of the reform process and how it was to affect governing structures across 







that contributed to the non-implementation of the devolution plan. Overall, the government 
intended to initiate and restore trust in the reform, with political commitment being the 
overarching characteristic to achieve the task (cf.  revised DIP 2009 -2013). Thus, the claim 
was that the decentralisation agenda was to receive renewed political commitment and 
involvement of relevant stakeholders, which was to be achieved by the established national 
decentralisation secretariat. 
 
Contrary to these claims, most interviewees reported that in the period after the publication 
of the revised implementation plan the decentralisation agenda appeared to be more 
fragmented than before, yet politicians both from government and the main opposition party 
kept emphasising the importance of devolving functions and services to local levels. Clearly 
each party had its own agenda in calling for devolution, but the fact was that government 
made little progress, while the main opposition at the time (the PF) seized the opportunity to 
chart a plan for how they were going to devolve functions and services when in power, given 
that government was clearly not keen to implement the policy (see PF Manifesto 2010). These 
events are similar to what happened with the health reform process, the widespread political 
impetus propelled stakeholders, including the electorate, to believe in the reform (see 
Chapter Five) 
 
The life of the National Decentralisation Plan in policy development (2002 – 2019) – 
Contextual factors 
 
As discussed in Chapters One and Two, decentralisation had been the main feature of the 
health sector reform process in Zambia between 1992 to 2006. Meanwhile, the broader 
National Decentralisation Policy (NDP) with its implementation plan, the Decentralisation 
Implementation Plan (DIP), was launched in 2004. But so far it has failed to be implemented 
(see, GRZ, 2002), with repeated attempts to make revisions to the implementation plan. 
Usually, these revisions have aimed to reflect the aspiration of the ruling party, as since the 
inception of the policy there have been four presidents from two ruling parties, with different 
approaches to the plan. Significantly this section demonstrates that the content of the plan is 
suitable but the mechanisms and processes for implementation have been challenging to 
create. Additionally, the context into which the devolution plan has been operating has largely 
been influenced by political dynamics, that have otherwise determined the funding 
landscape, institutional reforms, relationships with external partners, and shaped actor’s 
behaviours and response to the plan (see Chapters One and Three). Therefore, the discussions 
around the devolution plan recognise that the HIV/AIDS policy and the health reforms were 
mainly externally funded and were a result of global advocacy of decentralisation agendas (cf. 









What specific political factors has the devolution agenda been subjected to?  
 
Analysis shows that the content of the current devolution policy is well designed - as discussed 
in the section above, - but implementation has failed for the last sixteen years due to changes 
in government and the lack of capacity of local councils to manage the services that are 
supposed to be devolved to them. This was stated by most of the interviewees that have 
worked with the process since its inception (Inter 23 May 2018, high level manager district 
level: Inter. 24 May 2018, senior manager local government). 
Therefore, interrogating why there has been delayed implementation of the national 
decentralisation policy as it relates to health sector management is a key concern for this 
thesis. This is because, whereas in the past decentralisation efforts in the health sector had 
been in the forefront of implementing decentralisation policies, with the NDP the health 
sector has lagged behind in engaging with the policy. Equally important, the intentions of the 
NDP and DIP presented a new and formalised opportunity for enacting a regulatory 
framework for health service governance through the development and initiation of the 
health sector devolution plan. The DIP maps the intent to transfer management and control 
of selected social services to local authorities and in the case of health services the intentions 
are to transfer the management and control of primary health care to local authorities, while 
tertiary health care, the drug supply chain, supervision and policymaking are to be retained 
by the Ministry of Health at central level.  
 
As explained in Chapter One, the two previous decentralisation processes examined in this 
thesis were initiated with donor funding, but with the NDP Zambian governments have always 
insisted that it should be locally driven, implying that the government of Zambia has the sole 
responsibility for charting how the plan is implemented by aligning it to other development 
agenda and plans (see, GRZ, 2017, 2019). However, this chapter questions the concept of a 
domestically driven policy agenda because evidence shows that the government has no 
capacity to implement the reform, technically or financially. And thus, the German 
government has been involved at higher levels of government through the cabinet office to 
provide technical support.  
 
Given that the devolution agenda has been used as a political campaign tool, thus deemed as 
highly politicised, with the main opposition party (the Patriotic Front (PF)) having used it to 
gain popularity in 2011 while the incumbent Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) 
government had struggled to get on with it, interviewees who have been privy to the Zambian 
decentralisation agenda for the past sixteen years or more pointed out that, ironically, politics 
were the reason why the decentralisation agenda has repeatedly failed: the political context 
continues to distort the ideals and ideas of devolution (Inter.15 March 2018 former high-level 







interviewees attributed the failures to the demise of two presidents while in office, with their 
successors perhaps not having fostered continuity with the policy implementation plan or 
having taken different routes19, it was admitted by most interviewees that political patronage 
at central level that characterises Zambian governance20 has largely held back the 
decentralisation agenda. For the interviewees, they stated that because the agenda is always 
politically charged, politicians have not worked out the modalities to implement the 
devolution plan besides using it to promise the electorate with grassroot empowerment 
(Inter. 14 June 2018, high level central level bureaucrat). 
 
Evidently, there has been a rising and falling of decentralisation policy implementation in 
Zambia for more than a decade due to the political dispositions of different political parties 
towards the devolution plan. For example, interviewees attributed the surging up of the 
devolution plan by the second republican president Mwanawasa in 2002 to his stand against 
corruption in the civil service, with the intention to enhance accountability in service delivery. 
As one interviewee said,  
“…for the Mwanawasa government, a corruption free civil service was very important 
and thus we saw government convincingly preach decentralisation to improve service 
delivery through accountability at lower levels” (Inter 16 June 2018 high level manager 
cabinet office).  
As a result, one notable achievement by the Mwanawasa government was the establishing of 
the national decentralisation secretariat to oversee implementation of the policy, as well as 
to coordinate sector devolution plans at national level.  
However, the plans that were supposed to proceed with the implementation process stalled, 
as many interviewees commented that the government did not weigh the political costs when 
they were keenly advocating for devolution. It was when they realised that they were going 
to lose politically that they decided to hold back, because the main opposition party (the PF) 
had more councillors in key urban areas, so the government knew that if they were to devolve 
power it would be to key councils controlled by the opposition party. As expected, the failure 
to implement the plan sparked criticism from the PF. The PF made repeated calls for the plan 
 
19 President Levy Mwanawasa initiated the devolution agenda. He died in 2008 whilst in his second term of 
office, he had served a total of seven years. He was succeeded by his Vice President Rupiah Banda who was 
completely silent about the devolution agenda. He was defeated in the 2011 elections by Michael Sata’s 
Patriotic Front. Unfortunately, Sata died in 2014 having served three years of his first five-year presidential 
term. Sata’s successor, Edgar Lungu upon assuming office backtracked on the decentralisation decision of 
transferring mother and child health services to Ministry of Community Development; a directive was issued 
that the services be returned back to the Ministry of Health. Under his tenure the devolution agenda has been 
revised pending implementation.  
20 The Norwegian Evaluation Development Support to Zambia (1991- 2005) highlighted that Zambian politics 
are characterised by centralisation of power in the hands of the president supported by a small elite group that 







to be implemented because it was going to benefit them politically.  As one academic 
interviewee reported,  
“The devolution plan was not implemented for political reasons, and if we take a look 
back the Minister of Local Government at one point made a surprising remark that if 
the President wanted the devolution plan to be implemented it is going to be 
implemented” (Inter. 16 June 2018 academic).  
The interviewee went on to say that despite the minister having made such a bold ironical 
statement, she was not reprimanded by the government or the President, implying that the 
government was not ready to implement the plan. A former high-level manager at the 
Ministry of Health said that: 
“…the prospect of implementing the devolution plan by government was exciting for 
the PF because they knew that the local councils that generate revenue would be in 
their hands and the electorate would have given credit to them, and that’s what the 
government didn’t want because they were already struggling with popularity” (Inter. 
14 March 2018, former high-level manager MoH).  
The demise of Mwanawasa in 2008 left the plan unimplemented with his successor saying 
little about going ahead with implementation.  
With the PF having formed the next government in 2011, based on their political message of 
putting more money in people’s pockets, it was expected that they were going to be 
enthusiastic about implementing devolution. However, this was not to be, despite having had 
the majority votes both at national and local levels. Their political mantra of more money in 
people’s pockets was tied with taking service delivery closer to the people (see PF Manifesto, 
2010). In addition, their fierce opposition to the MMD government not implementing the plan 
raised expectations that the decentralisation plan was going to be delivered.  In fact, the 
campaign for the Patriotic Front was anchored on their promoting empowering local 
authorities for effective local governance and people participation.  
Seemingly with the PF government having promised to initiate changes within ninety days of 
government their preferred strategy was to leave behind the devolution plan in preference 
for geographical decentralisation by creating smaller units of administration through creating 
additional districts such that within two years, the country had moved from having 72 to 114 
districts (GRZ, 2012). Meanwhile the health sector was also reorganised outside the 
devolution plan by integrating mother and child health services with the Ministry of 
Community Development and Social Welfare (NHSP, 2015) Although the PF government 
fiercely opposed the previous government for not implementing decentralisation, theirs was 
also a similar route when they formed government.  
With the PF government in power, a number of interviewees reported that their political 







implemented (Inter. 16 May 2018, high level manager, Cabinet Office), because in addition to 
the PF having preached decentralisation while in opposition, their President had a historical 
legacy of being a decentralisation advocate. He was a pioneer of the health reform process 
while he served as Minister of Health during the initiation of the health reform process and 
the success of the health reforms were largely attributed to the political leadership he had 
exercised. However, it was realised that the PF government could not implement the 
devolution plan as expected by many. A senior manager interviewee stated that, because he 
was so confident in the ability of the PF government to implement devolution, he reminded 
many of his colleagues who had been sceptical of the process that the PF government was 
going ahead with implementation looking at the commitments that had been outlined 
towards implementing devolution (Inter. 24 May 2018, high-level manager MLGH). As that 
was not the case, he expressed disappointment that he unfortunately had to join the 
devolution sceptics movement.   
With other interviewees, (Inter. 24 May 2018 bilateral representative, former mid-level 
manager CBoH; Inter. 5 June 2018, former high-level manager MoH), their assertions were 
that because other forms of decentralisation were being mixed with the strengthening of the 
devolution agenda, it was going to get increasingly difficult for the PF government to 
implement devolution because the other forms of decentralisation like the creation of 
additional districts were typically going to require a huge amount of resources for 
infrastructure development, human resources deployment, and establishment of systems. 
The implication was that few resources were going to be allocated for devolution 
strengthening and implementation. As another interviewee pointed out, 
clearly most of us could see that even if the PF government was tabling to parliament 
the revisions of the national decentralisation plan and establishing new legislation and 
at the same time creating additional districts and reorganising the Ministry of Health, 
the capacity to initiate everything at once was limited. It was a question of either/or. 
(Inter. 6 July 2018 mid-level manager, MLGH). 
Another interviewee with a historical legacy of implementing reforms in Zambia echoed the 
sentiments expressed by the former, he reported that:  
“I got concerned when the PF government started initiating other forms of 
decentralisation while at the same time advocating for legislation review of the 
devolution plan…As it was, before they were in power, I was consulted a number of 
times on how devolving sectors like health could yield better services… they were even 
talks of me being given a position in government if they won the elections, but I was 
not interested.  After they won the elections, I saw that the plans had changed 
regarding decentralisation. Developments that I did not expect started happening, like 
the reorganisation of maternal and child health services by shifting it to the Ministry 







conviction that the President had in decentralisation, but in my eyes, those were abrupt 
decisions” (Inter. 5 June 2018, former high-level manager MoH).  
Related, another interviewee reported that he was confident that the devolution plan was 
going to be implemented by the PF government because of the plan being aligned to the 
constitution and the development agenda, which meant that the failure to implement 
devolution was to amount to the failure of the national development plan and the 
constitutional agenda (inter. 14 March 2018, mid-level manager, Parliament).  
As a result, most interviewees felt that, in as much as the PF government had accused the 
MMD government of fearing to promote local autonomy, they had also fallen in the same 
trap. Worse still, interviewees felt that the PF government had manipulated the electorate by 
using persuasive speech on how decentralisation was going to be implemented yet when in 
power they subverted the very idea they had promoted as an opposition party. Henceforth 
the slowed implementation of the devolution plan has been attributed to political 
preferences by different governments. For example, a number of interviewees from cabinet 
office, the health sector and academics were of the view that the Mwanawasa government 
was interested in implementing the devolution plan going by the commitment shown in 
setting up the National Decentralisation Secretariat (cf. Inter. 16 May 2018, high level 
manager, Cabinet Office; Inter. 15 June 2018, mid-level manager, MoH, Inter. 16 June 2018 
academic; former mid-level manager CBoH). However, the political threats posed by the 
opposition PF hindered progress in implementing the plan.  
However other interviewees felt differently and argued that there was nothing wrong with 
the PF having started to implement geographical decentralisation, for example an interviewee 
from a multilateral agency pointed out that;  
“I don’t even know why people want to devolve services in Zambia because the 
numbers are small. So, I supported the PF decentralisation of creating additional 
districts because with additional districts you create smaller units of administration 
and at the same time more jobs for the people, so resources are spread across the 
country, whereas with devolution fewer people consuming more resources to perfect 
the systems like trying to get the human resources component perfectly so that it aligns 
with our governance systems (Inter. 14 June 2018, multilateral representative).  
Another interviewee pointed out that devolution by sector was not ideal because councils in 
Zambia do not run at the same levels in terms of capacity and resource utilisation. For 
example, there are a lot of disparities between urban and rural councils, yet when one looks 
at sectors like health, they tend to be uniform across districts in terms of staffing whether it’s 
a rural or an urban district.  Overall, most of the interviewees from the health sector felt that 
devolution was not going to improve health services delivery with an interviewee pointing 







“…local councils are broke and cannot manage health services effectively. In health 
services we fence our resources, concepts which probably would not be understood at 
local government level and in addition we all know that government pays the least 
attention to council workers. We know that council workers go without receiving their 
salaries for more than six months. Imagine that they have not received their salaries 
for six months, but they receive the grant for health services delivery. Do you think that 
they will stay unpaid, yet they have some money which can be used for salaries? That 
is the catastrophe we are afraid of in the health sector. If government became serious 
with local council workers, then everyone would be comfortable to let them run 
primary health care.” (Inter 14 June 2018 former mid-level manager, MoH).  
In summary all the interviewees attributed the delay in implementing the devolution plan to 
the context shaped by political actors, for example different presidents approached the 
implementation process in correspondence to their interests. Thus, the design details of the 
devolution plan correspond to the problem it intends to address but has been inhibited by 
the power possessed by political actors.  
 
Implications of the delayed devolution plan 
Overall, the repeated failures of implementing decentralisation have been both a source of 
concern and disappointment amongst bureaucrats and those working within the Zambian 
development agenda. While planning activities have been achieved, it goes without saying 
that the failure to implement activities has significantly affected the trust in the reform 
process amongst actors. The supporters of decentralisation in Zambia emphasise that it is a 
worthy process for sectors like health because of the integrated planning process where the 
health sector will not plan in isolation of other sectors that have an impact on health 
indicators. They emphasise that it is an opportunity to bring the determinants of health under 
one umbrella and this will likely lead to improved health service delivery (Inter 12 June 2018, 
former high-level manager, MoH). As for the detractors, they felt that the politics, structures 
and institutions in Zambia have no capacity to conduct such as reform. As suggested by an 
interviewee from a multilateral agency, perhaps Zambia could implement what is suitable as 
opposed to devolving sectors and functions to weak structures at lower levels? 
Decentralisation seemed to be a tired topic across all levels of government, with the national 
decentralisation secretariat seen as an irrelevant institution. An academic who had worked 
with the health reform process reported that:  
“I was doing some work on the devolution policy in 2005 and interviewed staff at the 
national decentralisation secretariat…and then in 2016 the same staff were presenting 
the national devolution plan at a national development plan meeting. It was surprising 







almost ten years ago was the same they were presenting at the meeting. I then realised 
that the devolution plan had not made any progress over the years (Int. 12 March 2018 
academic interviewee).  
Others felt that the secretariat had no relevance and capacity to implement decentralisation, 
as cited by an interviewee from a multilateral organisation:  
“The decentralisation secretariat is a joke, there has not been enough investment from 
government because the staff working there are part time, they have other 
responsibilities elsewhere within the local government…it shows how government is 
not willing to go ahead with devolution because even the sensitisation is not there. 
Decentralisation is a big thing and it cannot be transformative with a skeleton staff 
managing the process” (Inter. 14 June 2018, multilateral representative, former MoH 
mid-level manager). 
Perhaps the concerns expressed by the interviewees were similar with the government’s 
future plan as since the time the interviews were conducted from early to late 2018 the 
decentralisation secretariat has undergone considerable changes. For example, there has 
been a change of staffing levels and management at the national decentralisation secretariat 
and in addition, a few months after the completion of fieldwork, the government introduced 
new legislation to parliament that was to alter the provisions of the 2013-2019 revised NDP. 
(Source: My observations and communication with staff I interviewed, for example the 
Director at the National Decentralisation Secretariat I interviewed during my fieldwork in May 
2018 was transferred in 2019 to work in another province in a different capacity).  
However, it is doubted whether cooperating partners/donors will be satisfied with such 
changes because an interviewee from a bilateral agency with the experience of working with 
the devolution agenda since its inception had complained about staff retention at the 
decentralisation secretariat stating that: 
“Working with the national decentralisation secretariat in terms of staff retention had 
been frustrating because when he builds capacity in staff at the secretariat, the 
government transfers them to work elsewhere. He pointed out that this was a source 
of frustration for him because it derails the efforts of moving forward with the process” 
(Inter. 20 June 2018 bilateral representative).  
In expressing his concerns, the interviewee felt that governments deliberately move staff 
away from the secretariat to slow down progress. Echoing these concerns, and that of a 
multilateral interviewee, a former mid-level manager at MoH pointed out that since staff at 
the decentralisation secretariat are not permanently stationed there, it’s easy for any 
government to move them away. The interviewee cited his experiences with the health 







“…there was a full-time secretariat prior to implementing the reform process with 
individuals on full employment contracts to work on the process with support from 
Swedish technical experts” (Int. 15 May 2018 former mid-level manager, MoH). 
Like that he felt that strong institutional capacity, capital and capital investment and 
commitment to the health reform process served as key to drivers to its implementation. He 
pointed out that with the current devolution plan, staff being part time at the secretariat and 
tasked with other government responsibilities, has been a very big weakness in the process 
because government can simply move the staff away from the secretariat to elsewhere. He 
concluded that this is one thing that donors have failed to engage with government to 
pinpoint that it’s a very big weakness because if a country intends to implement such a big 
reform, staff cannot be going in and out of an institution that is building the foundation of 
reform, such inconsistent activities erase institutional memory he reported (Int. 15 May 2018 
former mid-level manager, MoH). 
Other interviewees who were sceptical of the devolution process expressed relief that it has 
not been implemented and were hoping that it will not be implemented – most of them felt 
that it was an unnecessary process for Zambia. For example, an interviewee pointed out that 
the local councils have in the past failed to provide basic social amenities in their localities like 
garbage collection, and hence he wondered how they can manage a complex sector like 
health without capacity building (Inter. 14 March 2018, former high-level manager MoH). 
However, an interviewee working as a manager in the local council pointed out that: 
“… there will be nothing that will change with services like health at district levels 
because it will be the same staff working under the Ministry of Health that will be 
transferred to local government in the same capacities, only they will be reporting to 
the district councils as opposed to the central level at the Ministry of Health as it is at 
the moment” (Inter 23 May 2018, high level manager district level).   
The sceptics all pointed out that the devolution process can never work in Zambia because 
the current systems will not support the process. 
Overall, political dominance over the devolution process has regressed its implementation 
process owing to the decisions taken by political parties and presidents when in power. 
Undoubtedly the windows of opportunity to drive decentralisation were presented, the first 
one being the transition of MMD presidencies from Chiluba to Mwanawasa in 2002 and the 
second opportunity being the changes in governments from the MMD to the PF under Sata. 
Mwanawasa’s inclinations towards devolution were due to having had adopted hard-line 
policies towards fighting corruption and preferring more accountability in service 
dispensation (Bwalya and Maharaj, 2017), while Sata’s PF government leaned more on 
democratic approaches to service dispensation, thus the PF discoursed inclusiveness and 
service delivery driven by local structures as the basis for advocating for devolution. While 







appeal could not resolve structural and institutional problems let alone dissipate the political 
insecurities they were faced with, for example Mwanawasa feared Sata’s PF dominance in 
managing urban Local Councils. With Sata, his was a case of weak institutional structures21 
because as Mwanawasa held back on devolving; the capacity and time to build the reform 
process were eroding, and in addition, after his demise, his successor paid the least attention 
to the devolution agenda. Henceforth both governments were faced with unique problems, 
Mwanawasa with the fear of losing power to his opponent in some localities while Sata was 
faced with weak institutional structures and capacity to conduct reform, for example the 
failure to resolve the human resources transfer from central to district levels. Therefore, 
when Sata’s government went in power they inherited a weakened basis for devolution that 
they had to lobby renewed legislation in parliament that was supposedly aimed at fostering 
institutional capacities on the side of government to build reform.  
The discussions in this section demonstrate that the political context provided windows of 
opportunity at certain times, but ironically, the actors trying to implement devolution have 
been frustrated by political decisions. Evidently politicians have been more concerned with 
the loss of political territorial power that may be brought about by devolving administrative 
functions at district levels.   
  
Delayed Devolution in Comparison with the health reform process  
 
It is clear, then, that the political context has affected the way the NDP has operated. As 
discussed above, interviewees cited several reasons why Zambia has found it difficult to 
implement the NDP. Looking back at the history of decentralisation in Zambia since 1991, 
health sector decentralisation plans have always surpassed progress in other sectors. But the 
popularity of health decentralisation policies in Zambia typically reflects the international 
normative consensus on decentralisation of health services, as pronounced by the WHO 
(Kalumba, 1994). And thus, while the governments of Zambia had aspirations of implementing 
a broad national decentralisation agenda across sectors, the impetus to do so was absent 
internationally. The exception was health, signified by the availability of donor funding for 
health sector decentralisation, as noted by an interviewee:  
“…strictly speaking many African countries like Zambia were in an administrative mess 
in the early 1990’s… but as you may be aware, international health experts place an 
emphasis on improving health for all globally and that set the agenda for WHO to push 
for decentralisation. In short, everything was muddled together, some experts were 
 
21 The PF had admitted that institutional structures and capacity to conduct reform were weak as evidenced by 
the caveats stated in the Sixth and the subsequent Seventh National Development Plans, however they 
consistently maintained that they were going to implement devolution because they wanted to assure the 
electorate that theirs was a government more interested in the grassroots welfare and devolution was to make 







advocating for political liberalisation, others were offering solutions for improved 
public service management and that was complicated for Zambia. Keep in mind that 
we were implementing Public Service Reforms Programme together with health 
reforms, but no one can account for the improvements or what was achieved with both 
reforms” (Inter. 16 June 2018, Political Appointment, former high-level manager at 
MoH). 
The views expressed by the interviewee also reflect what literature on political reform in 
Africa highlights that, in the early 1990’s, the prevailing economic focus by African 
governments like Zambia was to create a highly functional civil service that was to efficiently 
deliver public goods (cf. Van De Walle, 1999, p:21).  And thus, in the quest to achieve the goal 
of effective public service delivery, several reforms were initiated by the Zambian government 
post multi-party democracy in 1991. Key to that was the health reform process, so to say is 
that the health reform process Some of the reforms that were initiated are still in operation 
to date. As already mentioned in Chapter Two, and as quoted above by an interviewee, the 
Public Service Reform Programme (PRSP), launched in 1993, was one such reform that was 
initiated by government to effect change in the management of public services, build capacity 
and increase performance in the public sector, and implement various forms of 
decentralisation (GRZ, 2012).                  
 
Thus, the idea of the NDP was/is to transfer decision making authority from central 
government ministries to local authorities, using devolution as a form of decentralisation 
(See, Chapter Two on the theoretical underpinnings of devolution). According to the 
development literature, governments opt for devolution on the premise that the transfer of 
decision-making to local authorities translates to participatory governance, which is believed 
to trigger increased community participation and representation of recipients of services, 
while on the provider’s side it’s associated with efficiency, responsiveness and responsible 
service delivery (see Chapter Two; Crook, 1993). 
 
Indeed, the Zambia NDP typifies these principles. For example, the main objective of the 
decentralisation policy states that:  
“Government aims to achieve a fully decentralised and democratically elected system 
of governance characterised by open, predictable and transparent policy making and 
implementation processes, effective community participation in decision-making, 
development and administration of their local affairs while maintaining sufficient 
linkages between the centre and the periphery” (NDP, 2009 -2013 p12). 
While four governments had expressed their commitment to implementing the NDP, their 
intentions did not result in implementation compared with the health reform process. The PF 
government in 2015 went ahead and revised the plan so as to set a revived agenda aligned to 







because they were identified as a risk to the implementation process (cf. Inter. 24 May 2018, 
high-level manager, decentralization secretariat). But some interviewees still felt that the 
doubts surrounding implementing devolution remained unaddressed by the PF government. 
For example, an interviewee stated that:  
“Most of us in the civil service see the current national decentralisation agenda as 
nothing but political speech. If we analyse the situation, the policy should have been 
implemented a while ago and if it was suitable, it is something most of us would have 
supported. But as it is, it will continue to remain in political speeches because there is 
little that is being done to change the structures that should enable the agenda” (Inter. 
14 June 2018, high-level Cabinet Office bureaucrat).  
Another interviewee stated that,  
“…there is no conviction among politicians that devolution can work. For example, the 
PF government grew cold feet towards moving the devolution way, perhaps politicians 
should continue to consult widely whether to proceed with it or not because we 
developed the sector devolution plans and that was it.” (Inter. 15 June 2018, mid-level 
manager, MoH).  
The views were also similar at community levels. At Ward Development Committee (WDC) 
level (the structures which are supposed to engage the community in local service 
governance), interviewees mostly expressed scepticism with regards to government 
commitment in engaging them as stated:  
“…having lived and worked in this community for more than 40 years, I have seen 
development promises come and go. …being a former primary school teacher people 
regard me as a key contributor to community development. My involvement in the 
WDC committee was by chance. There was no dissemination of information 
whatsoever about what the government was intending to do. My name was proposed 
by someone who is close to the ward Councillor that I needed to be part of this 
committee. I have repeatedly questioned if at all the government wants this to work 
because if they are interested, they should have widely disseminated information to 
the community of their intentions” (Inter. 10 May 2018 WDC member Lumwana 
District). 
Thus, the weaknesses identified by interviewees, show that there is a gap in what the 
devolution plan intends to achieve and the activities that have been conducted thus far by 
government and the local authorities which was not the case for the health reform process. 
An interviewee who was privy to have taken part in the health reform process at local level 
had this to say: 
“…I am one of the key pioneers of the Neighbourhood Health Committees. When we 







dissemination of information. The health workers used to hold meetings in the area 
with representatives from government. Sometimes even the area Member of 
parliament would be present because they wanted us to be aware that health was a 
community issue and they needed our leadership as a community to get involved in 
health matters. But when I compare to this thing they want to bring; I find it difficult 
to understand. Help me to answer this; is it because governments have changed? ...you 
see what happens now is that we just hear people talking about this thing and how 
people should organise themselves” (Inter.10 May 2018 former WDC member 
Lumwana District). 
In addition, the interviewee also complained about the attitudes of local council workers in 
his area, stating that they do not show commitment to the process they have been tasked 
with because they arrive late for meetings and there has not been enough sensitisation to the 
community.  
To echo his sentiments another interviewee reported that: 
“This WDC has no power and mandate. When we go for meetings where the council 
workers ask us what development we would like to see in the community, it’s always 
been about brainstorming. The situation has been the same for the last four years or 
so. And then the councils encourage us that we should start working with the 
community to initiate change. In my community there is a lot of malaria because 
rubbish is dumped everywhere and those are breeding grounds for mosquitoes, then 
we also have a problem of disorderly behaviour. …but how do I go and tell people to 
do the right thing when the councils with the legal authority have not informed the 
community about our existence and mandate as WDC? It’s disappointing that the 
council cannot solve any problems with us… you know we are a vulnerable community 
that lives very close to the council dumpsite for the whole Ndola district. Factories 
dump expired goods and chemicals very careless and what happens is that we have a 
group of unemployed youths who operate more like a gang and manage the dumpsite” 
(Inter. 4 June 2018 Community Representative, Retired teacher -Ndola) 
Other doubts expressed towards reform relate specifically to the MoH. Having gone through 
numerous organisational reforms all aimed at decentralisation, high level Ministry of 
Health workers reported that they felt that they were at the mercy of politics, despite 
having an interest in ensuring that policy was implemented successfully. Hence their 
feelings of being inhibited by political contexts to perform their duties led some of them 
to worry more about their job security than performing their roles as bureaucrats. The 
high-level bureaucrats also reported that Ministry of Health reorganisations were not 
about attaining health systems goals but job creation for unqualified political party 
loyalists, which alters the whole essence of reform and reorganisation. As one 







“…the change in governments changes the mood with everyone playing out to be 
a party loyalist to earn or keep their jobs. On one hand you have genuine party 
loyalists that are not qualified seeking to earn top positions in government, and 
on the other hand you have those that are qualified and seeking to maintain their 
jobs, they control the system at all costs to protect and safeguard their job while 
performance as a technocrat does not come as priority” (Inter. 5 June 2018, former 
high-level manager MoH).  
The views expressed have led to criticisms of the essence of reform in the health sector 
because it targeted qualified people, some of whom were driven out of the health sector 
and others transferred to ministries to work in unrelated professions. 
The views expressed by the interviewee takes us back to Chapter Five where the HPTF 
demonstrated the interrelationships that existed in the health reform processes where actors 
and resources where mobilised both locally and externally to attain implementation stage (cf. 
Buse et.al, 2006, p:9), here, the evidence that the HPTF demonstrates are the complexities 
that the devolution plan has encountered to be implemented. It shows the constraints 
generated by actors, structure and ideas present at given political and social periods (cf. 
Howlett et.al, 2009, p.8). And thus, the thesis has understood how the dynamic interplay of 
mechanisms and context produce outcomes (cf. Pawson and Tilley 1997; p56). For example, 
it has been understood that because of the presence of donor resources and commitment to 
the health reform coupled with a new government that had shown commitment to reform, 
the health reform process went ahead to be implemented while with the devolution plan it 
has been lost within several government’s agenda of broader reform. It is for these reasons 
that the thesis believes that the content of the policy is well outlined but what lacks are the 
implementation mechanisms and the environment constraints into which the ideals it 
promotes have been subjected to. The section below discussed the details of what the 
devolution plan contains.  
 
 
External influence on the devolution agenda in comparison with the health reform process. 
While policy implementation on the Zambian government’s side is still undergoing changes 
having made minimal progress, the activities on the side of cooperating partners have 
continued to be implemented. For example, the United Kingdom Department for 
international Development (DFID) in 2017 was reported to have invested an equivalent of 
$430 spending for every Zambian citizen (based on the population of 16.6 million people) into 
the decentralisation process (UK Zambia Facebook Page, 2017). The German government 
bilateral support to Zambia (through German Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit 
(GIZ) also made significant progress through its Decentralisation for Development (D4D) 







provided support at central and provincial levels of government and eight local councils as 
part of a pilot to roll out support to strengthen multi-level system of government structures 
for the provision of devolved services (D4D II, 2018). However, the implementation of the 
devolution has not gone without structural challenges. Seemingly to respond to the criticisms 
of accountability, GIZ from 2016 has constantly engaged with the Cabinet Office to provide 
support with regards to strengthening local authorities’ fiscal management. In addition, the 
European Union has also been engaging with the National Assembly of Zambia in building 
capacity among lawmakers to understand the budgeting process (see, NAZ, 2017). GIZ has 
also been conducting capacity building programmes to local councils signified by the 
workshops they hold (GIZ, 2016). Similarly, as with the previous health reform, donors have 
found it difficult to implement policies within weakened financial structures, which has led to 
the repeated attempts to conduct a key reform with several other reforms within the public 
sector, that is while GIZ is supporting the NDP implementation process, it’s also been 
conducting programmes on strengthening financial capacities of local government structures 
through the cabinet office. The EU has also been implementing programmes on Public 
Financial Management (PFM) to promote efficiency in planning and use of public resources 
(see, Parliament of Zambia, 2016). However, this thesis notes that there is also a failure on 
the part of donors to coordinate previous activities. For example, the HIV/AIDS structures had 
built the Provincial AIDS Task Forces (PATF) and the District AIDS Task Forces that were 
directly involved in community responses to HIV/AIDS. Perhaps they could have been a 
starting point? The thesis also notes that capacity building between government and donors 
also comes with initiating new institutional structures and thus the problem of continuity has 
presented challenges to implementing reform in Zambia.  
The UK government had clearly stated that the primary interest of such an investment was to 
primarily build effective human resources for service delivery in Zambia; services that should 
respond to local needs and effectively reach poorer communities (UK Zambia Facebook Page, 
















Figure 7: UK-DIFD Representative launching the Human Resource Project as  
Part of the Zambian Decentralisation Process 
 
Source : https://www.facebook.com/dfidzambia/posts/government-expenditure-in-zambia  
 
Unequivocally, the commitment to implement decentralisation is strong from the side of 
cooperating partners. However, despite such milestones being achieved by cooperating 
partners, mixed feelings were expressed among interviewees - especially from current and 
former ministry of health senior and mid-level managers. Some of their expressed 
dissatisfactions were attributed to the past experiences of failures of decentralisation, 
especially the human resources component of the health reform process. Others were wary 
of the German government’s position on decentralisation: put simply, they felt that the 
German government has/d not engaged with the health sector to understand the past failures 
of the health reform process and therefore the technical capacities of councils are not apt to 
manage primary health care as the Germans may presume. It was thought by the interviewees 
that if the health reform process was such a well thought out plan but failed to manage the 
human resources component then the councils are far worse off to manage such a complex 
process. The interviewees, they had this to say:  
“DfID is correct that decentralising human resources will create a pool of staff that are 
directly accountable to the districts… I also agree with the rationale of creating and 
promoting responsive human resources at district levels because right now there are 
ghost workers in districts who do not work in the physical locations as listed by 
government. You find that they work in urban areas, yet they are listed as working in 
a rural district. This starves the rural areas of the needed human resource. However, 
what DfID is trying to do has been tried before in Zambia during the health reforms 
and it failed the health workers lamentably. I am sure that even the secretary to the 
cabinet who has had experiences with the failures of decentralising human resources 







delinked from the Public Service Management Division, the Trade unions and their 
pension contributions? This is a huge puzzle considering that the Zambian government 
does not have money to retire workers and then rehire them. I wonder why people are 
insisting that health workers be transferred to local government? I think in Zambia we 
have amnesia” (Inter, 27 February 2019, former mid-level Manager MoH). 
“… what is the contribution of the German Government to the Zambian health budget? 
…very little...what project has the German government done in Zambia that is health 
related that you can point to? …almost nothing. At the moment the Ministry of Health 
owes drug companies millions of dollars, so why isn’t the German government coming 
forward to provide capacity within the Ministry of Health to offset such problems? … 
you see the coin is one sided, how can they build capacity in the local councils while 
they do not want to engage with the health sector”? (Inter, 15 March 2018 former 
high-level manager MoH).  
It is worth noting that while I was still conducting my fieldwork in July 2018, the human 
resources decentralisation component was piloting in Chibombo rural district, with an 
interviewee pointing out that I was conducting the study during a historical moment22 (Inter. 
20 June 2018 bilateral representative). However, there appeared to be no optimism in the 
process for the health sector, as it did not go ahead to be part of the pilot as planned (note: 
the process was conducted outside the health sector led by the decentralisation secretariat 
and donors). A bilateral representative interviewee charged with overseeing the process 
indicated that the Ministry of Health had taken a deliberate decision not to get involved in 
the piloting to which they had cited that they were not ready, and that the directive was made 
at ministerial level. To that the interviewee indicated that the pilot was to move ahead 
without the Ministry of Health (Inter. 20 June 2018 bilateral representative).  Whereas 
evidence and arguments suggest that less developed countries like Zambia have no ability to 
push back reforms initiated/led by donors (See Barnes et.al 2015: p. 65), the human resources 
devolution piloting phase indicates the contrary. Perhaps it’s the weakened position of the 
devolution plan that gave room to the MoH to exercise such agency, moreover there 
were/are no direct benefits that the MoH was/is to gain from the process (for example, 
Barnes points out that less developed countries like Zambia go along with donor preferences 
so as to access funds to address health problems but in this case the benefits were/are not 
 
22 Institutional and human resource capacity building is a key component of the DIP. The rationale is to create and 
strengthen institutional capacities to implement, manage and support decentralized governance, development and 
service delivery. And since the NDP entails the transfer of primary health care to local councils where district 
health structures will be transferred from MoH to district local authority structures, where the local authorities 
will have the mandate to manage its own human resources within their jurisdictions, with the power to hire and 
fire departing away from the current practice where human resources for health is centrally managed by the Public 
service Commission. The reasoning follows the ethos of devolution where power and authority to manage service 
delivery is placed entirely in the hands of local authorities. To that, DFID has been working with the Zambian 
government through the decentralization secretariat on the human resources component to develop mechanisms 







directly aligned to addressing health priority problems and as already cited, a former ministry 
of health high level manager criticised the German government for not offering direct support 
to address health priorities yet they have the interest to see councils manage primary health 
care) (Barnes et.al, 2015; Inter, 15 March 2018 former high-level manager MoH). Looking at 
the criticisms openly expressed by interviewees close to the health sector towards the 
German government’s involvement in devolution suggests that Zambian actors in the health 
sector are more responsive to cooperating partners’ ideas and ideologies if they offer direct 
benefits to the sector.  For the thesis this speaks volumes with regards to power that the MoH 
possesses over health service delivery which seemingly can be tied to the existing volume of 
donor support that they receive, thus in a way shapes, contorts and constrain the 
participation of other ministries yet the emphasis of the NDP has been a multisectoral 
approach to service delivery. 
Regarding the pilot of the human resources component, it was Interesting and perhaps a 
puzzle that information about the pilot implementation was withheld from key stakeholders 
as the interviewees who work within the civil service, MoH, local government and a multi-
lateral agency that funds health programmes in Zambia that were interviewed and some that 
were subsequently followed up for a second interview expressed ignorance that such a 
process was to be conducted.  
While cooperating partners have/had been working to resolve the problem of lack of capacity 
within local councils and the general difficulties that come with sector decentralisation, and 
more broadly decentralisation, the PF government was seemingly more interested in 
maintaining popular support, evidenced by the low level of investment in the devolution 
process and by opting to quickly fix the systems through geographical decentralisation and 
health sector reorganisation of maternal and child health services, as pointed out by an 
interviewee:  
“…clearly no Zambian governments in past 15 years have made deliberate efforts to 
drive devolution, they have been more interested in political appeal to the electorate. 
Take for example compared with the health reform process, the health reform was 
widely disseminated and the efforts of both government and cooperating partners 
were coordinated…. Another excellent example is the decentralisation of HIV/AIDS look 
at how massive the support was from government where Mwanawasa made an effort 
that the Zambian government budget was to include HIV/AIDS programme support 
and it was done. Political commitment was great, and bureaucrats worked to ensure 
services were delivered… now, am asking you who is studying this devolution, has any 
government shown such commitment to devolve services?  Have you heard of a budget 
for devolution or any media sensitisations?” (Inter. 15 March 2018 former high-level 







Nevertheless, an interviewee directly involved in working with the NDP pointed out that the 
concern should not be about whether the devolution plan is externally driven or not but about 
whether service delivery is shaped to address the needs of the population (Inter. 12 March 
2018 high-level manager Decentralisation Secretariat). Generally, similar views were 
expressed by interviewees from MLGH at national and district levels. For this thesis the 
concern in this regard is also about the utilisation of donor resources to effectively shape 
service delivery in the social sectors as the interviewee stated and not to judge whether donor 
involvement is right or wrong. The thesis is mostly interested to unearth how donor funds in 
the health sector have continued to be enmeshed in local political dynamics that may 
sometimes conceal the realities behind actors supporting or resisting reform.  
Evidently this section demonstrates that actors are central to policy action and in this case, 
the discussions specifically highlight the key role of international actors in policy reform and 
development. Even though the devolution agenda is principally based on locally driven ethos, 
the role of international actors plays an important role in resource constrained contexts like 
Zambia because international actors engage in generating resources and provide the required 
networks to address health needs and to drive complex policy systems, for example the DfID 
has engaged to resolve the human resources component of the devolution agenda and the 
Zambia government has for the last three years depended on their expertise.  
Context (f)actor’s influence on devolution implementation. 
In sum, the discussions highlighted in the previous two sections show that the efforts of 
devolution have all been conducted within central level structures overshowed by centrist 
politics and bureaucrats, despite the fact that the reform intends to transfer power to the 
lower district levels. Olowu (1989) points out that these are inherent failures of 
decentralisation policies in Africa and to this, he concludes that decentralisation has failed in 
most African countries mainly as a result of the conceptual difficulties of decentralisation 
because for most African governments decentralisation means extending centralist power to 
lower levels (Olowu, 1989).  The thesis agrees with the assertions made by Olowu that 
conceptual difficulties of decentralisation have contributed to the failures of decentralisation 
in African countries, as the Zambia devolution agenda provides evidence of fundamental 
weaknesses of centrist approaches to reform that aims to share responsibilities with lower 
levels. Ironically, the introduction of decentralisation reforms in Zambia originated from 
accumulating evidence of the weaknesses and failures of centrist approaches in delivering 
public goods and services (see, Kalumba and Freund, 1989) and the intentions are to shift 
service delivery to district levels. However, patronage by central level to roll out the process 
largely inhibits its progress. This patronage can be traced in the way that the central level 
controls the agenda and leaves out the lower levels. For example, the decentralisation 
implementation plan clearly lays out the structures that have been formed, some of which 
already existed, and strengthened to roll out the devolution plan from central level to local 







Figure 8: National Devolution Structures 
 
           Source: Revised DIP – (2009 -2013) 
 
To that, an interviewee at ward level (a member of the Ward Development Committee) stated 
that: 
“…I really don’t feel that what the council is doing makes any sense… let me tell you 
that council workers convene meetings with us and discuss nothing substantive, we 
know that they get allowances to hold meetings with us and one can tell that it’s their 
primary interest. This agenda of giving us power to control development is our areas 
is so vague, how do I just get up in the morning and tell people not to litter the 
environment… I wish you could come to one of the meetings, the proposed plans are 
not logical” (Inter. 11 April 2018. WDC member Solwezi district).  
Clearly the beneficiaries of the reform do not have much information about the 
implementation plan, neither do they feel that it’s attainable.  Evidence from district health 
staff further elaborates that capacity has not been built at district levels to enable devolution. 
For example, a district medical officer was concerned that reporting to the local councils has 
not added any value as far as he was concerned. He reported that even though they were 
required to report to the councils, as demanded by new protocol, he had not seen the benefits 
besides increased workload for him due to dual reporting to the Provincial Ministry of Health 
and the District Council Offices. He went on to state that the councils needed a better 
understanding of the services to be devolved to them and how they are to work with the 







The views were not the same among district health staff because a staff from another district 
reported something different. He said that: 
“…I have found it very efficient to work with the local council on health matters in our 
district. The sharing of resources is so efficient. For example, I am aware of all the 
activities at district level by other sectors through our district weekly briefings. So, what 
happens is that we plan in such a way that we share the use of vehicles as this is a rural 
area and some of our catchment areas have poor roads and extend as far as 120km. If 
Ministry of Agriculture plans to conduct their agriculture extension activities, we plan 
together so that our staff and theirs use the same vehicle and we allocate resources to 
other things like we reserve the use of fuel for our ambulances. So, I find it to be very 
efficient and a good way to efficiently manage health sector resources” (Inter. 11 April 
2018. high level manger district level MoH. 
Therefore, it suffices to point out that because politics and central bureaucrats have been the 
main drivers of the reform with lower levels (as implementers and beneficiaries) having very 
little to no involvement, the process has not received the required attention from lower levels 
to enable progression such that even the positives that have been recorded at lower levels 
are rarely spoken of by the central level. The implications of this for the reform have been 
that the process has not been clearly understood, especially by district health staff, as some 
of them reported that they were not sure was going to happen to them as frontline health 
workers. With the looming uncertainties at district level among health workers, the majority 
of staff felt devolution was going to impact the delivery of primary health care negatively, 
while some felt that it was going to have a positive effect. 
Interviewees who were in support of the CBoH with the previous health reforms were more 
critical of the politics surrounding the whole idea of devolution because they felt that there 
were missed opportunities with the health reform process: 
“…consider the environment in which these governments expect the devolution of 
health services to operate. I think it doesn’t make sense. The delegation instituted by 
the health reforms was the best model that could have improved health service 
delivery because you concentrate on growing a single sector and develop the technical 
expertise of the staff than being everywhere as the devolution plan suggests where 
you involve so many sectors. Where is the money going to come from? …and strictly 
speaking the devolution is the same as the politics of the UNIP government. You give 
power to local levels, yet they manage nothing” (Inter. 16 June 2018 academic former 
mid-level manager CBoH). 
“I am not a politician, but I studied that this devolution in Zambia will imply the pretext 
of giving power to local councils yet in the real sense it will be perpetuation of power 
at the centre. How will local councils hire and fire staff in the absence of expert staff 







to have people who are elected, yes, they are there but they still interfere with them a 
lot at the centre. Secondly, you should not have appointees like district commissioners 
within the local authority structures, people who should run the local authorities are 
the elected officials, so you can see what all these governments have been scared of. 
Just like UNIP, President Kaunda was so scared that if elected people managed local 
authorities obviously there were not going to be telephones from State House to 
instruct who to hire and fire. So, at the moment, the district commissioners are a thorn 
in the flesh to local authority development because they are agents of the central 
government, to put it simply agents of the President and the ruling party, so for me 
that is the greatest failure of what we have at the moment” (Inter. 15 June 2018, 
former high-level manager CBoH-pioneer of health reforms) 
“…all I can say is that in as much as the devolution agenda is a puzzle it has taken too 
long to figure out how to do things. You see with the health reforms, people knew that 
we needed something to govern health services, and I can tell you that not everything 
was bad about the health reform process, but corruption in government affected it so 
much although people would not like to admit that. There were opportunities for the 
government to strengthen fiscal management and that was done through the health 
reforms with donor support” (Inter. 24 May 2018 bilateral representative, former mid-
level manager CBoH) 
Evidently interviewees expressed themselves in this way because power is in the hands of 
politicians, thereby inhibiting participation of other relevant stakeholders in policy decision 
making, which apparently creates resistance and insecurity among top bureaucrats. One 
interviewee, for example, reported that: 
 
“…the devolution agenda has been hard to achieve at all levels. The changes in 
governments over short periods of time brought so many uncertainties. When I was 
serving in my position, I had to be cautious of the advice I provided to the new 
government for fear of being deemed as an opposition to their agenda. This was the 
case with a number of my colleagues” (Inter. 18 May 2018, former mid-level manager 
Ministry of Health).  
 
Given the multiple interpretations of the effects of politics on the devolution agenda 
expressed by interviewees, their views of the failure of the decentralisation policy by 
devolution as a reform tool have been shaped by their expectations and past experiences. 
Clearly actors across different government levels adjust to political moderations as opposed 
to performing their functions as bureaucrats, therefore this supports the assertion that policy 
implementation reflects a country’s political system. Clearly, the devolution agenda in Zambia 








Effects of political dominance on the devolution agenda for the health sector 
Decentralisation demands the readiness and capacity of the institutions that are to receive 
the power and responsibilities (Prudhomme, 2000). Going by what most interviewees 
reported, this thesis believes that the health sector has been hesitant to devolve primary 
health care partly because they have the fear of losing power which is very difficult for central 
structures as most literature outlines (cf. Smoke, 2003; Conyers, 2015; Litvack, 1998); but it 
has also been about the lack of capacity of lower levels to run health services (which is true 
in the sense of Zambia) which is also supported by several arguments concerning sector 
devolution (cf. Prudhomme, 1995; Crook, 2003). In some way, both arguments partly reflect 
the power of central actors to shape policy action.  
From the foregoing discussions the health sector is clearly not ready to decentralise 
primary health care. Most interviewees attributed the unwillingness to engage to the 
weaknesses within government structures and systems. For example, as already 
mentioned, the lack of capacity of the local councils, the inability of the decentralisation 
secretariat to engage key sectors like health for them to see the benefits of 
decentralisation. Not only does the blame fall on the decentralisation secretariat, but key 
government institutions, some of which are controlled by high political offices. For 
example, the devolution agenda is driven by the office of the vice president and therefore 
with such high-level political involvement it is expected that the agenda should have 
moved forward.   
 
Furthermore, looking at the current National Health Strategic plan which runs from 2017 
– 2021, it does not fully acknowledge that decentralisation has been on the agenda for a 
while, and therefore the health sector should prepare for the shifts in governance 
structures of health service delivery. Instead, it offers narrations on decentralisation and 
how it’s supposed to be conducted (NHSP 2017 -2021; p.63). This thesis notes that these 
were missed opportunities for the decentralisation process to engage with the health 
sector because as government is aware of sector plans, ministries earmarked for 
devolution should have been encouraged to submit strategic plans that recognised 
government intentions to implement devolution in the future. 
With the Ministry of Local Government and Housing (MLGH), for example, the picture is 
totally different from that of the health sector. The MLGH articulates how the devolution 
process has received support from the national decentralisation secretariat, bilateral 
support from the German government (GIZ) and the UK Department for International 
Development (DFID).  MLGH states that GIZ at central level has supported them through 
the Departments of Local Government Administration and Housing and Infrastructure 
Development. They also state that the support extended to the Decentralisation 
Secretariat, Ministry of Finance, Local Government Association of Zambia (LGAZ) and 







its stated that GIZ has supported Provincial Local Government Officers (PLGO), and eight 
partner councils in two provinces. The support was initiated in April 2015 to March 2018 
at a total of 4.5 million Euros of German contribution (MLGH, 2018). The work was 
conducted with the help of technical advisors of project teams and support staff.  
Furthermore, the decentralisation secretariat reported that GIZ has facilitated 
implementation of intergovernmental fiscal architecture and strategic management 
processes and cooperation relations for service delivery at local government level (D4D 
II, 2018). Undoubtedly bilateral support has helped to build capacity to build the 
devolution plan, including creating effective systems linking with the Ministry of Finance. 
Therefore, it was up to the Zambian government to strengthen the process because, as 
far as GIZ is concerned, their pilot projects under the local government have been 
successful and they feel that local government has the capacity to run services efficiently 
(GIZ, 2015).  
Clearly there is a mismatch to what is going on in the health sector compared to claims 
made by the MLGH regarding the strides made towards devolution. It is also clear that 
the decentralisation secretariat is more aligned with the functions of the MLGH, which 
operates more within the framework of the planned devolution while other sectors 
earmarked for devolution seem to be operating outside. It should also be noted that the 
decentralisation secretariat is an extension of local government (all the staff at the 
decentralisation secretariat hold official positions in the MLGH) and therefore other 
ministries may see is as pushing the agenda on behalf of local government.  
 
Critics of the devolution agenda also raised arguments that too many structures are 
involved on the local government side, thereby posing a threat of bloated structures. GIZ 
feels that their mandate has been achieved and considering the investments that have 
been channelled to the process it is understood why they want devolution to happen in 
Zambia. However, GIZ has not considered whether central government in the foreseeable 
future will have the capacity to maintain the bloated structures (Inter. 14 March 2018, 
former high-level manager MoH). Therefore, this thesis believes that, the arguments by 
almost all the interviewees in the health sector both current and former that devolution 
of the health sector will not likely succeed may be justified because one of the major 
causes of the breakdown of the health reform process was that government could not 
continue to fund extended expenditures at district levels as well as at Central Board of 
Health (cf. MoH, 2009). The structures were deemed to have been bloated with 
exaggerated monetary incentives for staff which negatively impacted on fiscal 
management and, to an extent, as reported by interviewees, that there was alleged fiscal 
irresponsibility and dominance by top management at district level. As reported by an 









 structures were bloated at district level and government could not afford to spend 
so much on the boards both at central and district levels…so it was a question of 
luxury spending meanwhile some health indicators were dropping…with the 
district health boards there were those employed by the boards and were receiving 
huge salaries while others were still working under old terms and conditions 
pending board conditions and that caused strife among workers. The other thing 
is that top managers had luxurious conditions of services and to an extent some 
abused the systems, some mangers would decide to sell board vehicles to 
themselves because such decisions could be approved locally…I mean there were 
a lot of irregularities that we found in fiscal management (Inter. 12 June 2018, 
former high-level manager at ministry of health).  
 
Therefore, the MoH is wary of what might happen at local levels regarding financial 
management and sustainability. However, there were two arguments brought forward 
regarding possible financial risks within local government, one was that there are fewer 
financial leaks posed and reported by the local government sector with a local 
government interviewee arguing that;  
 
“I don’t know why the ministry of health keeps talking about possible fiscal 
mismanagement within the Ministry of local government because if you look at 
the current auditor general’s report there are more misappropriation of funds 
reported from the Ministries of Finance and Health with very few cases at Local 
Government Ministry” (Inter. 9 July 2018, high level manager local government 
district level).  
 
The second argument is that economic conditions may not adequately support financial 
needs for social services provision by local governments. As started by an interviewee 
from a multi-lateral organisation:  
 
“…there has been a lot of debt contraction by government recently and as you can 
see the government owes the Chinese government a lot of money that the Chinese 
government has started controlling key parastatal companies especially the 
energy sector. This shows that the Zambian economy is very unlikely to invest more 
in the social sectors, and this leaves the health sector to external support. … two 
years ago, we were talking about graduating the health sector from donor 
dependency but it’s highly unlikely that we will be moving towards that direction” 








The second argument segues into the fiscal demands that the transfer of human 
resources for health may require to sustain at district levels. For the health sector, 
devolving human resources for health was repeatedly compared to the health reforms 
which the government failed to sustain on one hand and on the other hand the health 
workers were dissatisfied with the conditions of services. 
Undoubtedly, the planned transfer of the health work force from the central government 
reporting systems to the local authorities is unsettling amongst a wide range of actors. 
While the transfer of human resources to local authorities has been cited as a key 
component in the current NDP to drive accountability and improved managerial 
capacities at district levels (NDP, 2009 – 2013), its one that has cast uncertainties with 
regards to how the government will restructure the current operations to what the 
devolution plan proposes. Some actors also questioned whether the health work force 
with their unions will agree to the proposed plans as contained in the devolution 
implementation plan with concerns that in may lead to discontent amongst health 
workers, like it was with the health reforms. The widespread apprehension within the 
health sector has led the sector to lose trust in the devolution plan as evidenced by the 
concerns expressed by most of the current and former actors. 
Perhaps what to question regarding the structuring of human resources for health are 
the dispositions of civil service administration within the ministry of health and broadly 
in Zambia.  Considering that the aim of human resources component of the NDP is to 
create strategic human resources control at district level, where district levels will be 
tasked to recruit, manage and fire staff it’s expected that the capacity to conduct the 
tasks should be developed to a level in comparison with what currently exist at central 
level because in the absence of that it may create similar misunderstands that had ensued 
during the health reform process. Therefore, district councils’ capacity to manage human 
resources for health should match the current expertise by the Public Service 
Commission; which is why it’s important to interrogate the concerns expressed by actors 
within the health sector questioning the capacity of councils to conduct several tasks that 
are supposed to go along with devolution of health services.   
In addition, although government plans to align the functions to be transferred to local 
authorities with matching resources, there have been no attempts to do so by any 
government since the introduction of the devolution plan.  
What is significant about the delayed devolution of services specifically in the health 
sector is that: the capacity of councils is doubted; local councils are financially crippled 
and underfunded; the top structures at the MoH have not attempted to transition to local 
government, including the funding architecture; while there are attempts to pilot human 







changing leadership within the central government and the MoH have altered the 
direction of the devolution plan.   
The dominance of the highlighted challenges in implementing the devolution plan are 
highly significant here, because they: (i) provide an insight into the power relations 
between central government and lower level actors; government and donors; and 
ministry of health and local government actors (ii) show that policy implementation is 
affected by several contextual factors and, (iii) that successful policy implementation is a 
negotiated process that intersects the elements of content, context and process.    
Therefore, it will be useful to frame these characteristics using the policy triangle (figure 
9) as it provides relevant analyses of health sector governance by devolution, primarily 
on: what the plan is concerned with achieving and the power relations between actors 
and, how actors negotiate policy processes within contexts. The devolution plan has 
largely been influenced by politics and like all health policies it’s linked with politics and 
who influences policy making (cf. Walt, 1994, p.1; Buse et.al, 2012, p. 7).  
 
Figure 9: Devolution plan context and actors 
 
  
Implications of the delayed devolution on health sector governance  
The content of the devolution plan places emphasis on efficiency and accountability in 
planning, coordination and implementation in service delivery and specifically the health 
sector devolution plan (HSDP). Most reformers around the world would agree with such 







encouraging democratic participation in service delivery (cf. Faguet, 2014; p.3). For the 
devolution plan the premise is that when health officials are accountable to the local 
representation electorate there will be more of people’s voices in prioritising, planning, 
budgeting and reporting health services delivery at community/local levels. But the concern 
for this section of the thesis is that despite the positive attributions of the decentralisation 
plan the process failed to be implemented in Zambia and consequently this section seeks to 
explain why the case has been so.  
As this thesis has identified three major actors being politicians, bureaucrats and cooperating 
partners, the recognition is that each of them has different interests and perception towards 
the plan. As with the policy triangle, actors are at the centre of all policy actions - that is to 
say they decide what policies should be implemented at a specified time and how that policy 
will be implemented and justify how policy action will benefit society (Walt, 2004; p. 54). The 
agency they have exercised has had varied impacts on the progress of the implementation 
plan. For example, while cooperating partners have continued to invest and push to 
implement the plan, politicians and bureaucrats have held back.   
Even though politicians lead the way in policy formulation, the case with the decentralisation 
plan in Zambia has not been favourable because the nature of multiparty politics are that 
there are competing agendas between political parties and the decentralisation agenda has 
been subjected to that. And because of the competing agendas, it has come to be known that 
no political party is interested in power sharing with lower levels - and thus the failure to 
implement the plan. Consequently, politics limit the power and functions of other actors both 
at central and lower levels. For the bureaucrats it has been the case of politicians distorting 
the power to implement. The fact that top level bureaucrats are more interested in securing 
their jobs makes it difficult for them to exercise any power to control the implementation 
plan. More so, as already highlighted politicians in Zambia choose whom to work with at 
bureaucratic level and as a result, with the decentralisation implementation plan, the staff 
attrition rate due to transfers within the Ministry of Health and the Decentralisation 
Secretariat has been high, as reported by most interviewees. Each time a new government 
comes in, it brings along with its new top bureaucrats with different views on the 
decentralisation implementation agenda. An interviewee from a development agency 
reported that “I understand that every government has their own policy agenda, but 
decentralisation has been difficult to implement because we always start on a new chapter 
whenever there is change of government” (Inter. 13 June 2018, bilateral representative). 
Therefore, the control exercised by politicians has driven bureaucrats to believe that 
decentralisation cannot work in Zambia. 
Despite the opportunities that the devolution plan offers of transferring power and functions 
to lower levels to enable citizen participation, there has been inadequate resources provided 







between the MoH and the MLGHS at central and local level, to the extent that devolution of 
human resource development and management has proved to be difficult regardless of the 
involvement of cooperating partners. The divide between the two ministries has also gone 
along the lines of which cooperating partners are involved in the sectors. As already 
highlighted, the local councils are seen not to have the necessary human resource capacity to 
manage services like health and indeed the government through the Local Services 
Commission had embarked on rationalising deploying staff ensure appropriate HR 
management and development; rationalize deployment of staff to local councils to ensure 
key positions are filled with appropriately skilled personnel, including by redeploying staff 
from central government to local councils. The above explanations are illustrated in fig 10. 
Figure 10: Devolution in Zambia 
 
Context: Challenges 
a. Changes in government – have not favoured the continuity of the 
devolution agenda 
b. The low functional capacity of local authorities 
c. Underfunded local authorities 
d. Failure to work out the transfer of human resources to local levels 
e. Highly centralised planning of devolution of services 
 
Opportunities 
a. The changes in government with renewed agenda 







c. Change is legislation 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has highlighted a number of significant points with regards to how the devolution 
agenda was conceived and how implementation has stalled. Using the HPFT, it demonstrates 
that the content of the devolution plan intends to address key issues of improving service 
delivery and most importantly, the transfer of primary health care management to local 
authorities – a key component that can trigger community participation (cf. Smoke, 2003). 
However, the other components of the HPTF have proved to be difficult for the devolution 
agenda to operate. First the context has not favoured the implementation plan because the 
policy implementation plan has undergone several political regimes who have each 
approached the implementation process differently from their predecessors. Second the 
process is one that has been subjected to financial constraints and difficulties on how to 
structure institutions and functions to be performed when health services are devolved. 
Third, actors being at the centre of driving policy agenda have largely influenced the evolution 
of the policy for example although the policy is considered as a local policy initiative, external 
actors have played a key role in developing some aspects of the policy as well as playing a key 
role in driving the agenda forward. With local actors, there are existing silent conflicts 
between the local authorities and the health sector, but it was admitted by most of the actors 
who are outside both sectors that the local authorities are currently incapable of managing 
health services because they have no capacity to do so in terms of skill, knowledge and are 
underfunded by central government at the moment.  
 
Generally, this chapter provided an understanding of how mechanisms and context produce 
outcomes. The chapter analyses literature on policy development in relation to how policy 
decisions were arrived at and the influence of certain actors at a given point. The chapter also 
explained the constraints generated by actors, structure and ideas presented at given political 
and social periods (cf. Howlett et.al, 2009, p.8). Looking at the previous and existing efforts 
shown by various Zambian governments to implement the national decentralisation policy 
and how it relates to health sector management, it shows that political actors have 
constrained devolution implementation. Interviewees, especially those opposed to the idea 
of devolution, stated that the failures of the national decentralisation policy are embedded 
within the political and institutional contexts. Like most arguments that challenge 
decentralisation, detractors of decentralisation argue that most decentralisation policies in 
developing countries seem unimplementable because of several incapacities within systems 
(cf. Wetterberg and Brinkerhoff, 2016).  
 
Therefore, the evidence in which the decentralisation by devolution agenda has evolved 







services delivery considering the institutions and structures in which it operates. The design 
of the NDP is seemingly a good plan, but it’s a plan that cannot fit within the frameworks of 
Zambian institutions and also the political happenings. As one interviewee stated, the civil 
service has not been spared by multi-party politics because each time there is a change of 
government there are reshuffles with senior bureaucrats, with the party in power preferring 
to work with people whom they feel will support their agenda. Evidently, multi-party politics 
have weakened the civil service in Zambia, and it has had a large bearing on the success of a 
big reform like the devolution agenda. 
The uncertainty of implementing decentralisation dominates the current devolution plan of 
primary health care in Zambia. Other literature suggests that most failures of decentralisation 
in developing countries have to do with flaws in the design of the process. However, in the 
case of the Zambian NDP the design of the devolution policy is sound, but what makes it fail 
are the contextual factors. In the quest to decentralise, Zambia seems to focus more on the 
outputs rather than the outcomes. For example, in the creation of additional district to 
improve health services, the number of districts has increased but the quality of health care 
services seems to have remained the same if we go by the health indicators - especially with 
maternal and child health services. Human resource capacity has also not increased to the 
capacity needed in the newly created districts.  
Politically we can say that there is decentralisation but in terms of democratisation that is yet 
to be established. The key issue is that when engaging in decentralisation you look at changes 
in government relationships and changes in relationships across devolved structures and 
sectors involved (See Peckham 2008). The role of government as funder and steward of health 

























 Conclusion - What interpretations can be made about decentralisation?  
Overview   
 Revisits the main research question (and sub-questions) and how they have been 
addressed in the thesis 
 Identifies the contribution of the thesis to the study area 
 Discusses the key conclusions of the thesis 
 Discusses the implications of the research for decentralisation policy and practice 




Revisiting the Research Questions and analytical framework 
 
This thesis set out to contribute to addressing gaps in the body of literature on Zambia’s 
repeated attempts in implementing a variety of decentralisation policies to manage health 
services delivery. Specifically, the study aimed to answer the following research question:  
 
Why has decentralisation persistently featured in policy discussions over health 
service delivery in Zambia, and how have decentralisation efforts affected, and been 
affected by, the management of health service delivery in practice?  
 
To answer this research, question the thesis utilised the health policy triangle framework to 
situate arguments that put forward explanations of why and how decentralisation processes 
get to appear on the national agenda. This framework provides a means of exploring the 
evolution of policy over time using four thematic areas: content, context, processes and 
actors (see, Buse, et.al, 2012; p.4). For the purposes of this thesis, the framework provided 
explanations of why and how health policies appear on the agenda (international or national) 
and the factors that make them work more or less well in the real world. Specifically, the 
framework pointed to explanations of: why decentralisation of health services has been 
favoured; how it has evolved within the political contexts of Zambia; who has been involved 
in decentralisation processes and why; what pre-existing conditions have determined how 
decentralisation processes have evolved - specifically how pre-existing conditions have 
influenced how decentralisation has been designed and who has had the most/least influence 








In the empirical chapters, with the structure provided by the policy triangle’s four thematic 
areas, the thesis first generated explanations as to why decentralisation policies have been 
pursued by different Zambian governments to address health systems inadequacies.  
a.  What has driven the adoption of decentralisation policies in Zambia’s health 
sector? 
 
Second, in recognition of the fact that the persistent presence of decentralisation agendas in 
Zambia has not resulted in desired improvements to health outcomes, the framework’s 
emphasis on context (existing conditions) being a key determinant of policy outcomes helped 
explain how practises of politics and policymaking within established structures and systems 
in Zambia have played a key role in determining the results of processes.  
 
b.  What factors have enabled/inhibited Zambia’s health sector decentralisation 
processes? 
 
Third, the interactions of actors with their environment and with each other was identified as 
one of the factors that has driven (or inhibited) these policy processes, highlighting how actors 
in Zambia’s decentralisation processes have exercised individual agency. Three main actors in 
Zambian decentralisation processes were mapped as government, donors and bureaucrats.  
 
c.  How has political and bureaucratic action at different governance levels influenced 
health decentralisation policymaking? 
 
d.  How has political and bureaucratic action at different governance levels influenced 
health decentralisation policy implementation? 
 
In the discussion below, this concluding chapter discussed the fifth and final of the thesis’ sub-
questions: 
 
e.  What implications do the answers to a, b, c and d have for arguments for arguments 
about decentralisation as a health sector reform tool (in Zambia, and elsewhere)?   
Thesis contribution: Overview of key findings 
 
Here I briefly set out some of the key points arrived at using the health policy framework, 
which constitute original contributions of the thesis.  
 
First, focussing on content and context, decentralisation policies were introduced primarily 
for economic reasons, with political persuasion from development partners. However, in 
countries like Zambia decentralisation took a different path because of local structural and 







decentralisation ideas originated. For example, although decentralisation is intended to allow 
a wider range of actors to contribute to shaping the functioning of health services (Walt, 1994 
p.62), the nature of politics practised in Zambia did not in fact foster wider citizen 
participation. Zambia (like many other African countries) is geographically sparse (highly 
decentralised), yet the governance system is centrally managed, and thus there is poor 
integration between state structures and wider society, especially rural areas, resulting in 
poor delivery of services (see Olowu, 2003).23 Decentralisation policies have not succeeded in 
addressing this, or realising the idea of participatory policymaking at local levels. Power 
remains centralised. Second, focussing on actors and process, the framework highlighted the 
entrenched historical processes behind the introduction of decentralisation polices, which in 
turn spurred a variety of reactions from the three key actors (government, donors, 
bureaucrats) that have ultimately shaped decentralisation’s outcomes (see Howlett et.al, 
2009, p.50). The findings have demonstrated how actors get to interpret and translate 
decentralisation into action (or how they can use their agency to inhibit change) (cf. Howlett 
et.al, 2009, p.51).  
 
Some of the key points made in the thesis are mapped onto the health policy triangle 
framework in figure 11. The main point underscored by the framework is that despite the 
persistence of decentralisation policies in the Zambian health sector, the sector still faces a 
number of challenges. This thesis provides analysis of how those challenges have hindered 
health sector development and what can be done to improve the implementation of 




















23 African communities are diverse divided along ethnicity, cultural and religious lines. Thus, some remain isolated because 
































Adapted by the from Walt and Gilson (1994) 
 
Using the thematic areas of the framework as a guide, the thesis arrived at its conclusions by 
analysing decentralisation policy documents and through the use of data generated from the 
interviews. The analysis focused on understanding the political and socio-economic forces 
imbued in decentralisation programmes. Perceptions of the selected key informants involved 
in decentralisation with regards to how they perceived their roles and those of other actors 
that engage with in implementing decentralisation programmes in Zambia were considered. 
In the process, the analysis revealed the dynamics of actors’ involvement in decision making, 
and why actors at lower levels tend to resist the implementation of decentralisation (see 
Chapters Five and Six).  
 
Actors, who sit at the centre of the policy triangle, were indeed found to be fundamental to 
the repeated attempts at decentralisation in Zambia. The findings highlighted how central 
level (including sectors and Ministries) and donor actors dominate relationships, and how this 
impact on the participation of lower-level actors. The thesis found that in Zambia, power over 
decentralisation programmes is held by government and donor actors who have the 
mechanisms to adopt (or, in the case of donors, encourage the adoption of) policy and who 
hold the resources. Meanwhile, actors at lower levels have crucial roles to play in actually 
implementing policy to ensure that it produces the intended outcomes. These arguments 







as the relationships between the actors are so centrally and narrowly focused, and only a few 
actors are actually involved, decentralisation processes in Zambia have so often not reflected 
the ideals of greater inclusion in health policymaking. Chapters Five and Six further 
highlighted how actors have used their power and influence to navigate the 
opportunities/challenges (i.e., the systemic and cultural context).  
 
This concluding Chapter reviews the arguments that have been made throughout the thesis. 
Its central point is that although decentralisation policies in Zambia have largely emerged as 
a result of the influence of international trends, local factors have largely determined the 
outcomes of the processes (cf. Kalumba, 1997). In addition, this chapter identifies a series of 
learning points with regards to the importance of the research to decentralisation and policy 
practice in Zambia both practically and academically onto which to develop future research 
agenda on the value of implementing decentralisation policies in Zambia, given the specific 
opportunities and challenges.  
 
The chapter now goes on to provide a high-level review of the thesis structure and then moves 
on to discussing a series of more substantive points important to the thesis.  
 
Thesis High level Review 
 
The first three Chapters, Chapters One to Three, introduced the reader to the research inquiry 
- Decentralisation and Health Service Governance in Zambia - then Chapter Four went on to 
state the importance of conducting the study and how the health policy framework was 
embedded within the study to address the research questions. Broadly speaking, while 
Chapter One gave a general overview of the study, Chapter Two introduced the concept of 
decentralisation; its general meanings and what it entails in the development lexicon; its 
historical emergence; the debates surrounding its merits and demerits as a policy practice; 
and why it is a useful tool for health services management. Chapter Three introduced the 
reader to how decentralisation policies emerged to become popular in governing health 
services in Zambia. It discussed why and how decentralisation has consistently remained on 
the agenda since 1992.  Chapter Four outlined the research methodology and how it fits 
within the framework of the study inquiry.  
Generally, the first four chapters of the thesis highlighted the intellectual focus and the 
rationale for studying decentralisation using Zambia as a case study. As it is, the current 
literature focuses more on analysing what decentralisation can/cannot (or does/does not do) 
while neglecting the effects brought about by decentralisation’s heavy dependency on unique 
contextual moderators - that is, the pre-existing socio-political conditions and institutional 
structures in which decentralisation implementation processes are attempted. Thus, Chapter 
Four showed that applying the health policy framework helps demonstrate how 







The health policy framework was integrated with the research sub-questions to highlight four 
important areas of the research focus: (i) the rationale for the promotion of decentralisation 
policies by development partners, what that means for governments in developing countries, 
and how these meanings are interpreted locally; (ii) how policymaking defines relationships 
and interactions of actors according to the existing situational factors - including how 
expectations are moderated; (iii) how politics and relationships shape/are shaped by 
opportunities and challenges that health service provision comes with, and; (iv) how 
policymaking is a continuous negotiation process. Thus, both the limitations in the literature 
and why Zambia’s health decentralisation attempts provide a useful case study in which to 
study decentralisation of health services were investigated.   
A total of forty-two (43) interviewees who have worked in decentralisation programmes as 
far back as 25 years ago were interviewed at the National, District and Community levels to 
ascertain their views on decentralisation processes in Zambia. A literature review was also 
conducted on decentralisation, approaches to health policy management and primary health 
care services, health sector reform in Africa/Zambia, and decentralisation of health systems.  
In addition, an analysis of decentralisation policy documents in Zambia was also conducted - 
how the policies were formed (how they are conducted and legislated), the rationale behind 
their formation, how they were implemented, and what/who promoted the implementation 
at every stage. Thematic areas for document review focused on understanding the power 
relations (who calls the shots?) and how that impacted on policy success (and, ultimately, the 
effectiveness of health services delivery).   
 
Having laid the foundation of the study in the first four chapters, Chapters Five and Six moved 
on to demonstrate how decentralisation has been implemented in the Zambian health sector 
in relation to the official policy agenda, and how it has shaped/been shaped by existing local 
conditions (i.e., health financing architecture, local policy practice, relationships between 
actors etc). These later chapters focused on giving empirical evidence using case studies of 
various health decentralisation policies that have been implemented in Zambia since 1992. 
Although the Chapters generally focused on two case study couplets – the health reforms of 
1992 -2006 and the devolution plan of 2002 – to date, other decentralisation efforts are also 
referred to: the HIV/AIDS decentralisation policy (whose implementation plan of 2002 was 
strengthened by the HIV/AIDS global agenda); the 2011 shifting of Mother and Child Health 
functions from the Ministry of Health to the Ministry of Community Development and Social 
services (although that decision was later rescinded in 2014); and the creation of additional 
districts that meant additional district health offices. While the health reforms and the 
devolution plan each detail specific arguments about the influence of contextual factors on 
the successes and failures of decentralisation processes, they each provide unique 
understandings of the relationships in setting policy agenda and how that eventually has a 








Although more detailed and specific conclusions are drawn in the discussions below, at a high 
level the chapters do the following: First, they show why decentralisation has been pushed 
through development aid in recipient countries. Second, they show how developing countries 
(in the case of this thesis with a focus on Zambia) came to adopt the decentralisation agenda. 
Third, recognising that decentralisation often fails to produce the expected outcomes in 
developing countries, the chapters show that local practise supersedes the 
prescriptions/recommendations of academics and development agencies. Lastly, the 
chapters show that decentralisation will continue to remain on the policy agenda for the 
foreseeable future in managing health services in Zambia, and thus  the chapters highlight the 
gaps in the previous policies that should be researched to advance future decentralisation 
policies - mainly that the implementation of decentralisation programmes could be more 
decentralised, so as to provide opportunities for different actors to engage with the processes 
to contribute to shaping local practice (cf. Kalumba 1997). In other words, one of the key 
problems’ decentralisation has faced in Zambia is that, ironically, attempts to implement it 
have been highly centralised. 
 
The idea of Decentralisation in governing health services: origins and effects 
A key conclusion of the research is that decentralisation was idealised by development 
agencies as a positive step for the health sector in developing countries like Zambia in the 
context of declining economies coupled with poor service delivery and debt crisis in the mid 
1980’s through to the early 1990’s (cf. Freund, 1986; Simutanyi 1996; Kalumba, 1997). At the 
same time, within Zambia, decentralisation seemed desirable as the economy could not 
support effective health services delivery. Decentralisation formed a converging point for 
both recipient country governments and development agencies as there was ample evidence 
to suggest that earlier efforts by government to meet populations health needs had failed (cf. 
Walt et.al, 1986) – and that a change of approach was therefore needed. Furthermore, the 
widening gaps in health status between developed and developing countries was a major 
concern - and that situation still holds to date. It was within the context of these perceived 
crises that economic reforms were proposed for developing countries because, for many 
development thinkers, transformation of health services could only effectively occur within 
strengthened economies (see, Walt et.al, 1986, Kalumba, 1997). Thus, a number of 
negotiations began between development agencies and developing countries, starting with 
political reforms to usher in governments whose reformist agendas were aligned to the 
international normative consensus with regards to economic and health sector development.  
 
These negotiations culminated in significant political changes in most sub-Saharan African 
countries. For Zambia, the health reform agenda was one of the first to have had gained 
prominence. The negotiations between the Zambian government, individual actors and the 







today, i.e., policy change is largely driven by donor resources, donors’ significant presence in 
decision making and the formation of health policy. Implementing decentralisation has 
effectively come to be synonymous with the pursuit of health sector development goals 
within the health sectors of low- and middle-income countries like Zambia. But the context is 
very different. In developed countries, decentralisation focussed on sharing responsibilities, 
in contexts in which government was overwhelmed with the responsibilities of distributing 
resources – which were relatively plentiful. Thus, the situation prompted the need to involve 
lower structures of government and other entities to distribute resources and implement 
services effectively (cf. Slater, 1989).  But when decentralisation policies were transferred to 
SSA countries (Berman, 1986, Walt et.al, 1987), the result was that both structural and 
institutional rehabilitation took place at the same time to try and mirror the contexts of 
developed countries, and in addition were conducted using donor resources without 
necessarily involving and empowering national governments to raise their own resources or 
design mechanisms to fund their health systems (See, Walt et.al, 1987).  As Chapters Two and 
Three of this thesis shows, these historical dynamics of decentralisation in developing 
countries affected the way decentralisation has consequently evolved over time. As such, 
because decentralisation policies were introduced in the midst of socio-economic crises that 
prompted structural and institutional reconfiguration to host decentralisation, they were 
conducted hurriedly because, as it were, bilateral, multilateral organisations and academics 
were eager to implement their ideologies (see Lake and Musumali, 1999). For the Zambian 
health sector, these actions played a part in solidifying donor dependence, which still holds 
to date.  
 
Then, as Chapter Five shows, institutional reforms in the Zambian health sector introduced 
other donor driven concepts, including financing mechanisms like the Sector Wide 
Approaches (SWAps), that worked to improve the relationship between donors and 
governments in terms of efficient use of donor funds (cf. Chansa, 2009). At the same time, 
the WHO and UNICEF through the Bamako Initiative of 1987 promoted economic approaches 
to health services delivery for SSA through cost sharing (cf. Masiye et.al, 2010). As all these 
initiatives were internationally led, national sovereignty in terms of ownership of health 
programmes by Zambian governments was significantly weakened24. These reforms were 
being pushed by external actors, and countries like Zambia had to look at how best to adopt 
them, in order to benefit from the influx of external aid for implementing the reforms (see 
Masiye, et.al 2010).  
 
These trends have been reproduced over the last two decades, signified by the low budgetary 
allocations to the health sector by successive Zambian governments because donors have set 
 
24 It should also be noted that Zambia had just started practicing democratic politics and at that point political institutions 
were relatively new and local and international pressure were mounting in anticipation to see the change that was 







a pattern of heavily investing in the health sector. Consequently, it led to the emergence of 
negative perceptions such as ‘donor fatigue’ and repeated calls to wean developing countries’ 
health sector budgets off donor support (Chitah et.al, 2018). As Chapter Five discusses, it was 
within the context of these ideas that the devolution of health services aimed to refocus its 
approach to decentralising health services by insisting that the devolution agenda be solely 
driven by Zambian government resources. But this idea has been difficult to achieve, largely 
due to the vast amount of resources and expertise needed to implement it, and naturally 
donor involvement has come in to fill in the financial and technical gaps (see, Chapter Six). 
Thus, it appears that the trends that were set at the point of transferring decentralisation 
policies to weak institutions coupled with young democratic political practises have 
contributed to subverting decentralisation processes.  
 
Decentralisation in the life of local political practice: what it entails for health systems 
development  
 
Although the contemporary life of decentralisation was propelled by international donor 
agenda entwining with local politics, it does not fully explain why successive Zambian 
governments have continued to rely on it to manage health services with minimal success 
with regards to attaining health system goals. Chapter Four and other Chapters of the thesis 
provided relevant explanations here that there are actually several reasons why the situation 
is so. 
To begin with, it was shown that decentralisation in Zambia has been problematic as a result 
of the overenthusiasm of global institutions for its merits while neglecting the context of the 
local political contexts and interpretations into which the ideas were being transferred (cf. 
Olowu, 2003). It was as if global institutions assumed that, because they had an upper hand 
in the processes, they could also exercise control over the outcomes. It is for this reason that 
Chapter Three argued that although decentralisation policies were in existence under the 
UNIP government, prior to the period of socio-economic reforms of the early 1990’s, donors 
were not willing to commit their funds to the supposedly ‘broken’ political systems that were 
governed by UNIP, which had resisted their policies either by not adhering to the terms or by 
cancelling the agreements. Henceforth, donors prioritised fixing the political system by 
initiating multi-party democracy (see, Simutanyi, 1996, Van de Walle, 2001). It’s obvious that 
it was the UNIP dominance of political power and policymaking processes that donors aimed 
at reconfiguring, as UNIP operated on a one-party political ideology (see, Chapter Three). 
These views - that power concentration within the hands of government was the reason why 
service delivery was deplorable - became widespread among the elite (politicians and 
bureaucrats). In addition, the Zambian populous also bought into these ideas and were also 







While it is true that the provision of health services in Zambia had declined by the 1990s, the 
push to initiate health reforms were mainly driven by the Structural Adjustment Programmes 
(SAPs) agenda. However, as shown in Chapter Four, the Zambian government and most 
bureaucrats warmed up to the idea of reforms because of the widespread economic 
grievances of the masses. So, the agenda proposed by the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund to implement socio-economic reforms was accepted without question, as 
they were seen as the answer to poor service delivery that existed especially in the health 
sector (cf. Simutanyi, 1996). As a former bureaucrat interviewee pointed out: “the reforms 
were inevitable because the recommendations to reform the health sector matched with the 
poor economic conditions that existed, and in addition, local ideas corresponded with the 
donor agenda” (Inter. 14 March 2018, former high-level manager). Seemingly, the Zambian 
environment was ready to reform – at least on paper - based on the promises that the reforms 
were going to improve livelihoods and generally deliver better health services. Therefore, as 
seen in Chapters Four and Five, it was not purely a case of external imposition: political moves 
in Zambia also promoted decentralisation ideologies. The two chapters heightened debates 
on how political ideas around decentralisation travelled and eventually how they were seen 
to symbolise25 improved health services delivery.  
Nonetheless, the apparent acceptance of decentralisation ideas in a way concealed 
competing interests that existed in the Zambian context. But because there was widespread 
belief in the reforms, the situation generated unintended governing effects (see Chapter Five) 
that continue to dominate decentralisation and health service governance. These points will 
now be expanded upon in the discussion below and their implications emphasised. 
During the 1990s, decentralisation policies were widely recommended in developing 
countries as a democratisation tool. They were supposed to initiate effective means to 
economic management and service delivery, yet at the same time they concealed the existing 
deep-rooted structural inadequacies within African countries like Zambia (cf. Gilson & Mills, 
1995).  Consequently, Chapter Three argued that decentralisation in African countries was 
proposed by external partners (donors) as a panacea to address development problems 
without considerations of longer-term implementation issues. Thus, the reforms introduced 
overlooked how actors at lower levels would be affected, and also underestimated their 
political power. This is, however, not to suggest that donors’ agenda were entirely responsible 
for the failures of decentralisation policies in countries like Zambia - but rather what should 
be understood are the reasons behind the policy agenda and the effects on domestic policy 
life. In short, it should be understood that the values and interests of donors may not 
necessarily be reflected in the context in which they introduce their ideas. Although (as 
Chapter Five demonstrated) the health reform process was adopted because it represented 
 
25 It was a constituent of shared views and values. Many were converts to these popular views including the electorate. Thus, 
the MMD mantra ‘the hour’ depicted that the hour had come to transform all socio-economic ills which was pithy and 







shared understandings and meanings of policies that could possibly deliver the goals needed 
for attaining better health services in Zambia (cf. Kalumba, 1994), it later represented a 
chaotic situation for the health sector. While there was apparent consensus among central 
level actors towards the decentralisation of health services, an indication that their 
perspectives are dominant in shaping the practice of decentralisation, lower-level actors were 
not as passive as it seemed. What ensued later in the process was that actors at lower level 
exercised their power to push back the reform as it did not address their interests; one of the 
key reasons behind the breakdown of the process.  
Because decentralisation processes were confined to a high level - that is to say they 
incorporated the views of actors with political connections and actors who spoke the 
language of donors – the effect was that those that were left out sought to further their own 
interests at the point where they have the influence to do so. For example, as Chapter Five 
shows, because the health worker’s trade unions rejected the MMD government’s approach 
to health workers’ emoluments (as they were not consulted at decision making point), they 
mobilised countrywide strikes which had a huge impact on health services delivery. This 
prompted the government to issue repeated threats against the health workers to the extent 
of having fired some that didn’t comply with government orders to return to work (Inter. 12 
June 2018, former high-level manager at Ministry of Health). However, the actions taken by 
government did not deter further strike actions. An interviewee who was among the key 
actors in negotiating the reform process implementation was led to believe that the unions 
did not understand the reforms, which led them to spread misinformation to health workers 
regarding job security (Inter 24 May 2018).  The interviewee further stated that it caused 
concern and agitation amongst health workers and eroded their trust in the reform process 
(see Chapter Five). The government tried to salvage the situation through Ministerial 
reshuffles, by transferring the minister of health to the Ministry of Tourism, to appear as 
though they were responding to the grievances expressed by health workers (Inter. 15 June 
2018; former senior manager CBoH). In this case, it was argued in Chapter Five, government 
and donor power were overtaken by lower levels whose voices were not accounted for in 
drafting the policy texts. Although governments and donors in Zambia find ways of navigating 
such difficulties without engaging with the lower levels, again these processes tend to 
replicate the nature of decision-making in policy matter, which is confined to donors and 
government at central level, but is ineffective at improving the management of health 
services because as long as certain key actors (excluded from policymaking) feel that they are 
not benefiting from the process, they are bound to attempt to protect their interests.  
Related, Chapters Three and Five demonstrated that these dynamics were even a problem 
with the two successfully implemented decentralisation processes in Zambia (HIV/AIDS and 
the health reforms). Again, these were externally supported, and central government agency 
was key in determining the course of decentralisation policies. In the case of the health 







expressed by government to initiate the processes. But due to poor engagement with the 
lower levels and poor fiduciary26 structures, there was incoherence within the civil service 
that led to relationships breaking down between staff at MoH and CBoH, staff at health 
facilities and staff at CBoH and MoH, and between health facility workers and the 
government. 
   
So, in practice, while the Zambian government holds the obligation of mobilising resources to 
improve service delivery, they also need to continue maintaining a positive image to the 
electorate and at the same time maintain good relationships with their donors. In Chapter 
Five it was discussed that, faced with implementing the health reform programme, the 
government had to adhere to international norms of decentralisation in responding to local 
demands to address health problems and a way of cementing donor relationships. This 
relationship is important to government because it projects a positive image to the larger 
population (the electorate) about its commitment to develop the health sector. Therefore, 
continued donor support works for government in three ways. First, it provides continuity for 
bilateral relations (good for both). Second it cements and perpetuates the existence of 
patronage between senior level bureaucrats and government. Because senior bureaucrats 
possess the power to control resources, they are the ones who get the benefits through 
various channels, such as trainings and allowances. As a result, they tend to support and align 
themselves with the government of the day even when health policies have little impact on 
the larger population. Third, when citizens get the health benefits in their localities, their 
interpretation is that their elected government is working, even when it’s solely funded using 
support from external sources (see Chapter Six).  
 
Thus, because of government’s paternalistic ways of expending donor resources, they tend 
to use the funds to reward party loyalists indirectly and directly through employment favours 
and things like awarding of contracts (see Chapter Six).  
 
While it’s true that donor confidence is associated with good government leadership, and in 
that light the Zambian government can claim that it is because of their good leadership that 
donor presence in the health sector continues to exist, it confirms some contemporary 
literature that states that actors deepen resistance to policy change in some instances rather 
than facilitating it (see, Hill, 2014).  This is evidenced with the health reforms, as discussed in 
Chapter Five: that the reform was resisted at lower levels because it was seen to benefit 
actors at central level, including politicians.  
 
 
26 Zambia’s fiduciary structures were weak to manage an influx of donor funds and as such there were several 
reported financial leakages within the health system that led to funds ending up in private hands. In addition, 







Thus, although politicians on one hand may be seen to comply with donor requirements 
(which has not translated to improved health services) and on the other hand claim to initiate 
change by showcasing donor projects, in reality they seek to safeguard and promote their 
own political interests both to their electorate and the donors. Going back to the point made 
at the beginning of this section with regards to decentralisation’s outcomes being dependent 
on its historical trajectories and the existing environment, the section argues that 
decentralisation processes that have been implemented in Zambia have functioned within 
weak structural contexts where allegiance to the ruling party is considered key to participating 
in policy processes. It is a complicated environment where policy is made and implemented. 
To this, the Norwegian government recommended that attaining good governance was a 
prerequisite to improving policy legitimacy in countries like Zambia (Norad, 2008). Thus, the 
question that still remains is whether there is room for local policy entrepreneurship to grow 
when the patterns after failed reforms in African countries is to blame outsiders who initiate 
the reforms for the failures such that recently, subsequent reformers are always wary of 
initiating reforms (see, Barnes et. al. 2014 p.60).   
 
Given the arguments highlighted above, it’s evident that the political landscape in Zambia has 
been an obstacle to the decentralisation processes. First, given the context into which the 
policy transfer under the MMD government occurred, it proved difficult for the health reform 
process to work because political interests clashed with the ethos of promoting 
decentralisation. The patronage over national resources by politicians and bureaucrats 
deepened during the life of the implementation process such that community health needs 
and interests remained unattained. Specifically, the ethos of community empowerment 
through taking governance structures closer to the people to alleviate corruption and 
enhance accountability remained unachieved (Chapter Five). There is mounting evidence 
demonstrating that the Ministry of Health is an elite (or, to put it plainly, a rich) ministry which 
has been treated in a very special way regarding external funding, at the expense of 
communities.  
 
Going back to the arguments in Chapter Two that because of the ambiguity of 
decentralisation as a concept, it’s construed differently in developing countries, the thesis has 
identified some of the problems that flow from this in the Zambian case. Looking at Chapter 
Three, where the history of decentralisation policies and decentralisation of health is traced, 
offers a beginning to understanding how politics have dominated the rise and evolution of 
decentralisation policies.  
 
Much of the literature suggests failed public polices in sub-Saharan African countries like 
Zambia are a consequence of the neoliberal agenda and global capitalism (cf. Tandon, 2008, 
p.144).  Contrary to this, the argument here is that the Zambian government as an actor has 







do or do not yield positive outcomes). But because of client politics (see Norad, 2008), the 
government as an actor has failed to utilise the opportunities that decentralisation presents. 
Again, the historical progression of decentralisation agenda, especially with the current 
devolution plan, are instructive here: the government has successfully pushed away donor 
propositions with regards to devolving health services. If that agency had been used to direct 
resources to where they are needed, perhaps decentralisation could have led to greater 
success in health sector development (See Chapter Six). This point will be expanded upon in 
the next section, which discusses the role of actors in promoting/inhibiting the progression of 
decentralisation policies.  
   
To conclude the section, a number of novel insights have been provided. Decentralisation and 
local policy practise continue to be a challenge in Zambia because their introduction was tied 
to multiple reforms in a country with low human and technical capacity. Second, because too 
many reforms were introduced at once, governments found/is finding it overwhelming - as 
some literature states, SSA has often been like a laboratory for structural reform (see Olowu, 
2003). Not only did the reforms restructure policy and political life but also shaped the way 
policy is conducted, which has had a long-term effect.  Third, the political interests of ruling 
parties override their ability to implement reforms because they find that what 
decentralisation proposes threatens their political existence (i.e., centralised control), so they 
only implement some aspects of decentralisation that work to cement their political position.  
Fourth, because policy negotiations are kept closed between government and donors, the 
process neglects other important actors and excludes citizen participation, which leads to the 
emergence of resistance from lower government levels and citizens.   
 
Thus, this section of the thesis has established that reform agenda in the health sector should 
be relevant to the context; be effective in achieving health system goals and have impact and 
sustained long term policy goals. The understandings provide lenses from which academics, 
development practitioners and politicians alike can seize the opportunity to shape and 
influence decentralisation policies to yield positive outcomes. 
 
Manifestations of donor power in decentralisation 
 
Evidently donors have considerable influence in and interests over Zambia’s domestic health 
policy, signified by their continued presence in the sector. As discussed throughout the thesis, 
donors’ interests in domestic health policies in Zambia reflect international policy trends. 
Thus, the thesis sought to understand the various international perspectives about the value 
of (and the right way to initiate) decentralisation of health services.  In this respect, the thesis 








Chapters Three, Five and Six demonstrated how donors’ decentralisation agenda have 
penetrated the policy arena in developing countries, including how relationships are formed 
(cf. Howlett et.al, 2004, p.12).  Chapter Three focused on understanding the relationships of 
donors with developed countries and how they (donors) construct the ideas and how they 
seek to use those ideas, while Chapters Five and Seven showed how donor support in health 
sector development has dominated the decentralisation agenda for the past two decades 
with repercussions on relationships between actors for example because political actors hold 
the privilege to shape donor action, some of the key decisions arrived at in governing health 
services threaten the existence of key bureaucratic actors. The patterns of dominance by 
political actors are deeply rooted in a way that they are difficult to challenge and resist. For 
example, a bilateral interviewee stated that the Minister of Health in 2016 reported to 
cooperating partners in the health sector during a meeting that the ministry was to be 
restructured to a lean top structure meaning that the ministry of health central level was to 
be reorganised to fewer staff and departments, but the opposite happened after the 
reorganisation took place. In addition, key staff were transferred to go and work in other 
ministries for example some senior health economists were transferred to work at the 
Ministry of Works and Supply. The transfer of high-level bureaucrats to other ministries to 
work in positions unrelated to their professions is also an indication of how difficult it is to 
challenge political actors and continues to isolate key actors from the policy making 
processes. Chapter Three provided a good starting point for understanding how 
decentralisation ideas were facilitated through HIV/AIDS policy demonstrating that agenda 
that brings together a wide range of actors produces better outcomes.  Chapters Four and 
Five explained how donor activities have affected the operation of the decentralisation policy, 
and to some extents have inhibited the progression of the policy, especially with regards to 
government continued dependency on their resources so to say the narrowed participation 
of actors has constrained the achievement of decentralisation’s goals.    
As noted in the previous section, this is not to suggest that donors are entirely responsible for 
the failures of decentralisation policies in countries like Zambia, but the thesis provided 
understanding with regards to how decentralisation should be understood as follows: (i) 
donors’ influence over domestic health policy in Zambia, and how that influence is used; (ii) 
how donors’ promotion of decentralisation coincided with domestic appetite for it. The two 
highlighted arguments provided insights as to why, despite donors having invested heavily in 
decentralisation, it still hasn’t led to successful implementation of the policies.  
Having established in Chapters Four and Five (and reiterated in the section above on the 
origins of decentralisation) that decentralisation policies during the 1990’s travelled to 
developing countries as a democratisation tool through which to improve health services 
delivery (cf. Gilson & Mills, 1995), it is also true that donors have had long term effects on 
how decentralisation policies have evolved and worked in Zambia over time. This can be seen 







decentralisation policy implementation in Zambia cannot be talked about without mentioning 
donor involvement.   Donors have the resources, and thus they possess the power to control 
the course of policy. As Buse et.al (2012) laid it, donors possess ‘relational power’ - including 
financial and technical resources – and they therefore possess the power to control what is 
to be done and how. This helps in understanding the discussions in Chapter Three regarding 
the successes that were achieved by the HIV/AIDS decentralisation policy – a demonstration 
of how (at least in that case) donor power reinforced decentralisation for health services in 
Zambia using several disbursement mechanisms to finance the process. That policy 
succeeded because of the presence of global commitment which demanded that countries 
establish broad multi-sectoral responses. Despite HIV/AIDS having ravaged Zambia for almost 
a decade from the early 1980s to the 1990s, it the Zambian government had little capacity to 
address the problem until scale-up models and resources were designed and provided by 
powerful international institutions and countries (cf. Ndubani et.al, 2007; Walsh et.al, 2012). 
It was in the context of a public health crisis with resources and intervention models 
transferred to Zambia that decentralisation yielded positive results such as community 
empowerment.  
Undoubtedly the introduction of massive external resources for scaling up HIV/AIDS services 
helped align stakeholder interests, including government’s political commitment (cf. Ndubani 
et.al, 2007). The commitment that was exercised consciously embedded models to address 
the HIV/AIDS problem at community levels and therefore effectively harnessed community 
resources (Walsh et.al, 2012). However, despite the supposedly robust HIV/AIDS structural 
architecture, the HIV/AIDS decentralisation came with its own problems of structural 
limitations such as poor infrastructure, poor absorption capacity of the funding influx, and 
limited human resources for health to implement HIV/AIDS programmes (see Brugha et.al, 
2006). This resulted in cooperating partners firefighting to bring the human resources to an 
acceptable level. And since such efforts were centrally led by the Ministries of Finance and 
Health (as already discussed in the above section that argued how centrally led 
decentralisation continues to undermine the success of programmes), it led to 
misappropriation of funds such that the communities did not benefit as expected, and in fact 
often felt that funds were held at the top level and the community was being used by top 
bureaucrats and politicians to obtain funding from external sources (cf. Edstrom and 
MacGregor, 2010). Again, this demonstrates that decentralisation policies’ success in Zambia 
are inhibited if they are implemented in an attempt to fix structural insufficiencies, and that 
donor expertise and funding can perpetuate structural problems. In this case, though, donor 
funding proved to be useful in addressing the HIV/AIDS burden through effective community 
decentralisation structures, even though there was still a problem with the highly centralized 
mechanisms which were used by global institutions to disburse funds to lower levels  
Although the discussions in Chapter three regarding HIV/AIDS policy demonstrated that the 







donor funds for sustainability, with sporadic reports of misappropriation of funds, while 
funding to communities has significantly reduced. (Chapter Three). This reveals the 
implementation difficulties that donor power succumbs to - an indication that their power 
does not completely override local institutional cultures. What has happened in Zambia is 
that the HIV/AIDS decentralisation policy itself created a sort of elitism in which central level 
institutions were adequately funded to manage HIV/AIDS programmes, yet communities 
received meagre support (cf. Usher, 2010). Thus, Chapter Three argues that although the 
HIV/AIDS decentralisation processes supported by external funding donor support did create 
change for the health sector – unlike the devolution plan discussed in Chapter Six – this was 
because the policy ideas came with resources attached, and also because donors also 
provided resources to engage with local communities.  
While the opportunities for elites created by the funding influx led actors in the health sector 
to capture space that exhibited weaknesses, it should be borne in mind that these actors in 
the Ministry of Health had limited power as recipients of the HIV/AIDS policy - and in fact the 
creation of the National AIDS Council (NAC) represented a horizontal decentralisation where 
the new body was independent of the Ministry of Health even though the ministry of health 
was charged with oversight on providing treatment through health facilities and was expected 
to implement guidelines according to donor stipulations (see, Walsh, et.al, 2012). Perhaps 
donor power conceals difficulties in decentralisation policy implementation that are difficult 
to resolve – where national actors feel powerless in driving the policy agenda, yet they are 
given the mandate to implement policies which enables them to gain access to resources. As 
Barnes et. al (2015) highlighted, in many Sub Saharan African countries it is hard to determine 
who is responsible for making choices for health, the funders or the elected government, and 
this is because “the piper calls the tune” yet the government commands geo-space and 
political sovereignty (cf. Edstrom and MacGregor, 2010).  
In Chapter Five, where the health reforms were discussed, a combination of politicians, 
technocrats and donors were responsible for driving the reform process and as reported by 
interviewees, a very strong alliance was formed where two individuals, a technocrat and a 
politician, pushed the reform agenda (Int. 15 May 2018 former mid-level manager, MoH; 
Inter. 14 March 2018, former high level manager MoH). Prior to that, the two individuals had 
formed networks outside Zambia with the interest of reforming the health sector. It was in 
this context that the health reform process thrived because the essential relationships, 
networks, resources and skills were present. Coupled with that, the politician (who was also 
an interviewee for this study) pointed out that initiating policy change is a complex process 
and it was because of his academic background, technical know-how, and his position as a 
senior politician at party and government levels that he was able to push back the detractors 
of the process. He added that he was able to earn credibility with donors such that he was 
invited to be part of the international technical working group on health reforms at the World 







return a group of US Senators visited Zambia to learn how the country had succeeded in 
implementing the health reforms process (Inter. 24 May 2018, former high-level politician).  
It was because of such massive international support that the health reforms did make 
significant achievements in health services delivery, chiefly among them being the creation 
of District Health Boards and Hospital Management Boards which provided channels to 
transfer resources at service delivery points as well linking communities to health services 
structures, which is said to have had improved community-level health indicators such as 
immunisation coverage (MoH, 2001). However, despite the success in implementing the 
reforms with involvement of cooperating partners, Chapter Five also discussed a variety of 
reasons why the health reforms were halted. Key among them was that overall service 
delivery did not improve, and indeed was worsened by the introduction of user fees. (cf. MoH, 
2011). This demonstrates that external partners’ power and influence can prove to be useful 
in designing and implementing policies but is less reliable in guaranteeing success.    
Although donors continue to fund decentralisation programmes in Zambia, they are wary of 
the future because of the minimal gains that decentralisation has achieved so far (World Bank, 
2001, 2018). Moreso, and as already discussed in Chapter Six, in the recent past there is 
compelling evidence that donors in countries like Zambia are fatigued regarding financing the 
health sector. For example, the midterm health expenditure review conducted in 2016 
showed that health expenditure by the Zambian government falls far below the national and 
regional targets, and way below the Abuja declaration27 (World Bank, 2016). The relationship 
between the Zambian government and donors is most certainly strained, shown by the failure 
to initiate effective partnerships over the past years. So, what does this tell us about the 
future of health services in countries like Zambia? How can decentralisation effectively 
introduce resource mobilisation mechanisms to improve health financing? Perhaps these are 
valid questions that warrant future research.   
While the devolution plan has not been allocated the required resources and support by 
successive Zambian governments, there seems to be little enthusiasm on the donor side 
either. Different donors continue supporting various areas of their interests – The UK 
Department for International Development (DfID) supporting the human resource 
component for devolution, while German Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit 
(GIZ) supports the local authorities with capacity building (Chapter Five). One interviewee 
noted that donors are not interested in decentralisation anymore because it’s no longer on 
the top of the global agenda (Inter. 16 June 2018, former high-level manager MoH, Political 
appointment position) 
Indeed, the devolution plan has not had the donor support that was seen with the health 
reforms and HIV/AIDS. There are a variety of reasons for this. First, there has been a general 
 
27 Target set by African Union countries pledging to allocate at least 15% of their annual budget to improve the health 







consensus that donor funds distort health systems in developing countries more than they 
strengthen them (Edstrom and MacGregor, 2010; Kelley et.al, 2016). As a result, it was 
witnessed in this research that the donor approach to implementing programmes in Zambia 
has changed, for example donors in Zambia have indeed not been in the driving seat with 
regards to devolving health services, partly because health reforms proved to be contentious, 
and also because the Ministry of Health is resisting the idea of merging primary health care 
within local authority structures (see Chapter Six). In this case donor power has been limited 
in terms of convincing the Ministry of Health to accept having primary health care transferred 
to local authorities. For example, an interviewee from one bilateral donor reported that the 
Ministry of Health decided not to take part in the piloting of devolving human resources 
despite resources having been provided to conduct the activity (Inter. 20 June 2018 bilateral 
representative). So, as it is, while other ministries that have been earmarked for devolution 
launched their pilot projects in Chibombo district (Central Province of Zambia) in July 2018, 
the Ministry of Health has stayed away.  An interviewee also reported that donors were 
hesitant to get involved with the devolution of health services because of their past 
experiences with the failed health reforms (Inter. 14 March 2018, former high-level manager 
MoH).  
Regardless, the activities being undertaken under devolution are being supported by donor 
resources from GIZ and UK-DfID. Even though high-level government interviewees claimed 
that the Zambian government owned the devolution process, while at the same time 
admitting that government lacks the resources to take the process forward, it is clear that 
currently government cannot function without support from donors - especially when it 
comes to implementing such a big reform. The argument was substantiated by a multilateral 
interviewee who stated that “... you have to understand that currently the government is 
broke because they failed to meet the national target expenditures on health budgets, so how 
can they implement reforms?” (Inter. 14 June 2018, multilateral representative).  
Most technocrats are conscious of the situation, and there is evidence to suggest that their 
trust in the devolution plan has eroded. Most of those interviewed doubted whether 
devolution was ever going to be implemented due to the lack of resources and commitment 
by central government (Chapter Five). As presented in Chapter Six, the Zambian government 
claims that the process is locally driven, while they have not provided resources, with donors 
providing fragmented support. This has caused the devolution plan to stall. Although actors 
in the decentralisation processes mainly disagreed that the processes have stalled mainly 
because of the lack of donor support, it’s evident that the Zambian government will not 
implement devolution without a specific programme funded by donors, especially in the 
health sector. For these reasons, the academic literature that criticizes donors for distorting 
policymaking in low-and-middle-income countries (i.e., Edstrom and MacGregor, 2010) 
should consider how withdrawing/withholding support can also be distorting, by preventing 







Donor power will continue to manifest in various forms in the near future with regards to 
health sector governance in Zambia, as demonstrated in some of the arguments highlighted 
in the next section. However, this is not to say that the thesis supports donor dependence. 
Instead, what is needed is to continue remodeling the modes of support. 
 
Actor Participation in the Decentralisation Agenda and the effects on decentralisation and 
health governance.  
Having established understandings of why decentralisation appeared to be compelling in 
improving health services delivery in developing countries in Chapters Two and Four, 
Chapters Three, Five and Six demonstrate how these decentralisation ideas were received 
and appropriated to the Zambian Context through the HIV/AIDS, health reform process and 
the current devolution plan respectively. The policy triangle situates actors at the centre of 
policy operations and in this regard the thesis provided understandings of how various actors 
involved in the processes shaped/constrained the operations of decentralisation. The 
arguments in Chapter Six also highlighted how actors continue to exert their influence on the 
operation of decentralisation in Zambia.  
 
This section of the thesis concludes on the roles/contributions of actors to the way the health 
reforms and devolution of health services were/are produced within the rubric of 
decentralisation and health service governance.  Chapters Five and Six also showed that the 
outcomes of the two processes were determined by the dynamic interactions between actors 
- that is to say the way their ideas were expressed and how their interests manifested 
according to the context into which the ideas were implemented (this point takes us back to 
Chapter Four – the methodology Chapter – remember the research strategy was embedded 
within critical realism, with the belief that the production of successful outcomes by actors 
will depend on whether the appropriate ideas and opportunities  are/were introduced within 
an appropriate social and cultural context (cf. Pawson and Tilley 1997)).  
 
The unequal relationships between policy actors were highlighted in the discussions around 
how the HIV/AIDS and health reform policies were implemented, that demonstrated that 
donors and national level actors seemingly engage in unconscious relationships where 
national level actors claim that policies are driven by ‘us’ (Zambian actors), masked under the 
commonly used language of ‘donor buy in’ and a variety of transitive verbs: ‘ownership’, 
‘authority’, ‘command’ and ‘control’. This language has come to be accepted by both the 
donor and national level actors, although (as discussed above) national level actors engage in 
these relationships in order to create room to access funding (cf. Barnes et.al 2015, p. 65).  
These relationships demonstrate the inherently unequal ways in which decentralisation of 







client politics among top level bureaucrats, where national level actors exercise patronage 
over resources meant for health development programmes (see, Chapter Six). As already 
established in chapters Five and Six, this happens because Zambia is typical of a 
neopatrimonialism state. Henceforth, in policy negotiation processes lower levels have 
received less attention, meaning less resources to implement programmes and isolation from 
the processes. So, the question is how and why the situation continually repeats itself in 
Zambia’s decentralisation policies. 
To draw a comparison to these discussions, Barnes et.al (2015, p. 65) made similar 
observations (which this thesis is in agreement with) in assessing the politics of participation 
in health reform in Zambia through a Word Bank led Performance-Based Financing (PBF) 
project. They stated that: 
“…there is evidence that there is formal and informal participation in the design and 
implementation of PBF as a tool of health system reform in Africa. African actors are 
engaged in the formation of PBF as a means of health system reform; however, 
participation is often limited to specific elites working in the health system whose 
continued pay is dependent on alignment to the positive bias of PBF. These elites 
engage in a skewed principal-agent relationship with donors through whom they gain 
materially or politically as individuals”  
As discussed in Chapter Six, donors recognise these issues and some of them channel their 
resources towards policy implementing at lower-level structures such as the District Health 
Offices (DHO), while others have directed their funds to NGOs, CBOs and FBOs. But there have 
been outcries citing duplication of functions and programmes (MoH, 2006). Thus, in 
discussing actor participation and the influence it has on decentralisation, the thesis 
recognised that it’s important to establish why and how actors are key to moving the 
processes. Using the policy cycle, the research identified the actors and their roles in the two 
main decentralisation process – the health reform process and the devolution plan (see 
figures four and five). The point underscored by the processes of mapping actors is to provide 
evidence on how reform has been promoted/undermined by actors. The data used to 
populate the diagrams was obtained from the National Health Policies document for the 
health reforms (1992) and the Devolution Plan 2009 – 2011 for the devolution process. The 
two documents gave an indication of which actors were involved in the respective policy 
cycles. Given that actors are at the core of policymaking processes, identifying various roles 
that they play in the policy cycle helps to explain why some of the tensions mentioned above 
existed and continue to. The information plotted was also confirmed through interviews with 
stakeholders. 
Figure 12 demonstrates the level of actors’ engagement at the point of having introduced the 
health reform process through to the point of where it was repealed, while Figure 13 







arguments have been detailed in Chapters Five and Six to how actors responded, this section 
cements conclusively the dynamics that surround the politics and practices of actors in the 
decentralisation of health services. Before going into detailed discussions, a reminder that for 
the purposes of this thesis actors in Zambian decentralisation processes were categorised as 
Government (politicians) segmented into national, provincial and district levels. Community 
levels represents ordinary community structures whose power and influence are so often not 
recognised formally but does exist, especially in rural areas; then donors 
(bilateral/multilateral agencies) and bureaucrats segmented into national/central (mainly at 
Ministry level – high level management), then provincial and district levels bureaucrats were 
identified to have similar roles of being in middle management.  With regards to the level of 
engagement, 0 signifies no engagement at all, 1 - low, 2 - average and 3 – high as 
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Figure 12 demonstrates that donors did indeed dominate the health reform process 
throughout its existence – implicitly, to advance their interests and to guard their resources. 
The dominance was extended to the political arena as it was used as a channel to penetrate 
the policy space to begin with (see Chapter Three). Thus, the way donor and political 
dominance manifested itself in decentralisation’s local practice was that it limited 
opportunities for lower-level actors to engage in health reforms. In the case of communities, 
while the reforms served to bring governance structures closer to them, implementing 
mechanisms deeply isolated them, further limiting opportunities for them to hold 
accountable those who were in positions of power to manage the processes, let alone to 
demand better services.28 It was within the context of actor isolation that the health reform 
failed because it operated in a top-down manner, concentrating power and policy oversight 
at higher (central) levels of the public sector bureaucracy, as opposed to in a bottom-up, 
interactive and negotiated process (Barrett and Fudge 1981, p. 25).  
Figure 13 shows the progress of decentralisation of health services by devolution. Again, 
agenda setting was dominated by central level politicians with central level bureaucrats and 
donors backing the process. And since the process is based on the principles of Zambian 
government ownership, the policy legitimation process was conducted by politicians and 
central level bureaucrats, which again has left out key actors at lower levels in the health 
sector. The devolution agenda presents interesting findings to the research because it’s being 
conducted under two ministries. As discussed in Chapter Six, primary health care being 
transferred to the Ministry of Local Government and Housing is the main thrust of the 
devolution agenda. While in the case of the health reform agenda actors were all within the 
health sector, in the devolution plan actors are split between two sectors under the 
leadership of GIZ (although government claims that they are leading the process).  Within the 
Local Government sector, actors have been effectively engaged, but at lower-level 
interviewees complained that they had limited relationships with the higher levels (See 
Chapter Six).   
 
Evidently, at national level there are competing interests between the Ministry of Health and 
the Ministry of Local government. The competition stems from the fact that the health sector 
actors have resisted the transfer of primary health care to the local government ministry (see 
Chapter Six). There could be a variety of reasons for this, but as discussed in Chapter Six, 
health sector actors claim that local government structures are too weak to manage primary 
health care. However, this thesis concluded that the reasons given by health sector actors for 
not wanting to transfer responsibilities over primary health care to local authorities conceal 
their fears of the loss of power, as well as ceasing to be a ‘darling’ of the donors. Thus, going 
back to Chapters Three and Five, where the thesis underscored how donor power has long  
 
28 Figure 12 shows that political actors at lower levels were completely missing in the decentralisation process when they 








term effects over legitimacy of policymaking, actors in the health sector have continued to be 
motivated by the control of resources rather than focusing on improving health service 
governance.  
 
Although the devolution of health services has been on the agenda for the last ten years, most 
actors are not comfortable with the process - including donors and central level actors outside 
the health sector - as many of them feel that local councils have no experience in managing 
an influx of funds and therefore will struggle without robust financial management skills and 
strategies. However, the scale of what lies ahead seems to be downplayed by actors in the 
local councils as they perceive their counterparts in the Ministry of Health as just 
uncomfortable with the loss of power and resources (Inter. 16 April 2018 high level Manager 
district Council). This reflected at district levels as well as at national level within the Ministries 
of Health and at Local Government and Housing. For example, local authority workers were 
more focused on justifying the reasons why primary health care should be under their 
jurisdiction without necessarily admitting to some of the real concerns, such as the low level 
of investment by government in their ministry but were quick to point out how corrupt 
Ministry of Health officers are at central level. Ministry of Health officials in turn expressed 
concerns over the lack of financial management capacity of local authorities and concerns 
over emerging audit queries from the Auditor General’s office.  Although all these sentiments 
are justified, the key agent, the community, was seldom mentioned as having a role in 
accountability. This reflects the neopatrimonialism nature of politics in Zambia, where 
community voices are silent (Chapter Five and Six). 
So, the social political effects brought about by relationships between policy actors 
contributes significantly to the failures of decentralisation: the structural inequalities 
between higher and lower levels, and the dominance of the central level where lower levels 
are too weak/disempowered to challenge the status quo. Indeed, in practice actors at lower 
levels do not participate in any form of policy negotiations, despite that supposedly being one 
of the goals of decentralisation. As with the devolution plan, whereas GIZ support to local 
authorities has tried to empower local councils, politics has inhibited the participation of local 
actors. One of the districts where the research was conducted is predominantly an opposition 
stronghold. The local ward councillor pointed out that there are conflicts between the District 
Commissioner (DC) (an appointed civil service position mostly given to party loyalists with 
basic education and no civil service experience or background) who is an extension of the 
political arm at the district level, while the town clerk is a bureaucrat (Inter. 11April, 2018. 
Ward Councillor Solwezi District). 
Implementation readiness for future decentralisation processes in Zambia 
 
What are the implications if these findings for the future of health service delivery in Zambia?  







concern for the future of the current devolution plan (see, Chapter Five). These concerns were 
also expressed by a number of donors reflecting on how health systems in Africa should 
reform to accommodate the changes necessary to achieve better population health (World 
Bank, 2018). Specifically, this thesis recognises that the area of reforming health systems in 
Zambia is muddled such that every government since 1994 has attempted to implement 
reforms, including decentralisation policies, but always with limited success. These reforms 
have failed to produce mechanisms to empower communities, who continue to be in a weak 
position to hold high level actors to account and to challenge ideas that have perpetuated 
poor health services delivery. The long-term implications will be that health services will 
continue to operate in fragmented manner. While the donors are attempting to depoliticise 
health care, government at all levels is embracing neopatrimonialism and populism which fail 
to allow for the independent functioning of the civil service.  
In terms of corruption, while there have been sanctions in the past, there is a long way to go 
and the misappropriation of funds continues to occur. For example, in 2009 the Dutch and 
Swedish governments froze $33 million in aid for HIV/AIDS and other health programs in 
response to allegations that senior health ministry officials had stolen almost $2 million (KFF 
Daily Global Health Report, 2009, May 29). In 2018, DFID froze aid to Zambia after the 
government admitted that $4.3 million of aid money meant for social cash transfer 
programmes had gone missing. Ireland, Finland and Sweden followed suit - and the Ministry 
of Health was part of the scandal (BBC, 2018). Recently (June 2020), the current Minister of 
Health, Dr. Chitalu Chilufya, appeared before the Courts of Law for alleged misappropriation 
of public funds meant for use in the health sector (Gagne-Acoulon, 2018). Similar pilfering in 
local government or within the health sector seems inevitable because the centre continues 
to set a bad example regarding the (mis)management of public funds.  
This underscores the fact that decentralisation’s outcomes are dependent on the wider 
context. In this regard, the context is that actors at central level have been seen by actors at 
lower levels to have benefited personally from their power to control resources. Thus, there 
is a high likelihood that the same attitudes about patronage over resources will be transferred 
to lower levels. Certainly, this is how it is seen by actors at the Ministry of health who 
complained that councils had weak financial accountability mechanisms. At all levels, 
corruption cannot be prevented without implementing sound fiscal controls to deter it. 
Unsurprisingly, interviewees at community level working with local council officials to develop 
capacity for local services delivery expressed dissatisfaction with the conduct of middle 
management council officials, saying that they look to be more interested in getting 
allowances than finding means to strengthen community involvement (Chapter Five). 
According to the observations of this research, community empowerment was only 
successfully promoted in the case of HIV/AIDS policy, but even then, the resources that were 
devolved to communities to run HIV/AIDS programmes were not of the same magnitude as 







Key research findings 
In view of the discussions above, the key findings of the research are:  
1. Understanding donor-government relations. The successful implementation of the 
health reforms (1992 -2006) decentralisation plan was hinged on the political 
euphoria that had swept across sub-Saharan African countries in the late 1980s to the 
early 1990s, supported by external development partners. Within the Zambian health 
sector, two individual actors played a central role in driving the health reform agenda 
- largely because they had formed good relationships with the donors and were seen 
by government as key figures with the technical expertise and knowledge to drive the 
process. Although it’s claimed that the health reforms were locally initiated, the 
presence of the Swedish government and other donor technical and monetary 
support had an influence on the architecture of the reform process. Thus, the process 
was successfully implemented because of the resources and technical support 
provided by the donors, and the relationship that existed between the donors and the 
new MMD government. The relationship was cemented by trust, and the desire to 
depart from how the UNIP government had approached policy making and 
development of health services. Bureaucratic actors trust in the reform process is key 
– a useful finding for future research.  
2. The weaknesses of the Zambian context in embarking on big reforms like devolution 
because of inadequate resources to do so. Previous successfully implemented reforms 
depended on external resources, an indication that local mobilisation of funding to 
implement health sector reform using domestic resources remains a challenge.  
3. Technocrats are crucial actors in driving (or inhibiting) decentralisation in Zambia, and 
in this regard, they can be used as conduits to harmonise policy processes. For 
example, in the health reform process, the tensions among technocrats from the 
Central Board of Health (CBoH) and Ministry of Health (MoH) with regards to benefits 
played a part in subverting the process. In the case of the devolution agenda, the 
process has also been subverted by the different expectations between civil servants 
in the MoH and the Ministry of Local Government and Housing of what devolution 
intends to achieve.  
 
Thesis Contributions 
Decentralisation in Zambia has been affected by actors, institutional arrangements, financing 
mechanisms. In short, context matters. Care is therefore needed in extrapolating wider 
lessons from Zambia. Nevertheless, the thesis makes wider contributions to:  
1. Literature on decentralisation: The thesis makes a contribution to literature that 
states that in implementing decentralisation policies, context matters. The research 







operation of decentralisation policies. Actors at all levels of the domestic health 
system, from the national down to the district, have been shown to play important 
roles in forwarding or resisting decentralisation, including ‘non-political elites’ such as 
street-level bureaucrats and local health service administrators who are often 
overlooked in the literature. 
2.  African agency is key in this regard. How donors have influenced policy through 
money and technical support but their influence in getting results has been limited 
due to context. So, donors can do so much but what will determine the results are the 
key actors, the structures and the local political practice.   
3. The use of the Health Policy Triangle Framework (HPTF) as a useful framework in 
locating a constellation of actors and their roles and influence in policy processes. For 
example, in the health reform processes the HPTF located two actors not only as 
formal bureaucratic actors and politicians but as mediators within the donor 
community and within political party structures.   
4. Documenting the roles of donor ideologies within the Zambian health policy context 
– and how donors and the state have related to one another. Despite current 
literature advocating for more African influence in policymaking agenda within their 
own settings, it has been common in the decentralisation literature to attribute 
significant agency to donors, and less to the state. This thesis presents a more nuanced 
picture in which donors certainly were influential, but often failed to get their 
preferences met or achieve their policy goals.  
 
Implications of the research 
 
The thesis has provided some original insights on the attempts to implement decentralisation 
policies in Zambia. At the beginning of the thesis it was noted that decentralisation has been 
widely promoted (and adopted) in low-and middle-income countries to fix the perceived 
inefficiencies in delivering public goods.  
 
The thesis’ finding on the agency exercised by governments in Zambia are likely to apply 
equally to low- and middle-income countries, especially in SSA.  Whereas Barnes et.al (2015) 
assert that governments in these countries have limited agency, they nevertheless do exercise 
agency, including pushing back against donors’ agenda. Some scholars blame donors for 
having so much influence in African countries, but this thesis suggests that view of outside 
imposition is too simplistic. 
Furthermore, although it is not necessarily the intention of donors to promote incumbent 
political parties in power, their funding boosts public confidence in the government, 
especially where the public are more interested in accessing improved service delivery.  It’s 







confidence about the stability of government. Therefore, it is the belief of this thesis that 
donor ideas succumb to local political contexts, not just the other way around. 
There is clearly a lot to learn from Zambia’s experiences in implementing health sector 
decentralisation policies for the last three decades. This thesis has undertaken valuable steps 
to begin filling the gaps in knowledge that exists on decentralisation and health service 
governance. It has shown that decentralisation will produce results according to the context 
that it’s subjected to. Thus, for decentralisation to produce positive outcomes for health 
services delivery, there are specific contextually relevant (f)actors that enable it to do so. But 
unquestionably, it’s not a panacea to health sector development, to reiterate Smoke (2003), 
“certainly decentralisation is not a panacea for public sector ills or a natural enemy of effective 
government. These insights generated have been backed up by empirical analysis, so they 
therefore form the fundamental basis for future research on decentralisation and health 
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Appendix Six: Details of semi-structured interviews 
Site Selection 
SN Site Reason for Selection 
1. Lusaka 
Province/District/Town 
 Capital city of Zambia where all bilateral, multilateral, 
Central Government Offices and Ministries are located. 
2. Copperbelt Province (Ndola 
& Luanshya) 
 
 Metropolitan province with a combination of Cities and 
Municipal Councils, urban and peri-urban areas 
 Previously used a combination of public and private 
service providers to deliver health services 
 
3. North-western Province 
(Solwezi & Lumwana) 
 
 Rural but one of the fastest growing provinces run by 
Municipal Councils 
 
 A growing presence of private (mine) service providers 
that deliver health services 
 
 
List of people interviewed by date and type of interviewee  
27 - February - 2019, Bureaucrat. 
2 - March - 2018, Academic. 
14 - March - 2018, Bureaucrat. 
14 - March - 2018, Bureaucrat. 
14 - March - 2018, Bureaucrat.  
15 - March - 2018, Bureaucrat. 
11 - April - 2018, Community representative. 
16 - April - 2018, Civil Society representative.   
10 - May - 2018, Politician. 
10 - May - 2018, Community representative. 
10 - May - 2018, Community representative. 
14 – May - 2018, Bureaucrat district representative  
14 – May - 2018, Multilateral agency representative 
15 - May -2018, Bureaucrat 
16 - May – 2018, Bureaucrat 
18 – May – 2018, Bureaucrat 
23 – May – 2018, Bureaucrat 
24 – May – 2018. Bureaucrat 
24 - May – 2018, Former Politician 
24 – May – 2018, Bilateral representative  
4 – June – 2018, Community representative  
4 - June - 2018, Community representative 







4 – June – 2018, Community representative  
5 – June - 2018, Bureaucrat 
12 – June – 2018, Bureaucrat  
12 - June - 2018, Bilateral representative 
12 - June – 2018, Bureaucrat 
14 – June – 2018, Bureaucrat. 
14 - June - 2018, Multilateral representative 
14 – June - 2018, Multilateral representative). 
14 – June – 2018, Bureaucrat 
15 – June – 2018, Bureaucrat. 
15 – June – 2018, Retired Bureaucrat 
16 – June – 2018, Academic representative 
16 - June – 2018, Former Bureaucrat – Political Appointment 
20 – June – 2018, Bilateral representative 
6 – July – 2018, Bureaucrat  
6 – July – 2018, Bureaucrat district level representative 
6 – June – 2018, Bureaucrat district level representative 
9 - July – 2018, Bureaucrat district level representative 
9 – July - 2018 Civil Society representative 
9 – July- 2018 Politician 
 
Examples of organisations from which interviewees were affiliated 
1. Apex university – Medical School 
2. Cabinet Office 
3. Caritas Zambia 
4. Decentralisation Secretariat 
5. Department for International Development - UK 
6. German Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) 
7. Jesuit Centre for Theological Research 
8. Kafue District Health Office 
9. Luanshya Municipal Local Council 
10. Luanshya Ward Development Committees 
11. Lusaka Ward Development Committees 
12. Lusaka District Health Office 
13. Lusaka District Ward Development Committees 
14. Ministry of Local Government and Housing 
15. Ministry of Health 
16. National Assembly of Zambia 
17. Ndola District City Council 
18. Ndola District Health Office 
19. Ndola Ward Development Committees 
20. Solwezi District Council 
21. Solwezi District Health Office  
22. Public Service Commission 







24. Transparency International Zambia 
25. World Bank 
26. World Health Organization 
 
Interview Guides. 
Interview Guide A- National Level stakeholders; Government Officials (Decentralisation Secretariat 
Staff, Ministry of Health staff & Local Government Staff), Civil Society, Donor Agency Staff, 
Politicians,    
A- Background and introductory Questions (National Level Respondents) 
Respondent Background: 
 Education, profession/discipline, title/sector involvement in decentralisation e.g. Health 
sector, education sector etc 
 Can you tell me about your professional background to date? Probe: Involvement in 
Decentralisation processes, when did you begin to get involved in decentralisation/ How did 
you get involved? 
 Have you worked in health sector decentralisation before? Probe: Have you ever worked 
outside Zambia? Any other involvement in decentralisation outside Zambia, how the 
processes are similar/different to Zambia? How decentralisation in other sectors differs from 
health sector decentralisation?  
 
     B –Understanding the delivery and management of Health Service decentralisation  
 
 How is decentralisation of health services delivered and managed? – Probe: Institutional 
architectures for delivering decentralisation and the specific policy instruments (i.e. projects, 
donor support, sector budget support, general budget support)? 
 What documents are available to guide the various decentralisation plans? Probe: how they 
are disseminated and whether relevant stakeholders do approve of them? 
 Are there consultations in the production of these documents? 
 What are the justifications for the use of particular ways of delivering and managing 
decentralisation? 
 How have decentralisation policies been implemented in Zambia specifically the health 
sector? 
 What have been the motivations for implementing health sector decentralisation? Probe 
(1992 Health Sector reforms; creation of additional districts; and 2011 realignment of 
maternal and child health services   
 How can decentralisation policies be compared, Probe: across sectors, time periods? 
 Do Zambian decentralisation policies conform to global expectations? 
 How do the different stakeholders come together to support decentralisation policies, Probe: 
role of the Decentralisation Secretariat, Parliamentary committees, Community involvement 
and the Health Sector Technical Working Groups. 
 Are there mechanism that are put in place to involve all stakeholders in decision making 
Probe: At Provincial, district and community levels 







 What worked well/ what didn’t? 
 
C- Current Decentralisation Plan  
 How different is it from the previous decentralisation attempts and plans? 
 What are the intended outcomes? 
 Will they be achieved? 
 Will staff structuring and distribution of resources be affected? If so how? 
 
 
D-  Stakeholder Management and Relationships 
 
 How do different ways of delivering and managing decentralisation policies affect the 
relationships between different actors in the Zambian health sector?  To what extent do these 
reflect the normative goal of ‘equity of health service delivery? (identify actors and how 
linked, network analysis, power/influence)  
 How do different ways of delivering and managing decentralisation plans meet the normative 
goal of ‘ownership’ of health service delivery in Zambia? How do these perform to help 
strengthen the institutional and individual capacities and management systems in Zambia to 
identify, design, monitor and coordinate their ‘own’ health services? 
 
E- Sustainability 
 What are the prospects for the long-term effectiveness for delivering decentralisation 
plans in terms of their contribution to sustainable health outcomes in Zambia? 
(recognising that sustainability is a function of ownership and capacity)  
 What were the gains in the old decentralisation policies (for respondents who have 
previously been engaged in decentralisation) 
 How different is the new decentralisation policy from the previous ones? 
 What specific objectives does the new decentralisation seek to achieve and how? 
 
F- Policy Relevance (use of decentralisation policies in managing health services) 
 Are decentralisation policies effective in managing health services in Zambia? Explain 
 What lessons can be learnt from previous decentralisation policies to contribute to a 
better understanding of how the pending decentralisation plan could be more effective 
in delivering health services in the future?  
 
Specific Questions for Donor Agency Staff. 
 
 What are the motivations behind decentralisation policies in Zambia? 
 What mainly underpins these policies? 
 How will the new decentralisation plan benefit Zambia? 
 
 
Interview Guide B- Provincial Health staff, District Commissioners, District Health Staff, District 











A- Engagement with National levels 
 Level of involvement in decentralisation design, planning, management and 
implementation Probe: channels of engagement. Degree of involvement  
 How does the planning process work? 
 Are the processes well understood? 
 Is there any support received from the national level in implementing decentralisation 
plans? 
B- Current Decentralisation plan 
 Have you been consulted on the impending decentralisation plan? What have been your 
contributions to the imminent decentralisation plan? 
 Was the consultation something you felt satisfied with? 
 
 How different is it from the previous decentralisation attempts at Provincial/District levels 
 How will it affect the staffing, resource distribution at Province and district levels? 
 Do you think the current decentralisation plan will be achievable, if yes why, if not why? 
 




 How long have you lived in this community? 
 What is your role in this community? 
 Are you aware of the changes in delivery of health services? (if yes how did you become 
aware?) Probe for awareness in local government involvement 
 Are you involved in the current transitions of health service provision? If yes, probe for 
how 
 How will the transitions affect the community? 
 Do you think health services should be managed by local councils? Probe for why 
 Do you think this will help to deliver health services in a better way? 
 Do you think this community has the ability to manage health services? If so how? 
Is there anything else you would like to add?  
 
 
